An Investigation of Emergent Perceptual Phenomena in Primates: Illusions and Biases in Decision-Making by Parrish, Audrey E
Georgia State University
ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University
Psychology Dissertations Department of Psychology
12-17-2015
An Investigation of Emergent Perceptual
Phenomena in Primates: Illusions and Biases in
Decision-Making
Audrey E. Parrish
Georgia State University
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/psych_diss
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Department of Psychology at ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Psychology Dissertations by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University. For more information,
please contact scholarworks@gsu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Parrish, Audrey E., "An Investigation of Emergent Perceptual Phenomena in Primates: Illusions and Biases in Decision-Making."
Dissertation, Georgia State University, 2015.
https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/psych_diss/146
 AN INVESTIGATION OF EMERGENT PERCEPTUAL PHENOMENA IN PRIMATES: 
ILLUSIONS AND BIASES IN DECISION-MAKING 
 
by 
 
AUDREY E. PARRISH 
 
 
Under the Direction of Michael J. Beran, PhD, and Sarah F. Brosnan, PhD 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
The perceptual system operates ideally to reveal rapidly processed, accurate and 
functional information to an organism. However, illusory phenomena emerge when there is 
discontinuity between sensory input and perception on the basis of misleading contexts. Because 
illusions emerge as a byproduct of an otherwise functional and efficient perceptual system, they 
provide a means to understand better mechanisms of perception within and across species. 
Beyond anatomical and functional similarities in the visual system across primates, nonhuman 
primate species reveal intriguing similarities in the perception of visual illusions with one 
another and humans. 
This dissertation explored visual illusions across the Order Primates, including human 
adults and children, chimpanzees, rhesus monkeys, and capuchin monkeys, with a focus on 
when, why and for whom geometric illusions emerge. Geometric illusions occur when a target’s 
perceived properties (e.g., size, shape, color) are impacted by an illusory context. Specifically, I 
focused on similarities and differences in perceptual mechanisms across primate species and on 
the role of attention in illusion emergence. I also assessed the translational impact of visual 
illusions on everyday decision-making (i.e., food-choice behavior).  
Overall, this research demonstrated that illusions are complex, and they emerged 
differently across species as a function of processing mode (i.e., global versus local processing) 
and attentional control. Further, not all illusions were perceived equally. External factors 
including illusory array design (i.e., the relationship between target and inducer stimuli) and 
testing paradigm directly impacted illusion perception.  Response competition emerged if the 
illusory array was too heavily weighted towards inducing stimuli, such that the inducers were the 
more salient element within the array relative to the target stimulus. These methodological 
challenges proved to be especially true for local processors (e.g., monkeys) that first perceived 
the individual elements within an array prior to perceiving the global figure. The manner in 
which illusions are presented to pre- and non-verbal species can constrain or perhaps create a 
scaffold for illusory perception. Comparative research as in this dissertation provides a deeper 
understanding of how context influences perception and choice and will shed light on how we 
see and subsequently interact with our world.  
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1 INTRODUCTION 
In search of solving one of life’s greatest mysteries – the human mind – we must strive to 
understand cognition and behavior, and its attendant mechanisms, to the deepest and most 
complete degree. In our best efforts to complete this mission, it is not only beneficial, but also 
mandatory, to understand how human cognition differs from that of other species. The 
comparative approach provides the unique opportunity and challenge of delving into the minds 
of nonhumans to understand better not only their unique cognition and behaviors, but also to 
understand better our own. The current dissertation adopts the comparative approach to address 
questions of perception and its fallacies and how these impact subsequent decision-making in the 
primates, both human and nonhuman. By observing which species fall prey to perceptual 
illusions and biases, we can better understand the evolution of the perceptual system and when 
perception might fail in predictable ways. 
The question of how an organism obtains and uses information from its environment has 
a long-standing history in cognitive psychology and comparative ethology. A more basic 
question of how animals see the world around them has fascinated naturalists and scientists for 
much longer. The eminent biologist and ethologist Jakob von Uexküll (1934/1957) coined the 
phrase “Umwelt” to describe an animal’s distinct phenomenal or perceptual world, noting that 
“there can be no doubt that a fundamental contrast prevails everywhere between the environment 
which we see spread around animals, and the Umwelten that are built up by the animals 
themselves and filled with the objects of their own perception.” (p. 64). Understanding a species’ 
unique construction of its external world is not an easy feat, and while we may come to 
understand what an animal sees, we may never fully understand what it experiences 
(Wasserman, 2012). Despite the challenging nature of this endeavor, comparative psychologists 
15 
have long “peered” inside the minds of animals and have made significant strides in 
understanding the private sensory worlds, or Umwelts, of multiple species, often through the use 
of noninvasive behavioral and physiological procedures (see Lazareva, Shimizu, & Wasserman, 
2012, for a review).  
Beyond the study of sensory input, the integration and use of this perceptual information 
is of interest. For example, how does an organism extract salient features from the environment 
to inform judgment and decision-making? This intersection of incoming perceptual information 
and outflowing decisional processes and behaviors is at the crux of this research program. In the 
current series of studies, I will investigate nonhuman primate perceptual phenomena to 
understand better how animals gather information from and subsequently interact with the world 
around them. Beyond basic perceptual processes, I am interested in emergent perceptual 
phenomena, including illusions and biases that sometimes lead to sub-optimal judgment and 
decision-making within this domain. Here, I argue that perceptual biases and visual illusions 
emerge from the exact properties of the stimuli themselves (i.e., bottom-up processes based on 
the information extracted from the visual array itself; Gibson, 1979) and from internal heuristics 
that guide decision-making (i.e., top-down processes based on memory, expectations, past-
experiences, etc.; Neisser, 1976, and see Washburn, 2007).  
The objective for this set of studies is to investigate context effects on judgment and 
decision-making in the perceptual domain across primates. More specifically, I will investigate 
biases in the perception of size and quantity as produced by geometric illusions. Furthermore, I 
will address how these illusions might be impacted by the manipulation of attention towards 
different aspects within the visual array. Finally, I will investigate how these perceptual biases 
influence subsequent behavior in the action domain. I begin with an introduction to the 
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experimental study of perception and a literature review on visual illusions with a focus on 
comparative research. Next, I discuss the critical role of experimental design and visual 
processing modes in the emergence of these illusions across multiple species, and how they may 
interact to impact illusory percept formation. Finally, I introduce the future studies that will 
extend and contribute to this extant body of knowledge.  
1.1 Literature Review 
1.1.1 Perception 
The study of cognition often begins with an in-depth investigation into perception, a 
process by which incoming sensory stimuli from the environment are analyzed by the visual 
system, or other sensory modalities appropriate for the species under investigation (i.e., a 
species-typical Umwelt). Perceptual processes are often rapid and may even occur outside of 
conscious awareness. Although a seemingly simplistic component of cognition, perception relies 
on a crucial interplay between incoming stimulation from the environment (bottom-up processes) 
and extant knowledge and cognitive mechanisms that aid recognition and identification of 
incoming data (top-down processes). The perceptual system typically operates to reveal rapidly 
processed, accurate and functional information to the organism; however, illusory phenomena 
may emerge when there is discontinuity in sensory input and perception on the basis of 
misleading or altered contexts.  
1.1.2 Visual Illusions 
The study of cognition often begins with an in-depth investigation into perception, a 
process by which incoming sensory stimuli from the environment are analyzed by the visual 
system, or other sensory modalities appropriate for the species under investigation (i.e., a 
species-typical Umwelt). Perceptual processes are often rapid and may even occur outside of 
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conscious awareness. Although a seemingly simplistic component of cognition, perception relies 
on a crucial interplay between incoming stimulation from the environment (bottom-up processes) 
and extant knowledge and cognitive mechanisms that aid recognition and identification of 
incoming data (top-down processes). The perceptual system typically operates to reveal rapidly 
processed, accurate and functional information to the organism; however, illusory phenomena 
may emerge when there is discontinuity in sensory input and perception on the basis of 
misleading or altered contexts.  
1.1.2 Visual Illusions 
As visual creatures, seeing is our window into the world, and vision provides us with 
much of the information we use to interact with our world, attend to its features, memorize its 
content, form associations about its events, learn from its contingencies, and problem solve when 
faced with its uncertainties. Through experience, we come to rely on the veridical nature of 
sensory input such that information is expected to arrive not only quickly, but also accurately. 
Coren and Girgus (1978) referenced the common phrase that “seeing is believing” to highlight 
the dependence that we have on accurate depictions of our real world environment. When our 
conscious percept does not align with physical reality, it is important to uncover the causes of 
such errors. The study of visual illusions began in the mid-19th century, shortly before the formal 
recognition of psychology as a separate discipline distinct from physiology and philosophy 
(Robinson, 1972). The Oppel-Kundt illusion was the first established visual illusion in the 
psychological sciences whereby a divided space appears longer than an undivided space; see 
Figure 1 (Oppel, 1854). From this work, Oppel coined the concept of geometrisch-optishe 
taushung, which roughly translates to geometrical optical illusion, and thus began the systematic 
study of visual illusions.  
18 
A variety of geometric illusions quickly emerged thereafter, the majority of which are 2-
dimensional patterns distorting perceived size or distance and typically named after their 
originator (e.g., Baldwin illusion: Baldwin, 1895; Delboeuf illusion: Delboeuf, 1892; 
Ebbinghaus-Titchener illusion: Ebbinghaus, 1902; Mueller-Lyer illusion: Mueller-Lyer, 1889; 
Ponzo illusion: Ponzo, 1928; Zöllner illusion: Zöllner, 1860); see Figure 1. These early illusions 
often were touted more as curiosities or entertaining by-products of perceptual fallibility rather 
than important scientific phenomena. However, visual illusions have become a major topic 
within the perceptual sciences and a subfield of its own among cognitive psychologists. To date, 
there are well over 1,000 papers on visual illusions documenting their existence and their 
underlying causal mechanisms within multiple species.  
Visual illusions are not merely academic in nature, but they also have strong implications 
for interactions with the external world, interfering with the perception of one’s natural 
environment. In the mid 1700’s, the astronomer Robert Smith outlined naturally occurring 
illusory phenomena, citing size contrast effects by which animals or objects in a distant valley 
appear much smaller than their true size or whereby a large, distant city or landmark appears 
closer than its true distance (Smith, 1739). Similar depth phenomena are deliberately used in 
traffic control so that people overestimate their speed and subsequently decelerate on the basis of 
road marking design and misperception (Denton, 1971). Moreover, there are multiple examples 
of airplane accidents as a result of the misperception of height or distance by pilots (e.g., the fatal 
plane crash of a Boeing 707 and an Eastern Airlines Lockheed 1049C in 1965; Coren & Girgus, 
1978). Some of the oldest uses of illusions in everyday settings involve architectural design (e.g., 
the Grecian Parthenon which made use of convex and bowed features to enhance its perceived 
size; Luckiesh, 1922). A more pertinent and perhaps costly byproduct of visual illusions is their 
19 
common use in advertising and marketing. The shape of bottles and food packages are often 
designed so that they appear larger or fuller, influencing market prices and spending trends (e.g., 
Wansink, 2006). Thus, illusions are not limited to laboratory line drawings but are quite 
commonplace in the world that we inhabit and even may lead to serious mistakes in perception 
and behavior, emphasizing the need to understand when, why, and for whom these errors are 
most likely to occur. 
Documenting and describing the shortcomings of any system allows one to understand 
better the system itself. The study of visual illusions is akin to the study of errors and biases in a 
heuristics-based system (e.g., Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996; Gilovich, Griffin, & Kahneman, 
2002). Like the errors that arise from the misapplication of heuristics, illusions can be considered 
systematic errors that arise from the inappropriate application of some perceptual mechanisms 
(Robinson, 1972). This same research has referenced visual illusions as test instruments used to 
uncover the accuracy of the perceptual system from which other cognitive processes are built. 
Hermann von Helmholtz, a key contributor to the field of perception and vision in the 1800s, 
argued that the study of visual illusions plays a pivotal role in understanding the cognitive 
mechanisms underlying perception (e.g., Helmholtz, 1856). The sentiment of investigating 
perceptual errors to understand better perceptual functioning and visual cognition has since been 
reflected among many psychologists. 
1.1.2.1 Illusions Classified   
In the endeavor to understand better visual illusions and their attendant mechanisms, it is 
useful to organize the countless illusory percepts into general categories. Here, I will focus on 
the classification system devised by Coren and Girgus (1978) that largely is in agreement with 
the earliest division of illusions based on the type of figure distortion (Boring, 1942). Four major 
20 
classes of visual illusions are identified, including [1] limitations in sensitivity of the receptive 
organ, [2] direct distortion of stimulus input, [3] systematic perceptual errors, and [4] visual 
illusions. The first two classes represent actual distortions of visual input via structural errors 
(e.g., malfunctions within the eye itself) or direct manipulations of physical stimuli (e.g., via 
magnifying lens).  The third class of perceptual errors e.g., brightness contrasts) are widespread 
across humans and other species, whereas the fourth class of illusions represent an inexplicable 
discrepancy between perception and reality and may or may not be universal among all humans 
or across all species (e.g., illusory patterns). 
The current work will focus on the fourth class of visual illusions, which are also known 
as geometric illusions that emerge when a target’s perceived physical properties (e.g., size, 
shape, length, width, diameter, orientation, etc.) are distorted on the basis of the target’s 
surrounding figural context.  These are further subdivided according to the nature of the 
distortion (i.e., distortions of direction or size; see Figure 1). Direction illusions occur when the 
perceived shape or orientation of a given figure is misperceived (e.g., Zöllner illusion, 
Poggendorff illusion, Twisted Cord illusion, Kindergarten illusion, etc.). Size illusions occur 
when line length is distorted (e.g., Oppel-Kundt illusion, Horizontal-Vertical illusion, Mueller-
Lyer illusion, Baldwin illusion, Ponzo illusion, etc.) or when area is distorted via the target’s 
interaction with contextual elements (e.g., Ebbinghaus-Titchener illusion, Delboeuf illusion, 
Jastrow illusion, etc.). The current studies will focus on those illusory phenomena that result in 
the misperceptions of size (i.e., Ebbinghaus-Titchener illusion, Delboeuf illusion, Baldwin 
illusion).  
21 
1.1.3 Illusions in Animals 
Mechanisms that facilitate fast and accurate visual perception would presumably have 
high ecological validity among visual organisms and would be under strong selective pressure in 
a range of species (Agrillo, Petrazzini, & Dadda, 2013). Thus, there is a long-standing history 
within comparative psychology regarding how nonhuman animals whose primary sensory 
modality is vision perceive and categorize features within their environment. Comparative 
research in the perceptual domain covers a wide range of topics from early to late visual 
processes, such as perceptual grouping and segmentation, visual motion and depth perception, 
and the role of visual attention in perception (see Lazareva et al., 2012, for a review). 
Importantly, it is not only understanding when the visual system provides an accurate depiction 
of the external world, but also understanding when perception ‘fails,’ or leads to errors and 
biases that can reveal critical information on the organization and functioning of vision between 
species. Thus, the comparative study of visual illusions among nonhuman animals has emerged 
as an important sub-field within comparative cognition.  
Although human studies of visual illusions are vastly more numerous in the field of 
perception, comparative investigations of illusory phenomena recently have gained momentum 
and increased in number. Interestingly, my own evaluation of the limited number of book 
reviews on visual illusions revealed virtually no discussion of animal research, sometimes 
dismissing the comparative approach altogether on the basis of the difficulty in testing nonverbal 
subjects (Coren & Girgus, 1978; Gregory, 2009; Luckiesh, 1922; Robinson, 1972). In the earliest 
review, animal illusions were discussed as a byproduct of the animal itself (i.e., the evolution of 
camouflage in some species), rather than the actual perception of illusions by animals (Luckiesh, 
1922). Subsequently, comparative studies on visual illusions began as a justification for using 
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animal models to study physiological and structural factors of the visual system, including those 
that may be critical to illusion formation (Coren & Girgus, 1978). Current research on visual 
illusions in animals has expanded and now includes a range of species in an attempt to 
understand better the perception of complex stimuli and illusory phenomena within the organism 
itself. Comparative evidence of repeated and analogous responses to visual illusions within and 
between species, including humans, may reveal similarities across visual systems (Wasserman, 
2012). 
Comparative research, regardless of the topic area, has the challenge of investigating 
psychological phenomena without the use of verbal reporting. Moreover, perception research 
tests the subjective experience of an animal’s sensory system, which can vary greatly within and 
between species. One such procedure for understanding the perceptual world of a nonhuman 
animal (or human) is through the use of psychophysics, which allows comparative psychologists 
to quantify the sensory experiences of non-verbal animals as they compare to humans or to other 
nonhuman species (Blough & Blough, 1977). A variety of psychophysical methods are used to 
establish the perception of the relative sensory quality of stimuli (e.g., larger or smaller, brighter 
or dimmer, etc.) or absolute detection of stimuli (e.g., presence or absence). An absolute 
threshold is established by calculating the average point between which a stimulus is no longer 
detected (0%) and when it is perfectly detected (100%), or by calculating the point of subjective 
equality (PSE) at which two stimuli are no longer distinguishable in a relative judgment. These 
psychophysical methods allow for the construction of an animal’s subjective experiences that are 
otherwise inaccessible, including illusory percepts, by generating reports from the animals of 
what they do (or do not) perceive. 
23 
To date, a large number of illusory patterns have been studied among a wide range of 
animals using psychophysical procedures. Many early studies focused on documentation of 
visual illusions among avian species, which continue to provide a major contribution to the 
literature today, including the Ebbinghaus-Titchener illusion (Columbidae: Nakamura, 
Watanabe, & Fujita, 2008; Gallus gallus: Ducker, 1966; Rosa Salva, Rugani, Cavazzana, 
Regolin, Vallortigara, 2013), the Jastrow illusion (Gallus gallus: Revesz, 1924), the Mueller-
Lyer illusion (Columbidae: Malott & Malott, 1970; Malott, Malott, & Pokrzywinski, 1967; 
Nakamura, Fujita, Ushitani, & Miyata, 2006; Nakamura, Fujita, & Watanabe, 2009; Psittacus 
erithacus: Pepperberg, Vicinay, & Cavanagh, 2008; Turtur risorius: Warden & Baar, 1929), the 
Horizontal-Vertical illusion (Gallus gallus: Winslow, 1933), the Ponzo illusion (Columbidae: 
Fujita, Blough & Blough, 1991, 1993) and the Zöllner illusion (Columbidae: Watanabe, 
Nakamura, & Fujita, 2011, 2013; Gallus gallus: Ducker, 1966; Watanabe, Nakamura, & Fujita, 
2013). Recently, the study of visual illusions also has been expanded to the study of fish to 
illustrate even further continuity between human perception and distantly related animal species 
(e.g., Darmaillacq, Dickel, Rahmani, & Shashar, 2011; Sovrano & Bisazza, 2008, 2009; Wyzisk 
& Neumeyer, 2007; see Agrillo et al., 2013, for a review).  
Additionally, mammalian species have been tested on a number of visual illusions, 
including the Horizontal-Vertical illusion (Cercopithecinae and Cebus: Dominguez, 1954), the 
Zöllner illusion (Macaca mulatta: Agrillo, Parrish, & Beran, 2014; Papio papio: Benhar & 
Samuel, 1982), the Ebbinghaus-Titchener illusion (Papio papio: Parron & Fagot, 2007; Tursiops 
truncatus: Murayama, Usui, Takeda, Kato, & Maejima, 2012), the Ponzo illusion (Equus: 
Timney & Keil, 1996; Macaca mulatta: Bayne & Davis, 1993; Fujita, 1996; Pan troglodytes: 
Fujita, 1997, 2001), the Mueller-Lyer illusion (Cebus apella: Suganuma, Pessoa, Monge-
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Fuentes, Castro, & Tavares, 2007), the Duncker illusion (Macaca mulatta: Zivotofsky, 
Goldberg, & Powell, 2005), the Oppel-Kundt illusion (Rattus: Ducharme, Delorme & Boulard, 
1967), the Delboeuf illusion (Pan troglodytes: Parrish & Beran, 2014a), the rectangle illusion 
(Cercopithecinae and Cebus: Dominquez, 1954; Harris, 1968) and the corridor illusion (Papio 
papio: Barbet & Fagot, 2002; Pan troglodytes: Imura, Tomonaga, & Yagi, 2008).  Overall, this 
comparative research reveals similarities of illusory perception across several nonhuman animal 
species and humans, and also reveals interesting differences that appear to be the byproduct of 
the species’ unique visual systems and important experimental effects. 
1.1.3.1 Primate Perception 
The vast majority of comparative visual illusion research has been conducted with 
nonhuman primates, which are the focus of the current work. Nonhuman primates provide a 
unique and invaluable resource for understanding perceptual processing and visual cognition in 
humans as they share similar functional and anatomical visual pathways. The reduced reliance on 
olfactory sensory information with the increased dependence on perceptual processing of visual 
information represents one of the defining characteristics of the Order Primates, and a critical 
shift in how monkeys and apes perceived their worlds compared to some other mammals. This 
shift to predominantly visual sensory input led to a reduction in snout size and stereoscopic 
vision denoted by large, forward-facing eyes that allowed for accurate depth perception via the 
overlap of vision from each eye (Strier, 2007). An astute visual system marked by accurate depth 
perception would have obvious advantages in the evolution of primates as they navigated an 
arboreal world and fed on small, fast-moving insects (Sussman, 1999).  
Anatomically and functionally, the visual systems of human and nonhuman primates are 
highly congruent, with few major differences in the primary and secondary visual pathways 
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(Ungerleider & Mishkin, 1982; see Matsuno & Fujita, 2009 for a review). The visual systems of 
monkeys and humans are similar in the range of their visual field, detection of fine details via 
visual angle, and retinal sensitivity to fast stimulus changes (e.g., De Valois & De Valois, 1988; 
Fagot & Deruelle, 1997; Fobes & King, 1982; Weinstein & Grether, 1940; Wilson, Lavallee, 
Joossee, Hendrickson, Boothe, & Harwerth, 1989). Chimpanzees’ visual acuity in response to 
color and form perception matches with that of Old World monkeys and humans, suggesting 
strong phylogenetic continuity of the primate visual system (e.g., Essock, 1977; Fobes & King, 
1982; Grether, 1941; Matsuno, Kawai, & Matsuzawa, 2004; Matsuzawa, 1990). Thus, nonhuman 
primate perception provides an exceptional model of human visual cognition, and unsurprisingly, 
has a longstanding history in comparative psychology (for reviews, see Lazareva, et al., 2012; 
Roitblat, 1987; Wasserman, 1993).  
1.1.3.2 Geometric Illusions in Primates 
Nonhuman primates perceive a range of geometric illusions, many in the same direction 
and to the same extent as humans. Several illusions have received extensive attention in the 
comparative literature, with efforts to understand better their attendant mechanisms and how they 
manifest across multiple primate species. One example is the Ponzo illusion, in which identical 
horizontal lines situated between two converging lines appear unequal in length such that the line 
closer to the converging apex is perceived as longer than the line further from the apex (see 
Figure 1H). Fujita and colleagues studied this illusion extensively in pigeons and several primate 
species, including humans, chimpanzees, and rhesus monkeys, and demonstrated strong 
continuity in illusion perception across these species (Fujita, 1996, 1997; Fujita, Blough, & 
Blough, 1991, 1993). Other geometric illusions, including the Zöllner, Horizontal-Vertical, 
Mueller-Lyer, and corridor illusions are perceived similarly among monkeys and humans, 
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providing further support for homologous visual pathways among primates (Agrillo et al., 2014; 
Barbet & Fagot, 2002; Benhar & Samuel, 1982; Dominguez, 1954; Suganuma et al., 2007). 
Although these studies provide evidence indicative of continuity in the perception of 
illusory phenomena across primates, evidence to the contrary also exists. An interesting case 
includes the comparative study of the well-known Ebbinghaus-Titchener illusion, which is one 
of the most extensively studied and robust size illusions among human subjects (e.g., Coren & 
Enns, 1993; Girgus, Coren, & Agdern, 1972; Massaro & Anderson, 1971; Weintraub, 1979). In 
this illusion and the related Delboeuf illusion, a target circle is embedded within one (Delboeuf) 
or multiple (Ebbinghaus-Titchener) inducing circles of variable size, which in turn directly 
impacts the perception of target circle diameter (see Figure 1A and Figure 1D).  
Although the Ebbinghaus-Titchener and Delboeuf illusions and their underlying 
mechanisms are well studied among humans, there is rather limited comparative research 
regarding the perception of either of these illusory patterns in other primates. In fact, there is 
only one study of each of these illusions in nonhuman primates, with each study leading to a 
different pattern of results. The first study on the Ebbinghaus-Titchener illusion indicated that 
baboons did not perceive the illusion in a human-like fashion (Parron & Fagot, 2007), whereas 
the second study on the Delboeuf illusion indicated that chimpanzees did perceive the illusion as 
humans do (Parrish & Beran, 2014a). To muddle the story further, there are three additional 
comparative studies on the Ebbinghaus-Titchener illusion, including two among avian species 
that also lead to conflicting results, with domestic chicks perceiving the illusion as humans do 
(Rosa Salva et al., 2013), but pigeons perceiving an opposite pattern from humans (Nakamura et 
al., 2008). The third study found positive evidence for the illusion in a human-like fashion in a 
single bottlenose dolphin (Murayama et al., 2012). The limited number of comparative studies, 
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and the variability among the results, is striking given the extensive attention to these illusions in 
the human literature and the similarities between human and animals in other geometric size 
illusions. 
In the current set of studies, I will explore the perception (or lack of perception) of the 
Ebbinghaus-Titchener and Delboeuf illusions across primates, with a focus on the factors that 
may lead to differences in illusion emergence. Uncovering similarities in the perception of 
illusory phenomena among primates has clear advantages and can suggest potential homologies 
between species. Beyond documentation of similarities in illusion perception, it is also necessary 
to investigate when and why key differences emerge. In the following sections, I will expand the 
discussion of the Ebbinghaus-Titchener and Delboeuf illusions, including coverage of their 
underlying mechanisms. Subsequently, I will consider the potential role of species’ unique visual 
systems and key experimental differences that may lead to differences in reported illusion 
perception or non-perception. Finally, I will offer a series of experimental studies that will test 
these specific predictions among a range of primate species.  
1.1.4 Ebbinghaus-Titchener Illusion and Delboeuf Illusion 
The Delboeuf illusion occurs when the size of two identical target circles are 
misperceived on the basis of one concentric circle surrounding the target (Delboeuf, 1865). A 
target circle enclosed in a smaller concentric circle is perceived to be larger than the same-sized 
target circle enclosed in a larger concentric circle (see Figure 1A). Similarly, the Ebbinghaus-
Titchener illusion occurs when the diameter of two identical target circles are misperceived on 
the basis of multiple inducing circles (Ebbinghaus, 1902; Titchener, 1901). Similar to the 
Delboeuf illusion, in the Ebbinghaus-Titchener illusion, target circle diameter is overestimated 
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when embedded within multiple smaller inducing circles and, inversely, target diameter is 
underestimated when embedded within multiple larger inducing circles (see Figure 1D). 
The Ebbinghaus-Titchener and Delboeuf illusions are two of most robust geometric size 
illusions and have been the focus of an extensive experimental history within the field of human 
cognition (e.g., Delboeuf illusion: Coren & Girgus, 1978; Delboeuf, 1865; Nicolas, 1995; 
Oyama, 1960; Van Ittersum & Wansink, 2012; Ward & Lockhead, 1970, 1971; Ebbinghaus-
Titchener illusion: Aglioti, De Souza, & Goodale, 1995; Coren & Enns, 1993; Choplin & Medin, 
1999; Ebbinghaus, 1902; Girgus et al., 1972; Massaro & Anderson, 1971; Titchener, 1901; 
Weintraub, 1979). In addition to the extensive literature on adult subjects, both illusions 
spontaneously emerge in young children and infants (e.g., Kaldy & Kovacs, 2003; Piaget, 
Lamercier, Boesch, & von Albertini, 1942; Weintraub, 1979; Weintraub & Cooper, 1972; 
Yamazaki, Otsuka, Kanazawa, & Yamaguchi, 2010; Zanuttini, 1996). Beyond just demonstrating 
the existence of these illusions, much work has been done to document and describe the 
mechanisms that produce these illusions (e.g., Girgus et al., 1972; Morinaga & Noguchi, 1966; 
Weintraub, 1979). 
1.1.4.1 Pool-and-Store Theory: Contrast and Assimilation    
The Ebbinghaus-Titchener and Delboeuf illusions are often explained in light of the Pool-
and-Store Model that incorporates the cognitive mechanisms of contrast and assimilation (Coren 
& Girgus, 1978; Goto, Uchiyama, Imai, Takahashi, Hanari, Nakamura, & Kobari, 2007; Jaeger 
& Lorden, 1980; Nicolas, 1995; Oyama, 1960; Roberts, Harris, & Yates, 2005; Ward & 
Lockhead, 1970, 1971). For these size illusions, there is a direct relationship between illusion 
magnitude and the ability to group or simultaneously process elements within the array (Parron 
& Fagot, 2007; Roberts et al., 2005). The distance between target and inducing circle(s) directly 
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impacts processing such that closer elements (i.e., higher density, lower inter-elemental distance 
between target and inducers) leads to a stronger illusion (Martin, 1979; Roberts, et al., 2005).   
Contrast and assimilation can account for the relationship between illusion magnitude 
and array density. When the target and inducing circle(s) are similar in size and/or are proximally 
positioned, they are pooled in the visual system as one entity (Morinaga, 1956). The gap between 
the inner and outer circles is relatively small, leading the perceiver holistically to pool these 
individual elements (Girgus & Coren, 1982). This phenomenon, also known as assimilation, 
results in the overestimation of inner target size relative to an identical target. Contrary to this, 
when the gap between the inner and outer circles is relatively large and thus the circles are 
dissimilar in size and/or distally positioned, the actual difference between the two elements is 
exaggerated and they are perceived as distinct entities (Weintraub, Wilson, Greene, & Palmquist, 
1969). This phenomenon is known as contrast, which creates the illusion that the inner target is 
smaller than it actually is, resulting in the underestimation of size relative to an identical target 
(Pollack, 1964). Although there is some variation in the effects of contrast and assimilation 
(Nicolas, 1995), there is an optimal ratio at which each effect can be predicted to occur (also 
known as Morinaga’s Optimum Ratio; Morinaga, 1956; Oyama, 1960). Contrast, or 
underestimation of the target circle, is most likely to occur when the ratio between circles equals 
0.33 (Ogasawara, 1952). Assimilation, or the overestimation of target diameter, is most likely to 
occur at a ratio of 0.67 (Piaget et al., 1942).   
Furthermore, the extent to which the stimuli in a given set (both target and inducers) can 
be seen together in one glance or fixation (i.e., visual extent) predicts whether assimilation or 
contrast will occur (Coren & Girgus, 1978). If multiple visual glances are required to perceive all 
elements in an array (as is predicted by their proximity or the overall size of the array), contrast 
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is likely to occur as each entity is held as a separate percept and their differences are accentuated. 
Conversely, if the entire array (both target and inducers) is seen in one glance as is facilitated by 
close proximity, assimilation occurs in which the differences between elements is reduced and 
they are perceived as one entity.  
Interestingly, the emergence and magnitude of the Ebbinghaus-Titchener and Delboeuf 
illusions are sensitive to experimental manipulations of stimuli properties. Specifically, the 
effects of contrast and assimilation are reduced when target and inducer features are altered so 
that one increases in salience over the other (e.g., Oyama, 1960; Rabin & Adams, 1993; 
Weintraub & Schneck, 1986). For example, in the Ebbinghaus-Titchener illusion, reducing the 
brightness, and subsequent salience, of the inducing circles decreases the illusion magnitude 
(Oyama, 1962; Weintraub & Cooper, 1972). A similar diminished effect is seen in the Delboeuf 
illusion by decreasing the brightness of the inducing circle (Weintraub et al., 1969). Moreover, 
increasing the number, and subsequent salience, of inducing circles increases the magnitude of 
the Ebbinghaus-Titchener illusion (Massaro & Anderson, 1970; Oyama, 1960). Along with 
increasing the salience of either the target or inducer, increasing their differences also impacts 
illusion emergence. For example, using incongruent shapes for the target and inducing stimuli 
decreased the strength of the Ebbinghaus-Titchener illusion, whereas using congruent shapes 
increased the illusion (e.g., Coren & Enns, 1993; Coren & Miller, 1974). These results taken 
together imply that highlighting the differences between target and inducer reduces the 
likelihood that the elements will be grouped together, thus reducing the likelihood for illusion 
emergence.  
These results in combination with studies on the underlying mechanisms for the 
Ebbinghaus-Titchener and Delboeuf illusions suggest a critical interplay between individual 
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elements within an array. If target and inducer(s) are close enough in space to one another, they 
are pooled together leading to the overestimation of target size. Conversely, if target and 
inducer(s) are distant enough from one another, contrast occurs leading to the underestimation of 
target size. If either element (target or inducers) is emphasized, the typical illusory pattern is 
disrupted. Specifically, highlighting the target under judgment decreases illusion magnitude and 
increases accuracy, whereas highlighting the illusory inducing elements increases illusion 
magnitude.  
1.1.4.2 Comparative Evidence for the Delboeuf Illusion  
Despite the extensive research on the Ebbinghaus-Titchener and Delboeuf illusions 
among humans, there has been relatively limited comparative research on these patterns among 
nonhuman animals.  To date, there is only one nonhuman animal study on the Delboeuf illusion, 
in chimpanzees (Parrish & Beran, 2014a). This work was motivated by the human consumption 
literature, in which food portion estimation and intake is directly related to the misperception of 
quantity as a function of dish size. Van Ittersum and Wansink (2012) reported an experimental 
analysis of the Delboeuf illusion in humans as it manifested in a food quantity judgment and 
serving task. People judged identical food portions to be larger when plated on a small dish and 
smaller when plated on a large dish. Moreover, subjects over-served onto (and over-consumed 
from) large plates but under-served onto (and under-consumed from) small plates. These 
findings were replicated with chimpanzees; although the apes were highly accurate in relative 
quantity judgments when different food portions were displayed on identically sized plates, the 
chimpanzees judged identical or even smaller food portions to be larger if they were plated on a 
small dish than an identical or larger portion of food on a large dish (Parrish & Beran, 2014a). 
32 
These results are explained in light of the Delboeuf illusion such that the size of the target 
circle (food portion) was misperceived on the basis of the surrounding context (plate). In these 
cases, assimilation can be explained by the fact that the gap between the plate edge and the food 
was relatively small, and thus the difference between the two was minimized, and potentially 
perceived as one entity. Contrary to this, large plates led to the underestimation and over-
consumption of food because the gap between the plate edge and food was larger, leading to a 
contrast effect in which the difference between the two entities was exaggerated.  These results 
suggest continuity in the perception of the Delboeuf illusion between chimpanzees and humans. 
1.1.4.3 Comparative Evidence for the Ebbinghaus-Titchener Illusion  
Similar to the Delboeuf illusion, there is rather limited comparative research on the 
Ebbinghaus-Titchener illusion. Thus far, four nonhuman animal species have been tested on the 
Ebbinghaus-Titchener illusion: baboons, dolphins, pigeons, and chicks. Interestingly, the only 
positive evidence of a human-like illusory pattern is from a dolphin and four-day-old domestic 
chicks (Murayama et al., 2012; Rosa Salva et al., 2013). Baboons apparently do not perceive the 
illusion, accurately judging target circle size without being influenced by surrounding inducers 
(Parron & Fagot, 2007), and a reversed illusion from the typical human pattern was found among 
pigeons in which small (or large) inducers resulted in the underestimation (or overestimation) of 
target size (Nakamura et al., 2008).  
The null and negative effects among baboons and pigeons led the authors to suggest that 
perhaps the neural substrate necessary for perceiving the illusion was lacking among avian 
species and Old World monkeys, evolving late in the primate lineage (see Parron & Fagot, 
2007). However, the recent evidence in domestic chicks and the dolphin challenges this 
hypothesis. The chick and dolphin data may suggest analogous visual pathways in which the 
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necessary neural substrate for perceiving this illusion would have evolved independently in these 
phylogenetically distant species (see Rosa Salva et al., 2013). Instead, perhaps these 
contradictory findings illustrate a more complicated picture in which variable results are a 
byproduct of differences among the experimental paradigms (e.g., in training procedures or 
stimuli used). The null results found in baboons for the Ebbinghaus-Titchener illusion are also 
interesting given our recent positive evidence for the Delboeuf illusion among chimpanzees 
(Parrish & Beran, 2014a). The perception of the very similar Delboeuf illusion, but not the 
Ebbinghaus-Titchener illusion, within closely related primate species warrants additional 
research.   
1.1.5 Comparative Variance Explored 
The evident variability in the perception of these two closely related illusions is 
suggestive of differences among species’ visual cognition. This variance also may be a 
byproduct of experimental design, or perhaps an important combination of the two. Here, I argue 
that the mixed results are motivated by the interplay of the species’ biology (e.g., their unique 
visual systems) and, importantly, the experimental paradigm used (e.g., training procedure and 
stimuli design). Human research has demonstrated that differential attention (via instructional or 
design cues) to target and inducing elements within an array can lead to critical differences in 
illusion direction and magnitude (e.g., Massaro & Anderson, 1970; Oyama, 1960, 1962; 
Weintraub & Cooper, 1972; Weintraub & Schneck, 1986). Moreover, visual processing mode 
plays a key role in grouping mechanisms and the temporal focus of perception between the entire 
array and the individual elements within the array, further impacting illusion emergence. I will 
introduce each of these components separately and then discuss how they may converge to 
34 
explain the variability within the comparative literature regarding the Ebbinghaus-Titchener and 
Delboeuf illusions. 
1.1.5.1 Variance Explained via Experimental Paradigm 
Geometric illusions emerge as a result of the interaction between figural elements within 
an array, including the target stimulus and the inducing context. The target’s parameter of 
interest (e.g., size, direction, distance, etc.) may be misperceived on the basis of other 
components within the array, giving rise to the illusory percept. A large amount of evidence 
suggests that differential attention to these various elements (target or context) leads to 
differences in the perception and magnitude of many geometric illusions. Furthermore, 
differential attention may lead to the complete elimination or even reversal of some illusory 
phenomena.  
A number of early studies on human perception of visual illusions demonstrated that 
verbal instructions to ignore the illusory inducing context and focus on the parameter of interest 
or target stimulus led to a decrease in illusion perception. Bates (1923) demonstrated an 
elimination and even reversal of the Mueller-Lyer illusion after he instructed subjects to focus on 
the target (horizontal line) and ignore the illusory-inducing stimuli (fins). A similar effect was 
found with the Delboeuf circles; the illusion was greatly reduced and even eliminated for some 
subjects after they were instructed to ignore the concentric circle and focus on the target circle 
(Restle, 1971). Similar results were noted in the absence of direct instruction; Gardner and Long 
(1961) found a decrease in the magnitude of the Mueller-Lyer illusion if subjects simply 
concentrated on the target stimulus. 
Beyond verbal instruction, the magnitude and direction of several illusions are impacted 
via simple element manipulation. Manipulating stimuli brightness (via contrast), color, and 
35 
distance effectively influences illusion perception. Several investigators have documented that 
focused attention on the target via contrast or color manipulation led to a decrease in illusion 
magnitude and direction, whereas increased attention to the context led to an increase in illusion 
magnitude (e.g., Kindergarten illusion: Lipps, 1897; Muensterberg, 1897; Mueller-Lyer: Coren 
& Girgus, 1972; Dewar, 1967; Ebert & Pollack, 1972, 1973; Pollack & Chaplin, 1964; Delboeuf 
illusion: Oyama, 1962; Weintraub & Cooper, 1972; Weintraub et al., 1969). In several studies, 
the magnitude of the Ebbinghaus-Titchener illusion decreased if one isolated the target circle by 
increasing the distance between the target and inducers (Girgus et al., 1972; Martin, 1979; 
Morinaga & Noguchi, 1966; Weintraub, 1979). Alternatively, illusion magnitude increased if 
one focused on the inducing circles by increasing the number (and subsequent density) of 
inducers (Girgus et al., 1972; Massaro & Anderson, 1971; Morinaga, 1956; Yamazaki et al., 
2010). Overall, then, illusion magnitude and direction decreases when the target stimulus is 
focused upon and, conversely, illusion magnitude increases when the surrounding context or 
illusory-inducing elements are the focus.  
1.1.5.2 Variance Explained via Visual Processing Mode 
In addition to experimental manipulation, the visual processing mode of multi-component 
figures (not limited to illusory figures) also influences the perception and grouping of separate 
components within a visual array. The perception of complex figures (i.e., those comprised of 
multiple elements) is hierarchically organized such that figures are processed at the overall group 
level and at the individual element level. Depending upon the temporal development or order of 
processing, a precedence effect emerges in which the group configuration (global precedence) or 
the individual elements (local precedence) are first processed.  For humans, a robust global 
precedence emerges in which the overall configuration is first processed, followed by the 
36 
individual elements that comprise the object (e.g., Broadbent, 1977; Kimchi, 1992; Lamb & 
Robertson, 1988; Navon, 1977, 1981). This global-to-local perception of objects is facilitated by 
perceptual principles, such as the Gestalt laws by which certain properties of the figure (e.g., 
similarity, proximity, etc.) enhance the grouping of individual elements into a cohesive object 
(Koffka, 1935; Wertheimer, 1923). Conversely, a local precedence emerges if an organism first 
processes the individual elements prior to the overall configuration.  
Despite evidence of a rather robust global precedence among humans, comparative 
evidence among nonhuman primates is much less consistent (see Matsuno & Fujita, 2009, and 
Fagot, Barbet, & Parron, 2012, for reviews). Fagot and colleagues’ initial work on perceptual 
grouping by baboons (Papio papio) replicated the experimental studies from the classic Navon 
(1977) human research. These studies demonstrated multiple lines of evidence for a local 
precedence among baboons in which monkeys first attended to local elements prior to the overall 
group configuration (Deruelle & Fagot, 1997, 1998; Fagot & Deruelle, 1997; Fagot, Tomonaga, 
& Deruelle, 2001; Parron & Fagot, 2007). A local-to-global processing mode has since been 
documented among other primates including rhesus macaques (Hopkins & Washburn, 2002), 
capuchin monkeys (De Lillo, Spinozzi, Truppa, & Naylor, 2005; Spinozzi, De Lillo, & Salvi, 
2006; Spinozzi, De Lillo, & Truppa, 2003), and some chimpanzees (Fagot & Tomonaga, 1999; 
Matsuno & Tomonaga, 2007). However, these results are not ubiquitous, as some primates 
demonstrate a human-like global precedence effect, including cotton-top tamarins (Neiworth, 
Gleichman, Olinick, & Lamp, 2006), macaques (Tanaka & Fujita, 2000; Tanaka, Onoe, Tsukada, 
& Fujita, 2001), and chimpanzees (Fagot & Tomonaga, 1999; Fujita & Matsuzawa, 1990; 
Hopkins, 1997; Hopkins & Washburn, 2002; Matsuno & Tomonaga, 2007; Matsuzawa, 1989; 
Tomonaga & Matsuzawa, 1992).  
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Precedence effects are subject to variability depending upon array presentation and 
design, and thus procedural differences may help explain the conflicting results. Considering first 
the evidence from human studies, processing mode is dependent upon the nature of the stimuli 
such that differential attention towards elements within an array can shift a global precedence to 
a local precedence (e.g., Grice, Canham, & Boroughs, 1983; Kinchla & Wolfe, 1979; Lamb & 
Robertson, 1988; Martin, 1979; Navon, 1981; Pomerantz & Sager, 1975; see Kimchi, 1992, for a 
review). Consistent with the literature from humans, several aspects of experimental design 
including stimulus properties and training procedures may explain the differences seen among 
nonhuman primate studies. Several comparative studies have specifically manipulated stimuli 
density by grouping individual elements closer in proximity or connecting these elements with 
small lines. Despite these experimental manipulations, a local precedence still emerged among 
baboons (Deruelle & Fagot, 1998; Fagot & Deruelle, 1997) and capuchin monkeys (Spinozzi et 
al., 2006). However, this hypothesis has been used to explain the positive evidence of a global 
precedence among nonhuman primates. For example, cotton-top tamarin monkeys are the only 
New World monkey species to thus far demonstrate a global precedence and this effect 
disappeared with the introduction of sparse stimuli (Neiworth et al., 2006). Moreover, Fagot and 
colleagues have argued that the global processing mode evident among several chimpanzee 
studies, including their own, is directly linked to higher stimuli density within the presented 
arrays (Fagot et al., 2012).  
1.1.5.3 Precedence Effects and Visual Illusions 
Pertinent to the current studies, processing mode may directly impact the emergence of 
visual illusions, and specifically of geometric illusions comprised of hierarchical, embedded 
stimuli. By definition, a global precedence favors the simultaneous evaluation of all elements as 
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a cohesive whole, or initial processing of the group configuration and secondary processing of 
elemental details. A local precedence favors the initial separate evaluation of the parts or 
elements of a hierarchical stimulus with a primary focus on the local details prior to overall 
group processing. The perception of visual illusions, which is dependent upon the interaction 
between elements within an array, is likely influenced by the mode of visual processing and the 
stage at which a given species perceptually groups multiple elements into a holistic 
configuration.  
Experimental evidence from the human literature supports this link between visual 
processing mode and the emergence of visual illusions. Specifically, the global impression 
theory suggests that a global assessment of target and inducing stimuli leads to higher rates and 
magnitudes of geometric illusions (Coren & Girgus, 1978). Data from split-brain patients 
demonstrates that the right cerebral hemisphere is spatially oriented and more global in nature, 
whereas the left cerebral hemisphere is verbally oriented and more linear or local in nature (e.g., 
Bogen, 1969; Kimura, 1966, 1973; Levy-Agresti & Sperry, 1968; Ornstein, 1972). Based on this 
information, certain patterns of visual illusions should be more apparent when processed in the 
right hemisphere than the left hemisphere. Experimental data support this hypothesis.  For 
example, the magnitude of the Mueller-Lyer illusion increased when stimuli were presented to 
the right hemisphere in comparison to when presented to the left hemisphere (Clem & Pollack, 
1975; see Figure 1F).  
Moreover, earlier research demonstrated individual differences in ‘processing style’ such 
that some humans have a stronger global precedence than others. For these subjects, the 
magnitude of certain illusions was increased above and beyond the magnitude for those subjects 
with weaker global processing (e.g., Berry, 1966, 1968, 1971; Dawson, 1967; Witkin, 1967). A 
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similar effect of reduced illusory perception was found among children with autism who adopt a 
more locally-oriented processing mode than typically-developing children and adults (Dakin & 
Frith, 2005; Happé, 1996; Happé, Briskman, & Frith, 2001; but see Ropar & Mitchell, 1999). 
Additionally, a reduced bias towards the Ebbinghaus-Titchener illusion was documented in the 
Himba tribe, who also demonstrate a more pronounced locally-oriented precedence effect than 
typically-developing Westerners (de Fockert, Davidoff, Fagot, Parron, & Goldstein, 2007).  One 
possible explanation is that the Himba people are seminomadic cattle herders from a remote area 
of Namibia who track the identity of individual cattle, placing a premium on attention to local 
details (de Fockert et al, 2007).  
Clearly, processing mode directly impacts the perception of certain visual illusions 
among human subjects, and specifically the illusions that require the simultaneous processing of 
multiple elements within an array. However, the interaction between processing mode and visual 
illusions has received much less attention in comparative research. Next, I explore the interaction 
between species-unique processing mode and experimental design, and their joint influence on 
illusion perception. Specifically, I argue that species with a local precedence (or a less robust 
global precedence) may be less susceptible to perceiving geometric illusions. However, 
enhancing attention towards specific elements within an array (i.e., inducers) may increase 
likelihood of illusion emergence for all species. Thus, a species-unique perceptual style along 
with experimental manipulations that favor global or local processing of array elements should 
impact the emergence of illusory patterns. 
1.1.5.4 Experimental Design and Processing Mode Jointly Impact Illusion Emergence 
Visual illusions are dependent upon the simultaneous processing of multiple elements 
within an array, including target and inducing context stimuli (Roberts et al., 2005). Disruptions 
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to the simultaneous processing of or interaction between elements within an array would 
negatively impact the likelihood of illusion emergence. I have now discussed two separate 
components that influence the holistic processing of a visual array: experimental design and 
visual mode of processing. It is possible that these very factors led to the conflicting findings 
among nonhuman animal species for the Ebbinghaus-Titchener and Delboeuf illusions in the 
comparative literature.  
Several key differences exist among the comparative studies for these two size illusions, 
including disparities among training procedures, reinforcement contingencies, and stimulus 
properties, all of which could impact the critical simultaneous processing of elements within an 
array (Murayama et al., 2012; Nakamura et al., 2008; Parrish & Beran, 2014a; Parron & Fagot, 
2007; Rosa Salva et al., 2013). The training procedures utilized for both pigeons and baboons 
may have favored enhanced focusing of the target stimulus devoid of the illusory inducing 
context or stimuli. For example, Parron and Fagot (2007) presented different colored target and 
inducer circles, a manipulation which was aimed to promote attention to the bright yellow central 
target over the inducing circles. Furthermore, Nakamura and colleagues (2008) first trained 
pigeons to classify a series of target circles as large or small based on their diameters. Once they 
accurately and consistently classified targets into these two categories, six inducer circles were 
gradually faded in (from light to dark) to maintain accurate target discrimination. Thus, the 
pigeons were trained to effectively ignore inducing circles and selectively attend to target 
diameter. In addition, the pigeons were required continually to peck at the sample target circle in 
order to produce two choice keys representing the large and small classifications. Increasing the 
salience of, and subsequent attention towards, the target stimulus of the Ebbinghaus-Titchener 
and Delboeuf illusions has been known to reduce illusion magnitude and even the direction of 
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the illusion in human subjects (e.g., Coren & Girgus, 1972; Oyama, 1962; Weintraub & Cooper, 
1972; Weintraub, et al., 1969). The enhanced attention towards the target stimulus in both 
Nakamura et al. (2008) and Parron and Fagot (2007) may have contributed to the lack of illusory 
percept formation.  
Using a different approach, Rosa Salva et al. (2013) found positive evidence of the 
Ebbinghaus-Titchener illusion among four-day-old domestic chicks. There were several 
experimental differences between this design and the two previous animal studies. Most notably, 
the inducing circles were present throughout the training procedure, making them a relevant 
component of the array throughout the entire study. Similarly, Murayama et al. (2012) presented 
a relative size discrimination task to a dolphin subject who was trained to select the larger of two 
target dots surrounded by inducing circles. Critically, this study also featured the target and 
inducing stimuli during both training and testing. This key design feature of including the entire 
array throughout the entire study (including training and test trials) would support the necessary 
simultaneous processing of the full array, rather than presenting the inducers in a manner that 
reduces their salience or enhances attention towards the target. To further illustrate this point, the 
single study of the Delboeuf illusion with chimpanzees demonstrated a human-like perception of 
the illusion and, critically, presented both the target and inducing circle throughout the entire 
study rather than enhancing the salience of or attention towards one component of the array 
(Parrish & Beran, 2014a).  
In conjunction with perceptual processing mode, precedence effects may further impact 
experimental procedures that favor the enhancement of local elements. Rosa Salva et al. (2013) 
argued that the procedures used with pigeons and baboons, both of which are known to display a 
robust local precedence (e.g., baboons: Deruelle & Fagot, 1998; Fagot & Deruelle, 1997; e.g., 
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pigeons: Cavoto & Cook, 2001), may have worked in conjunction with their locally-oriented 
perception to jointly enhance attention toward the individual elements, rather than processing the 
overall global configuration. Training species with a local precedence further to isolate 
individual features within an array via experimental procedures and ignore the illusory-inducing 
context would effectively reduce (and perhaps reverse) the necessary holistic processing of 
individual elements, and potentially the illusory effect itself. Alternatively, dolphins, like 
humans, display a global precedence when perceiving objects through vision and echolocation, 
and also demonstrated perception of the illusion in a human-like fashion (Murayama et al., 2012; 
Pack, Herman, Hoffmann-Kuhnt, & Branstetter, 2002).  
The key relationship between processing mode and illusion perception can be applied in 
nonhuman animal research where there is even greater variability within species-unique 
perceptual styles. Specifically, nonhuman primates provide a valuable resource to comparative 
research because of their close phylogenetic relatedness with humans and strong similarities in 
visual cognition (see Lazareva, et al., 2012; Roitblat, 1987; Wasserman, 1993 for reviews). 
Critically for my purposes, however, nonhuman primates also demonstrate key differences in 
processing mode, with some species demonstrating a more robust global precedence (like 
humans), and others demonstrating a rather robust local precedence. The selected species for the 
current work differ in their mode of perceptual processing: humans display a robust global 
precedence (e.g., Navon, 1977, 1981), chimpanzees display a global precedence, but this effect is 
subject to change depending upon experimental design (Fujita & Matsuzawa, 1990; Hopkins, 
1997; Hopkins & Washburn, 2002; Matsuzawa, 1989; Tomonaga & Matsuzawa, 1992), and 
rhesus monkeys and capuchin monkeys display a local precedence (De Lillo et al., 2005; 
Hopkins & Washburn, 2002; Spinozzi, et al., 2003, 2006). Thus, these primates provide an 
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invaluable resource in the comparative study of visual illusions and a unique opportunity to 
explore the relationship between processing mode, experimental design, and the perception of 
visual illusions.  
1.2 Current Aims 
I propose a series of studies that will be used to investigate the emergence of illusory 
phenomena among four primate species, including humans (Homo sapiens), chimpanzees (Pan 
troglodytes), rhesus macaques (Macaca mulatta), and capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella). The 
ultimate goal is to compare and contrast the emergence of geometric size illusions among these 
primate species with the prediction that both experimental design and species’ unique perceptual 
styles will influence perception and performance. To confirm that capuchin monkeys and rhesus 
monkeys are local processors, I will first assess their processing modes using a pre-established 
paradigm used to measure precedence effects within computer-trained nonhuman primates. Next, 
I will investigate the Delboeuf (Study 1) and Ebbinghaus-Titchener (Study 2) size illusions in 
these four primate species, using a psychophysical two-choice discrimination task. Despite 
species’ differences in visual processing mode, I will employ an experimental procedure that 
emphasizes holistic processing of the entire array to provide the best possible chance for illusory 
percept formation across all species. Thus, the obtained results may differ from other 
comparative studies that intentionally directed attention towards local features within the illusory 
array (e.g., Nakamura et al., 2008; Parron & Fagot, 2007, but see Murayama et al., 2012 and 
Rosa Salva et al., 2013).  
Furthermore, I will investigate how these and other geometric size illusions may be 
attenuated or eliminated via differential attention to separate elements with the perceptual array. 
Study 3 introduces a third geometric size illusion (the Baldwin illusion) within a concurrent-task 
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paradigm that allows for the modulation of attention across the visual array (exclusively towards 
the target or inducing elements). Finally, I will explore the relationship between visual illusions 
and decisional biases in a food-choice task with human children. Study 4 will extend the 
investigation of visual illusion perception into the domain of real-world, decisional biases.  
1.3 Predictions 
I had three over-arching hypotheses for this line of research. My first hypothesis was that 
illusion perception would be influenced by the species’ unique perceptual styles. Because 
holistic processing of the entire visual array (i.e., simultaneous perception of both the target and 
inducing elements) is critical to the emergence of visual illusions, I predicted that the species 
with a more globally-oriented processing style (i.e., humans and apes) would be more likely to 
perceive these geometric illusions, whereas the species with a more locally-oriented processing 
style (i.e., monkeys) would be less likely to perceive the illusions.  
My second hypothesis was that attention would influence performance and illusion 
perception throughout these studies. Differential attention towards individual elements within a 
visual array may disrupt the necessary holistic processing of the entire array that is key for 
illusion perception. Aside from being of theoretical importance in helping us understand how 
these biases emerge, this is of practical importance because previous studies have varied in how 
training and experimental procedures drew attention to various features within the illusory array. 
Apparent species differences may be due to these procedural variations. Thus, I predicted that 
paradigms that minimize enhanced attention towards separate features within the task would 
promote perception of the illusions (e.g., Studies 1 and 2), whereas paradigms that disrupted 
holistic processing of the visual array would reduce illusion perception (e.g., Study 3), 
irrespective of the species being tested. My final hypothesis was that illusory biases would 
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translate from perception of 2-dimensional visual illusions to 3-dimensinoal decisional biases, 
such as food choice behavior (e.g., Study 4). I predicted that decisional biases would manifest in 
accordance with perception of visual illusions using psychophysical measures.  
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1.5 Figures
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Figure 1. Geometric illusions, including the (A) Delboeuf illusion, (B) Poggendorff illusion, (C) 
Twisted Cord illusion, (D) Ebbinghaus-Titchener illusion, (E) Horizontal-Vertical illusion, (F) 
Mueller-Lyer illusion, (G) Baldwin illusion, (H) Ponzo illusion, (I) Oppel-Kundt illusion, (J) 
Zöllner illusion, and (K) Jastrow illusion. 
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PERCEIVING COMPLEXITY: 
PERCEPTUAL PROCESSING MODE IN MONKEYS  
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ABSTRACT 
Perceptual processing mode is the order in which hierarchical, complex visual stimuli are 
perceived. Human adults typically display a global precedence in which they perceive the larger, 
global configuration prior to the individual elements that comprise the figure. Interestingly, a 
variety of nonhuman species perceive complex visual arrays in the opposite manner from that 
described here. A local precedence emerges when individual elements are perceived prior to the 
larger configuration. Here, we tested the processing mode of rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) 
and capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) using a delayed match-to-sample task that presented 
hierarchical compound stimuli in which the larger, global configuration was comprised of 
smaller elements. The global configuration (e.g., large letter ‘E’) either matched (e.g., small 
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letter ‘E’s) or differed (e.g., small letter ‘F’s) from the local elements from which it was 
comprised. The matching-to-sample task’s response set contained an identical match to the 
sample or a foil that differed in its global pattern, its local elements, or both its global and local 
features. Both species of monkeys displayed a local precedence, showing significantly higher 
performance rates when stimuli matched on their local elements in comparison to when only 
their global features matched. These results are consistent with previous findings documenting a 
local processing style among monkeys.  
 
 
INDEX WORDS: Perceptual Processing Mode; Precedence Effects; Local Processing; Capuchin 
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2 PERCEIVING COMPLEXITY:  
PERCEPTUAL PROCESSING MODE IN MONKEYS 
Prior to the formal studies of this dissertation, I first assessed the perceptual mode of 
processing within capuchin monkeys and rhesus monkeys using a paradigm adapted from 
Hopkins and Washburn (2002).  Hopkins and Washburn used a matching-to-sample procedure 
that presented a hierarchical compound stimulus in which the larger, global configuration was 
comprised of smaller elements. The global configuration either matched or differed from the 
local elements from which it was comprised. For example, a letter “F” could be comprised of 
multiple smaller “F”s or could be comprised of multiple smaller “E”s. The matching-to-sample 
task’s response set contained an identical match to the sample or a foil that differed in its global 
pattern, its local elements, or both its global and local features. Hopkins and Washburn reported 
that rhesus monkeys and chimpanzees discriminated stimuli using their global and local features, 
but chimpanzees demonstrated a global precedence (i.e., they showed higher performance rates 
and faster response times using global features in comparison to local elements), whereas rhesus 
monkeys demonstrated a local precedence.  
In the current study, I presented the same matching-to-sample paradigm used by Hopkins 
and Washburn (2002) as it represents one traditional approach to assessing processing modes 
using computerized testing with primate species. My first objective was to confirm that rhesus 
monkeys and capuchin moneys included in the current set of studies also demonstrated a local-
to-global precedence as previously reported in the literature (Cebus apella: De Lillo, Spinozzi, 
Truppa, & Naylor, 2005; Spinozzi, De Lillo, & Salvi, 2006; Spinozzi, De Lillo, & Truppa, 2003; 
Macaca mulatta: Hopkins & Washburn, 2002). These results would be informative to 
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understanding potential species differences across primates in geometric illusion perception as 
investigated throughout this dissertation. 
2.1 Methods 
2.1.1 Subjects 
The nonhuman primates included in the current study were housed and tested at the 
Language Research Center (LRC) of Georgia State University (GSU) in Atlanta, Georgia. LRC 
primates were never food or water deprived for testing purposes and had 24-hour access to water, 
including during testing. They received a daily diet of fruits, vegetables, and primate chow 
regardless of participation in testing, and daily caloric intake was kept consistent by taking into 
account the amount of food earned from testing. All testing protocols complied with guidelines 
for working with nonhuman primates as approved by the GSU Institutional Animal Care and Use 
Committee. GSU is fully approved by the Association for Assessment and Accreditation of 
Laboratory Animal Care.  
Four male rhesus macaques (11 – 21 years of age) and eight capuchin monkeys (five 
females; 6 – 17 years of age) were included in the current study. Rhesus macaques were singly 
housed with 24-hour access to their computerized apparatus. Macaques had constant visual and 
auditory access to conspecifics and received weekly access to an indoor-outdoor enclosure with 
another monkey. Capuchin monkeys were socially housed and voluntarily separated into 
individual test boxes for computer testing. Monkeys worked on the current experiment for 4 hour 
(capuchin monkeys) or 8 hour (rhesus monkeys) test sessions during which time the monkeys 
worked or rested as they chose.  
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2.1.2 Apparatus 
Monkeys were tested using the Language Research Center’s Computerized Test System 
that includes a color monitor, personal computer, digital joystick, and food pellet dispenser 
(Evans, Beran, Chan, Klein, & Menzel, 2008; Richardson, Washburn, Hopkins, Savage-
Rumbaugh, & Rumbaugh, 1990). Primates manipulated the joystick with their hands to 
isomorphically control a small round cursor on the computer screen. Correct responses led to 
banana-flavored pellet rewards (45-mg pellets for capuchin monkeys and 94-mg pellets for 
rhesus monkeys: Bio-Serv, Frenchtown, NJ) via a pellet dispenser interfaced to the computer 
through a digital I/O board (PDISO8A; Keithley Instruments, Cleveland, OH). Task programs 
were written in Visual Basic 6.0. All monkeys were computer trained and had participated in a 
number of perceptual experiments prior to the current study (e.g., Agrillo, Parrish, & Beran, 
2014; Beran & Parrish, 2013). 
2.1.3 Stimuli 
Stimuli were hierarchically structured with multiple smaller (local) elements comprising 
the larger (global) pattern. Library 1 (EF) contained letters E and F, Library 2 (HL) contained 
letters H and L, and Library 3 (CS) contained circles and squares. For Library 1 and Library 2, 
large stimuli measured 5.5 cm x 9 cm and small stimuli measured 0.5 cm x 1 cm with an inter-
elemental distance of 0.5 cm. For Library 3, large stimuli measured 4.5 cm x 6.5 cm and small 
stimuli measured 1 cm x 1 cm with an inter-elemental distance of 0.5 cm. 
All stimuli were black on a white computer background. Figure 1 depicts the three 
libraries used in the current study. For each library, stimuli either differed based on their local 
elements, their global pattern, or both their local and global features. For all libraries, stimuli 
pairs [1 and 3] and [2 and 4] differed based on local elements. Stimuli pairs [1 and 2] and [3 and 
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4] differed based on global pattern. Stimuli 1 and 4 and 2 and 3 differed based on both their local 
and global features.   
2.1.4 Procedure 
Subjects completed a matching-to-sample task in which a sample stimulus was randomly 
drawn from one of the three libraries. Subjects first made contact with a “start” box and then 
touched the sample stimulus using their joystick-controlled cursor, following which two 
comparison stimuli were presented. One comparison stimulus matched the sample and the other 
comparison stimulus (the foil) was randomly drawn from the same library. The sample was 
centrally located in the top half of the computer screen. Comparison stimuli were presented 
equidistance to the right and left of the sample in the bottom half of the screen. Location (right or 
left) of the matching stimulus and the foil was randomized across trials.   
Three conditions were presented: the foil could differ from the sample in its local 
elements (Local condition), its global pattern (Global condition), or in both its local and global 
features (Both condition). In training and testing, conditions were randomly presented in equal 
proportions. Contacting the identical matching stimulus on a trial led to feedback in the form of a 
positive auditory tone and one pellet reward. Contacting the foil led to a buzz tone and a 20 
second timeout period during which the screen remained blank. The inter-trial interval was 1 
second, following which the “start” box reappeared in the center of the screen.  
2.1.4.1 Training 
 Monkeys were trained using a simultaneous matching-to-sample procedure in which the 
sample remained on the screen during selection of the match or the foil by the subject. This 
allowed the animals to learn the rules of the task. Half of the monkeys were trained on Library 1 
(EF) and half of the monkeys were trained on Library 2 (HL). Criterion was set to 70% accuracy 
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on the most recent 50 trials for each condition: Local, Global, and Both. Once criterion was met, 
all subjects completed a generalization phase using the opposite library from the one that they 
used in training. For example, if a subject was trained on Library 1 (EF), they completed 
generalization using Library 2 (HL) and vice versa. In the generalization phase, subjects 
completed 50 trials of each condition (Local, Global, and Both) in random order with the given 
library.  
2.1.4.2 Testing 
In the test phase, all procedures were identical to those described above, except that the 
monkeys were tested using a sequential matching-to-sample procedure in which the sample was 
removed from the screen after subjects made contact with the stimulus. The sample was not 
present during selection of the match stimulus or foil stimulus. 
All monkeys completed a minimum of 50 trials per library for each condition in the 
following order: Library 1 (EF), Library 2 (HL), and Library 3 (CS). Accuracy (selection of the 
matching comparison stimulus) and response latency (the time elapsed between comparison 
stimuli presentation and selection of a match on each test trial, measured in hundredths of a 
second) were recorded. Accuracy was measured for the first 50 trials per library for each 
condition. Latency was measured for the first 50 correct trials per library for each condition. To 
obtain an equal number of trials to measure latency, incorrect trials were re-presented until a 
minimum of 50 correct trials were obtained for each condition.  
2.2 Results 
2.2.1 Capuchin Monkeys  
To examine performance in terms of accuracy in the test phase, a 3x3 repeated measures 
ANOVA was conducted with library (EF, HL, CS) and condition (Both, Global, Local) as 
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independent variables.  Capuchin monkey performance (Figure 2) revealed a significant main 
effect of condition, F (2, 14) = 14.59, p < .001, ηp2 = .68. There was not a main effect of library, 
F (2, 14) = .11, p = .90, ηp2 = .02, nor a significant interaction between condition and library, F 
(4, 28) = .28, p = .89, ηp2 = .04. To explore the condition variable further, we collapsed across 
libraries to compare each condition to one another using paired samples t-test. A Bonferroni 
adjusted alpha level of .016 was used per test given that three comparisons were made (.05/3). 
Performance in the Both condition was significantly higher than performance in the Global 
condition t(7) = 3.92, p = .006, and performance was significantly higher in the Local condition 
than in the Global condition, t(7) = -6.09, p < .001. Performance did not differ between the Local 
and Both conditions, t(7) = .72, p = .49. These results support the hypothesis of increased 
performance for Both and Local conditions relative to performance in the Global condition.  
To examine performance in terms of latency for capuchin monkeys (Figure 3), a 3x3 
repeated measures ANOVA was used to determine the effect of library and condition on 
response time. For capuchin monkeys, there was no main effect of library, F (2, 14) = .53, p = 
.60, ηp2 = .07, nor of condition, F (2, 14) = 1.48, p = .26, ηp2 = .18. There was no interaction 
between library and condition, F (4, 28) = 1.04, p = .40, ηp2 = .13. Although performance data 
indicated higher accuracy for Both and Local conditions relative to the Global condition, there 
was not a facilitation of response times for capuchin monkeys in any one condition relative to the 
others.  
2.2.2 Rhesus Monkeys  
A 3x3 repeated measures ANOVA was conducted with library (EF, HL, CS) and 
condition (Both, Global, Local) as independent variables for test phase performance.  Rhesus 
monkey performance (Figure 2) also revealed a significant main effect of condition, F (2, 6) = 
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14.91, p = .005, ηp2 = .83, but no main effect of library, F (2, 6) = 1.93, p = .23, ηp2 = .39.  There 
was a significant interaction between condition and library, F (4, 12) = 6.07, p = .007, ηp2 = .67. 
To explore the interaction further, I ran a separate one-way ANOVA comparing conditions for 
each library.  
To subdivide data based on library, we separated each animal’s test data based on the 
library that they initially trained on (EF or HL), the library that they completed generalization 
testing with (EF or HL, the opposite from training), and the library that they completed novel test 
trials with (CS for all monkeys). For test data using the training stimuli, there was not an effect 
of condition F (2, 6) = 1.80, p = .24, ηp2 = .38, nor for the generalization library, F (2,6) = 4.03, p 
= .08, ηp2 = .57. There was a significant effect of condition for the CS library, F (2, 6) = 93.27, p 
< .001, ηp2 = .97. To explore this effect of condition for the CS library further, we compared 
each condition to one another using paired samples t-test. A Bonferroni adjusted alpha level of 
.016 was used. Performance in the Both condition was significantly higher than performance in 
the Global condition (t(3) = 16.01, p = .001). Performance in the Local condition also was 
significantly higher than in the Global condition (t(3) = -8.85, p = .003). Performance did not 
differ between the Local and Both conditions (t(3) = -1.26, p = .30). As with capuchin monkeys, 
these results support the hypothesis of increased performance for Both and Local conditions 
relative to performance in the Global condition for rhesus monkeys. 
To examine performance in terms of latency for rhesus monkeys (Figure 3), a 3x3 
repeated measures ANOVA was used to determine the effect of library and condition on 
response time. For rhesus monkeys, there was a main effect of library, F (2, 6) = 6.95, p = .03, 
ηp2 = .70, but not of condition, F (2, 14) = 4.59, p = .06, ηp2 = .61. There was no interaction 
between library and condition, F (4, 12) = .94, p = .47, ηp2 = .24. Although performance data 
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indicated higher accuracy for Both and Local conditions relative to the Global condition for the 
CS library, there was not a facilitation of performance in terms of response times for rhesus 
monkeys. The main effect of library was likely due to a learning effect; all monkeys were fastest 
with Library 3 (the last library presented) across all conditions. This pattern of results suggested 
that the rhesus monkeys came to respond faster to the general task demands with experience. 
2.3 Discussion 
For rhesus monkeys and capuchin monkeys, a local precedence was reported for the 
discrimination of hierarchical compound stimuli. Although both species performed best when 
they matched stimuli that were identical in terms of their global features and their local elements, 
the monkeys also were significantly better at matching stimuli when their local elements were 
identical in comparison to when only their global features matched. Thus, as previously reported, 
capuchin monkeys and rhesus monkeys demonstrated a local-to-global precedence in a 
perceptual task modeled off of the classic Navon (1977) paradigm in which human adults 
showed a clear global-to-local processing style when perceiving large letters comprised of 
smaller, individual letters. Further, these results match previous reports of a local processing 
style by capuchin and rhesus monkeys (Cebus apella: De Lillo et al., 2005; Spinozzi et al., 2003, 
2006; Macaca mulatta: Hopkins & Washburn, 2002). 
The differences in processing mode across primates and other nonhuman animal species 
is intriguing given overall commonalities in the primate visual system across monkeys, apes, and 
humans, including physical and functional similarities (see Matsuno & Fujita, 2009 for a 
review). First, the properties of the stimuli themselves can drive global or local processing within 
perceptual mode tasks, with stimuli size, density, visual angle, and spatial location impacting 
precedence effects in humans (e.g., Grice, Canham, & Boroughs, 1983; Kinchla & Wolfe, 1979; 
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Lamb & Robertson, 1990; Martin, 1979; Navon, 1981 Navon & Norman, 1983) and animals 
(e.g., Cavoto & Cook, 2001; De Lillo et al., 2005; Neiworth, Gleichman, Olinick, & Lamp, 
2006). However, the results seen here among capuchin and rhesus monkeys are in line with 
previous local-precedence reports using a variety of tasks (e.g., visual search, matching-to-
sample) and a variety of stimuli design within these two species (De Lillo et al., 2005; Hopkins 
& Washburn, 2002; Spinozzi et al., 2003, 2006).  
Beyond influences of stimuli, adaptive hypotheses have been put forth to account for 
capuchin monkeys’ local processing style, including the need to attend to local detail within their 
environments. For example, capuchin monkeys vigilantly search for very small, fast moving prey 
and forage for small seeds (Hladik, 1975). These foraging demands may place a premium on 
local detail focus within a capuchin monkey’s natural environment (see De Lillo et al., 2005). 
Further, local processing in pigeons has been attributed to their myopic (nearsighted) foraging of 
small food on the ground, perceived by the frontal visual field (Bloch & Martinoya, 1982). 
Because of the nature of cognitive testing (nearby visual stimuli comprised of small detail), it is 
likely that pigeons process test stimuli with the frontal field, favoring attention to fine detail and 
a local precedence (Cavoto & Cook, 2001). Thus, the manner in which a species perceives its 
natural environment, with an emphasis either on global or local details, likely influence the 
evolution of either local or global precedence effects. 
The role of executive function in precedence effects (specifically, the role of attention) 
also should be taken into account when considering the emergence of global processing. 
Research among children with autism spectrum disorder has revealed a strong local processing 
style, accompanied by decreased connectivity in the brain from areas that are key in global 
processing such as the right hemisphere and an overall reduction in white matter (Brock, Brown, 
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Boucher, & Rippon, 2002; Frith, 2004; Just, Cherkassky, Keller, & Minshew, 2004). Reduced 
connectivity also yields compromised top-down attention processes that are important in global 
processing of complex stimuli (Just et al., 2004). Attention control and, specifically, the ability to 
focus on global features appear to emerge secondary to local processing, perhaps as a byproduct 
of top-down attention modulation. Thus, there is unlikely any single factor in the emergence of 
global processing, but rather processing mode emerges as an interplay between a species 
ecology, its behavior, and the existing neural architecture supporting perception and attention. 
Future studies that seek to disentangle their complementary roles will shed light on the 
emergence of global processing in primates. 
Relevant to this dissertation, perceptual processing mode has proven to be important in 
the emergence of some visual illusions, particularly those that integrate multiple elements into 
one overall figure (Coren & Girgus, 1978). These types of illusions rely upon the simultaneous 
processing of multiple elements within a visual array. Humans who demonstrated a strong 
global-to-local precedence also demonstrated increased perception of visual illusions (e.g., 
Berry, 1968, 1971; Dawson, 1967; Witkin, 1967), whereas those that were more locally-oriented 
often failed to perceive illusions in a similar manner or sometimes not at all (Dakin & Frith, 
2005; de Fockert, Davidoff, Fagot, Parron, & Goldstein, 2007; Happé, 1996; Happé, Briskman, 
& Frith, 2001; but see Ropar & Mitchell, 1999). Similarly, several nonhuman species that are 
documented as being more local-processors failed to perceive illusions in a human-like manner, 
further supporting a link between processing mode and illusion perception (e.g., Columba livia: 
Nakamura, Watanabe, & Fujita, 2008; Gallus gallus domesticus: Nakamura, Watanabe, & Fujita, 
2014; Papio papio: Parron & Fagot, 2007). Whether animals are constrained by perceptual 
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processing mode will be explored here in a series of geometric size illusions across primate 
species. 
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2.5 Figures 
 
Figure 1. Stimulus Library 1 (EF), Library 2 (HL), and Library 3 (circle-square) for each 
condition (Both, Global, and Local).  
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Figure 2. Mean percentage correct for rhesus monkeys and capuchin monkeys in each condition 
(Both, Global, and Local). Error bars depict corrected 95% confidence intervals for repeated 
measures tests (Cousineau, 2005).   
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Figure 3. Mean response times (in seconds) for rhesus monkeys and capuchin monkeys in each 
condition (Both, Global, and Local). Error bars depict corrected 95% confidence intervals for 
repeated measures tests (Cousineau, 2005). 
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DO YOU SEE WHAT I SEE? A COMPARATIVE INVESTIGATION OF THE DELBOEUF 
ILLUSION IN HUMANS (HOMO SAPIENS), RHESUS MONKEYS (MACACA MULATTA), 
AND CAPUCHIN MONKEYS (CEBUS APELLA) 
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ABSTRACT 
Studying visual illusions is critical to understanding typical visual perception. We 
investigated whether rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) and capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) 
perceived the Delboeuf illusion in a similar manner as human adults (Homo sapiens). To test 
this, in Experiment 1, we presented monkeys and humans with a relative discrimination task that 
required subjects to choose the larger of two central dots that were sometimes encircled by 
concentric rings. As predicted, humans demonstrated evidence of the Delboeuf illusion, 
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overestimating central dots when small rings surrounded them and underestimating the size of 
central dots when large rings surrounded them. However, monkeys did not show evidence of the 
illusion. To rule out an alternate explanation, in Experiment 2, we presented all species with an 
absolute classification task that required them to classify a central dot as ‘small’ or ‘large.’ We 
presented a range of ring sizes to determine whether the Delboeuf illusion would occur for any 
dot-to-ring ratios. Here, we found evidence of the Delboeuf illusion in all three species. Humans 
and monkeys underestimated central dot size to a progressively greater degree with progressively 
larger rings. The Delboeuf illusion now has been extended to include capuchin monkeys and 
rhesus monkeys, and through such comparative investigations we can better evaluate hypotheses 
regarding illusion perception among nonhuman animals. 
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3 DO YOU SEE WHAT I SEE? A COMPARATIVE INVESTIGATION OF THE 
DELBOEUF ILLUSION IN HUMANS (HOMO SAPIENS), RHESUS MONKEYS 
(MACACA MULATTA), AND CAPUCHIN MONKEYS (CEBUS APELLA) 
Although understanding how perceptual mechanisms rapidly and accurately process 
sensory information is important, it is also informative to understand when and why perception 
‘fails’. Such failures can reveal clues about how the perceptual system operates because those 
failures illustrate how perception interacts (correctly or incorrectly) with physical stimulation 
and sensory input. Studying misperception often involves studying susceptibility to illusions, and 
much of this work has been conducted from a comparative perspective, because in that way we 
can better understand the evolution of human perception.  Comparative studies have revealed 
similarities and differences in ‘misperceptions’ or visual illusions across primates, including the 
Horizontal-Vertical illusion (Dominguez, 1954), the Zöllner illusion (Agrillo, Parrish, & Beran, 
2014; Benhar & Samuel, 1982), the Ponzo illusion (Bayne & Davis, 1993; Fujita, 1996, 1997, 
2001), the Mueller-Lyer illusion (Suganuma, Pessoa, Monge-Fuentes, Castro, & Tavares, 2007), 
the Duncker illusion (Zivotofsky, Goldberg, & Powell, 2005), the rectangle illusion (Dominquez, 
1954; Harris, 1968), the corridor illusion (Barbet & Fagot, 2002; Imura, Tomonaga, & Yagi, 
2008) and the Delboeuf illusion (Parrish & Beran, 2014) 
Despite some continuity in perceptual illusions across species, differences in the 
perception of other visual illusions across primates have emerged as well. A notable example is 
the well-known Ebbinghaus-Titchener illusion (Figure 1), which is one of the most widely 
studied and robust size illusions among humans (e.g., Aglioti, DeSouza, & Goodale, 1995; Coren 
& Enns, 1993; Ebbinghaus, 1902; Massaro & Anderson, 1971; Weintraub, 1979).  In this 
illusion, the sizes of two identical central dots are misperceived as a function of several 
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surrounding circles. If small circles surround the central dot, the dot is overestimated relative to 
the same-sized central dot surrounded by several large circles. Interestingly, baboons do not 
perceive this illusion as humans do (Parron & Fagot, 2007) despite positive evidence of other 
visual illusions in this species (e.g., Barbet & Fagot, 2002; Benhar & Samuel, 1982). When 
presented with the Ebbinghaus-Titchener illusion, baboons instead accurately discriminated 
central dot size even in the presence of the outer illusory circles, leading Parrot and Fagot to 
argue that perhaps the neural substrate necessary for perceiving this illusion was lacking among 
Old World monkeys, instead evolving late in the primate lineage. This hypothesis was supported 
by a reversed Ebbinghaus-Titchener illusion documented in pigeons (Columba livia: Nakamura, 
Watanabe, & Fujita, 2008) and adult bantam chickens (Gallus gallus domesticus: Nakamura, 
Watanabe, & Fujita, 2014). However, complicating the question, various non-primate species 
have since shown evidence of perceiving the Ebbinghaus-Titchener illusion as humans do, 
including a dolphin (Tursiops truncates: Murayama, Usui, Takeda, Kato, & Maejima, 2012), 
domestic chicks (Gallus gallus domesticus: Rosa Salva, Rugani, Cavazzana, Regolin, 
Vallortigara, 2013), and redtail splitfin fish (Xenotoca eiseni: Sovrano, Albertazzi, & Rosa Salva, 
2015). 
Similar to the Ebbinghaus-Titchener illusion, the Delboeuf illusion presents two 
identically sized central dots that are surrounded by either a small outer ring or large outer ring 
(rather than multiple circles; Figure 1). Dots encircled by a large ring are underestimated in terms 
of their size, whereas dots encircled by a small ring are overestimated. This illusion has been 
studies extensively in human perception (e.g., Coren & Girgus, 1978; Delboeuf, 1865; Nicolas, 
1995; Van Ittersum & Wansink, 2012; Ward & Lockhead, 1970). Despite the breadth of research 
with human participants on these highly similar size illusions and the comparative studies 
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investigating the Ebbinghaus-Titchener illusion in animal species, only one study has presented 
the Delboeuf illusion to an animal species (Parrish & Beran, 2014). In a food-choice task, 
chimpanzees were presented with two circular food items (to mimic central dots) from which 
they could choose one for consumption. Food sizes were misperceived on the basis of outer plate 
size (which mimicked outer rings), with chimpanzees choosing a smaller amount of food on a 
small plate relative to a larger amount of food on a large plate. Similar results in humans also 
have been reported in food choice and consumption contexts (e.g., Van Ittersum & Wansink, 
2012).  
The perception of the very similar Delboeuf illusion, but not the Ebbinghaus-Titchener 
illusion, within closely related primate species warrants additional research. Beyond 
documenting the perception (or not) of an additional illusion among monkey species, 
understanding when this illusion is most likely to occur among different primate species is 
essential to establishing the mechanisms that underlie size illusions of this nature. Here, we 
assessed the Delboeuf illusion in two additional nonhuman primate species, the rhesus macaque 
and the capuchin monkey. We were interested in whether monkey species also might perceive 
this illusion in the way great apes and humans do, or if instead they might show patterns similar 
to Parron and Fagot’s (2007) investigation of the highly similar Ebbinghaus-Titchener illusion 
with a monkey species (baboons).  
In Experiment 1, we presented the monkeys with a relative discrimination task in which 
they were trained to choose the larger of two central dots that were sometimes surrounded by the 
illusory-inducing Delboeuf rings. This approach matched that of Parron and Fagot’s (2007) study 
examining the Ebbinghaus-Titchener illusion, which used a 2-choice discrimination procedure. 
In order to more fully investigate why the illusion was absent in Experiment 1, we then 
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investigated the mechanisms underlying the Delboeuf illusion in Experiment 2. This was done by 
varying the ratio of the target dot diameter to concentric ring diameter to establish a range of 
diameter ratios at which the illusion was most likely to emerge. Here, we introduced an absolute 
classification task (instead of a relative discrimination) in which participants classified a central 
dot as ‘small’ or ‘large’ relative to a never presented central target size. We included the 
Delboeuf rings of variable size that may influence dot size perception. We presented both 
experiments to human participants to confirm our approach and to provide a comparison for the 
nonhuman primate species. 
We predicted that size-judgment performance would be impacted by outer ring size for 
both experiments for all species. For Experiment 1, we predicted that all species would perceive 
the Delboeuf illusion, preferring the central dot encircled by the small ring relative to the same-
sized central dot encircled by a large ring. For Experiment 2, we predicted that the larger 
concentric rings (target dot-to-ring ratios < .50) would lead participants to over-classify central 
dots as small as they should appear smaller in the large context. Alternatively, we predicted that 
the smaller concentric rings (target dot-to-ring ratios > .50) would lead participants to under-
classify central dots as small as they should appear larger in the small context. 
3.1 Experiment 1 
3.1.1 Methods 
3.1.1.1 Participants 
Nonhuman Primates 
The nonhuman primates included in all experiments were housed and tested at the 
Language Research Center (LRC) of Georgia State University (GSU) in Atlanta, Georgia. LRC 
primates are never food or water deprived for testing purposes and have 24-hour access to water, 
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including during test sessions. They receive a daily diet of fruits, vegetables, and primate chow 
regardless of participation in testing, and caloric intake is kept consistent by taking into account 
the amount of food earned from testing when determining the diet. All testing complied with 
guidelines for working with nonhuman primates as established by protocols approved by the 
GSU Institutional Animal Care and Use Committee. GSU is accredited by the Association for 
Assessment and Accreditation of Laboratory Animal Care.  
Seven adult rhesus macaques (all males) and thirteen adult capuchin monkeys (6 males 
and 7 females) were included in the following experiments. Rhesus monkeys are individually 
housed and have 24-hour access to a computerized testing apparatus within their home cage. 
Rhesus monkeys have constant visual and auditory access to conspecifics and receive weekly 
access to an indoor-outdoor enclosure with another monkey. Capuchin monkeys are group 
housed in indoor-outdoor enclosures, and they separate voluntarily into individual testing 
enclosures for computerized testing (with visual and auditory access to conspecifics). Monkeys 
have participated in several computerized perceptual discrimination tasks (e.g., Agrillo et al., 
2014; Beran, 2006; Beran & Parrish, 2013; Beran, Smith, Coutinho, Couchman, & Boomer, 
2009). 
Humans  
Twenty-two human participants were recruited from GSU’s undergraduate student body 
(average age: 21 years old ± 4, 12 females). Participants were required to give informed consent 
prior to participating in the experiment(s) and received course credit for their participation. 
Testing complied with the procedures and protocols that were approved by the Institutional 
Review Board. 
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3.1.1.2 Apparatus  
Nonhuman Primates 
Nonhuman primates included in this study were joystick trained for computerized testing 
using the Language Research Center’s Computerized Test System, consisting of a color monitor, 
personal computer, digital joystick, and food pellet dispenser (Evans, Beran, Chan, Klein, & 
Menzel, 2008; Richardson, Washburn, Hopkins, Savage-Rumbaugh, & Rumbaugh, 1990). 
Primates manipulated the joystick with their hands to isomorphically control a small round 
cursor on the computer screen. Monkeys were not restrained during testing, thus the viewing 
distance from the monitor was approximately 30.5 cm to 40.5 cm. Correct responses led to 
banana-flavored pellet rewards (45-mg pellets for capuchins and 94-mg pellets for rhesus 
monkeys: Bio-Serv, Frenchtown, NJ) via a pellet dispenser interfaced to the computer through a 
digital I/O board (PDISO8A; Keithley Instruments, Cleveland, OH). Programs were written in 
Visual Basic 6.0.  
Humans 
Human participants were tested at individual computer carrels with a personal computer, 
a digital monitor, and mouse for testing. They were not given food rewards but were given 
written feedback on the computer screen regarding the accuracy of their responses. 
3.1.1.3 Stimuli 
On all trials, the stimuli, including dots and (when present) concentric rings, were black, 
presented on a white background, to minimize enhanced attention to one of these array elements 
over the other. For testing, one central target size was established and was present on every trial 
(standard target = 3 cm in diameter; designated as Level 7). Using a psychophysical step 
procedure, a range of 13 possible target dots to be compared to the Level 7 dot was established.  
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Levels 1-6 were all smaller than the Level 7 dot, and their size was generated by the following 
equation: Level = 3*0.98(7-TrialLevel). This made Level 1 dots the easiest to discriminate from 
Level 7 and Level 6 dots the hardest to discriminate. Levels 8-13 were all larger than the Level 7 
dot, and their size was generated by the following equation: Level = 3*1.02(TrialLevel-7). This made 
Level 13 dots the easiest to discriminate from Level 7 and Level 8 dots the hardest to 
discriminate. In this way, Levels 8-13 were progressively larger dots for which Level 8 dots were 
objectively hardest to discriminate from the Level 7 dot, and Level 13 dots were easiest to 
discriminate.   When they were present, small or large concentric rings encircled the target dots. 
On those trials, both dots were encircled by an outer ring or both dots had no ring.  There were 
never trials in which only one dot had a ring. A small ring was 4.5 cm in diameter for all target 
dots, and thus the Level 7 dot comprised 67% of the small ring, and a large ring diameter was 9 
cm in diameter and thus the Level 7 dot comprised 33% of the large ring.  
3.1.1.4 Design and Procedure 
Nonhuman Primates 
On each trial, participants made a relative size judgment between two target dots of 
variable diameter. Each trial presented the standard target dot (Level 7) versus a randomly 
selected dot from the range of Level 1 to Level 13.  At the outset of each trial, participants 
moved a small round cursor that they controlled into contact with a grey button at the top center 
of the computer screen.  Then, that button disappeared, the cursor re-centered, and two stimuli 
appeared as choice options. Each stimulus was comprised of a target dot. In some conditions, a 
ring surrounded the dot. These stimuli were simultaneously presented (left- and right-justified at 
center of the screen, with the larger dot size randomized for one of these two locations on each 
trial). Participants were required to contact one of the two stimuli within 3 s, or the trial was 
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scored as an error. After selection of a stimulus or after 3 s of inactivity, the screen was cleared 
completely.  Selection of the stimulus that was the larger of the two dots led to a melodic chime 
and a pellet reward.  Selection of the smaller of the two dots led to a buzz tone and a 20-s 
timeout period during which the screen remained blank. The inter-trial interval was 1 second. 
Monkeys worked on the task between 2- and 4-hours per day, completing as many trials as 
possible within a testing session given their motivation to engage the task.  
There were six conditions.  Trials in the Baseline condition presented two differently 
sized target dots on each trial with no concentric rings, and this established the baseline 
performance rate in discriminating dot sizes when concentric rings could not make any impact on 
the perception of the dot sizes.  Trials in the Large Control condition also presented two 
differently sized target dots, but large rings surrounded each dot. Trials in the Small Control 
condition presented two differently sized target dots, but small rings surrounded each dot. These 
two conditions were considered control conditions because they presented an objectively larger 
dot to choose from in a non-illusory inducing context (i.e., identically-sized rings).  
Trials in the Congruent Test condition presented the smaller of the two dots surrounded 
by a small ring and the larger dot surrounded by a large ring. If the Delboeuf illusion occurred, 
these Congruent Test trials should have led to a decrease in performance by leading participants 
to overestimate the small dot (because it appeared larger in the small ring) and to underestimate 
the large dot (because it appeared smaller in the large ring). Trials in the Incongruent Test 
condition presented the smaller of the two dots surrounded by a large ring and the larger dot 
surrounded by a small ring. If the illusion occurred, the Incongruent Test condition should have 
led to increased performance as the small dot appeared even smaller than it actually was in the 
large context, whereas the large dot in the small context appeared even larger than its true size.  
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Within the Congruent and Incongruent Test conditions, a special kind of test trial could 
occur that did not occur in the Baseline, Large Control, or Small Control conditions.  In this trial 
type, called the Delboeuf Illusion trial (Figure 1), the dots were the same size (both Level 7). 
However, a large concentric ring surrounded one dot and a small concentric ring surrounded the 
other dot.  This array created the context for the standard illusion in which the target surrounded 
by the large ring should appear to be smaller in size than the same sized target surrounded by the 
small ring. There was no objectively correct choice as both targets were identical. We subdivided 
the monkeys into two groups, one of which received no feedback at all for the Delboeuf illusion 
trials and immediately began the next trial upon completion of this trial type (Gambit, Gonzo, 
Han, Lily, Logan, Lou, Nala, Nkima, Obi, Wren). The other half were randomly given either 
positive feedback in the form of a food pellet or immediately sent to the inter-trial interval 
without any timeout on Delboeuf illusion trials (Chewie, Gabe, Gale, Hank, Gretel, Griffin, 
Liam, Mason, Murph, Widget). 
3.1.1.4.1 Training 
Monkeys completed a set of training trials to learn the rule of selecting the larger dot in 
the two-choice discrimination task. This was done using the three easiest absolute levels (Levels 
1-3 and Levels 11-13), divided into 50% Baseline trials, 25% Large Control trials, and 25% 
Small Control trials. The criterion was set to 85% correct over the most recent 60 trials. After 
monkeys reached criterion, they immediately entered the test phase during that session.  
3.1.1.4.2 Testing 
In the testing phase, we introduced the full continuum of levels (Levels 1 – 13). Test 
sessions were divided into 30% Baseline trials, 20% Large Control trials, 20% Small Control 
trials, 15% Congruent Test trials, and 15% Incongruent Test trials. Delboeuf illusion probe trials 
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(Level 7) were presented only in the Congruent Test and Incongruent Test conditions, and they 
occurred with equal probability to the other 12 levels. Monkeys completed between 6,000 – 
12,000 test trials depending upon their overall performance. We assessed overall accuracy after 
6,000 test trials. If monkeys reached 75% accuracy across all conditions after 6,000 trials, they 
were finished with the experiment, and all of their data were included in the analyses. Otherwise, 
they continued in the experiment until they reached the 75% criterion, and we analyzed the last 
6,000 test trials from those animals as we considered this mature performance on the task. 
Humans  
The general procedure was very similar to the monkeys’ procedure described above, 
including the same stimuli and trial levels. Participants first were required to contact a trial-
initiation stimulus and then used the computer mouse to select one of the two stimuli. Correct 
responses led to a flashing stimulus that said ‘Correct!’ in the middle of the screen, whereas 
incorrect responses led to a flashing stimulus that said ‘Incorrect’ in the middle of the screen. We 
shortened the timeout period for incorrect trials to 8 s. In accordance with the monkey procedure, 
Delboeuf Illusion trials were non-differentially reinforced. Failure to respond within 3 seconds of 
stimuli presentation led to an instruction to respond more quickly to the trials. The inter-trial 
interval was 1 s. A testing session was 60 minutes or until the participant completed 800 test 
trials. We only used data from those participants who completed at least 600 trials in the task 
because fewer trials than this would not have allowed for enough trials at each difficulty level for 
each condition. All participants met this requirement. 
Minimal written instructions were provided instead of a training phase to maximize the 
number of test trials completed per session with each participant. Before starting the experiment, 
participants read the following text: 
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In this experiment, you will choose between two options on the screen, one on the 
left and one on the right.  Please choose the larger of the two black dots. Click the Start 
button, and then click on one of the two options.  You need to make these responses 
fairly quickly.  Correct responses move you right to the next trial. Incorrect responses 
lead to a short period where the task is frozen.  You need to complete 800 trials, so the 
better you do, the faster you will finish. When you are ready, click on the START button. 
3.1.2 Results 
For all analyses, difficulty level was the absolute value of the difference between the trial 
level (1-13) and Level 7. Thus, Level 6 and Level 8 stimuli, which were the objectively most 
difficult stimuli to discriminate from the Level 7 stimuli, were recoded as Difficulty 1 trials.  
Level 5 and Level 9 stimuli were recoded as Difficulty 2, and so on, so that we had a new range 
of levels - Difficulty 1 (hardest) to Difficulty 6 (easiest) for each condition.  
Nonhuman Primates 
Throughout the remaining analyses in the current and following experiments, we 
removed any trials on which the monkeys timed-out because they did not respond quickly 
enough. These were extremely infrequent throughout all testing (ranging from 0.57% to 5.62% 
of trials across all monkeys).  
We conducted a mixed-design analysis of variance (ANOVA) to examine the effect of 
condition (Baseline, Small Control, Large Control, Congruent Test, and Incongruent Test) and 
absolute difficulty level (1-6) on the selection of the larger central dot with species (capuchin 
monkeys and rhesus monkeys) as the between-subjects variable. There was a significant main 
effect of condition, F (4, 72) = 8.18, p < .001, η2p = .31, and difficulty level, F (5, 90) = 610.20, p 
< .001, η2p = .97. There was not a significant main effect of species, F (1, 18) = 1.46, p = .24, η2p 
101 
= .08. There was a significant interaction between condition and difficulty level, F (20, 360) = 
2.89, p < .001, η2p = .14. There was not a significant interaction between condition and species, F 
(4, 72) = 0.71, p = .59, η2p = .04, nor between difficulty level and species, F (5, 90) = 1.05, p = 
.39, η2p = .06, nor was there a three-way interaction, F (20, 360) = .83, p = 0.68, η2p = .04.  
Figure 2 depicts group-level performance (i.e., selection of the larger central dot) as a function of 
condition and difficulty level for capuchin monkeys and rhesus monkeys.  
Because there was no main effect of species and no interaction of species with either of 
the other variables, we combined the two species for subsequent analyses. We then used a t-test 
to compare performance in selected pairs of conditions with a focus on the test conditions, 
collapsing across difficulty level using the average mean percentage of correct choices. A 
Bonferroni adjusted alpha level of .016 was used per test given the three comparisons of interest 
(.05/3). Performance in the Baseline condition was significantly higher than the Incongruent Test 
condition (t(19) = 4.22, p < .001), but did not differ significantly from the Congruent Test 
condition (t(19) = 1.85, p = .08). Performance in the Congruent Test condition did not differ 
significantly from the Incongruent Test condition (t(19) = 2.58, p = .018).  
For the Delboeuf Illusion probe trials, we conducted a one-sample t-test to compare 
selection of the illusory ‘larger’ dot (i.e., the Level 7 dot surrounded by the small ring) to chance 
level. Neither species’ selection of the illusory dot differed from chance (capuchins: t(12) = -
1.59, p = .14; rhesus monkeys: t(6) = 0.53, p = .62). We ran individual binomial tests on these 
data for each monkey, which are provided in the online appendices.  
Humans 
We conducted a within-subjects repeated-measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) to 
examine the effect of condition (Baseline, Small Control, Large Control, Congruent Test, and 
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Incongruent Test) and difficulty level (1-6) on the selection of the larger central dot. There was a 
significant main effect of condition, F (4, 84) = 45.11, p < .001, η2p = .68, and difficulty level, F 
(5, 105) = 231.54, p < .001, η2p = .92.  There also was a significant interaction between condition 
and difficulty level, F (20, 420) = 12.98, p < .001, η2p = .38. Figure 2 depicts group-level 
performance as a function of condition and difficulty level for human participants.  
We then conducted a t-test to compare performance in selected pairs of conditions with a 
focus on the test conditions, collapsing across difficulty level using the average mean percentage 
of correct choices. A Bonferroni adjusted alpha level of 0.016 was used per test given that three 
comparisons were made (.05/3). Performance in the Baseline condition was significantly higher 
than performance in the Congruent Test condition (t(21) = 9.21, p < .001), but did not differ 
significantly from the Incongruent Test condition (t(21) = .12, p = .91). Performance in the 
Incongruent Test condition also was significantly higher than the Congruent Test condition t(21) 
= -6.07, p < .001). Note that this was the expected pattern of results for illusion perception. 
These results differed from what was seen with monkeys, in which the Incongruent Test 
condition did not differ from the Congruent Test condition. 
For the Delboeuf Illusion probe trials, we used a one-sample t-test to compare selection 
of the illusory ‘larger’ dot (i.e., the Level 7 dot surrounded by the small ring) to chance level. 
Human participants selected the illusory dot that was surrounded by the small ring significantly 
above chance levels (t(21) = 4.71, p < .001). We also ran individual binomial tests on these data 
for each participant, which are provided in the online appendices. 
3.1.3 Discussion 
Human participants perceived the Delboeuf illusion in the current task, underestimating 
the size of central dots when large rings surrounded them and overestimating central dots when 
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small rings surrounded them. Further, human performance was disrupted in the Congruent Test 
condition as expected. Participants overestimated smaller dot sizes (because they appeared larger 
when surrounded by the small ring) and underestimated larger dot sizes (because they appeared 
smaller when surrounded by the large ring). Perception of the Delboeuf illusion in the current 
task matches that of previous reports in the literature for human adults (e.g., Coren & Girgus, 
1978; Delboeuf, 1865; Nicolas, 1995; Van Ittersum & Wansink, 2012).  
Rhesus monkeys and capuchin monkeys successfully learned to choose the larger of two 
central dots in the relative discrimination task. In Delboeuf Illusion trials, some monkeys (N = 2) 
perceived the illusion in a human-like fashion, selecting the dot surrounded by a small ring as 
larger at significant rates. However, more monkeys (N = 6) appeared to perceive the illusion in a 
reversed manner whereas the remaining monkeys did not demonstrate a preference at all in this 
trial type. Further, the monkeys’ performances were disrupted in the Incongruent Test trials, but 
in the opposite manner than was predicted and from that shown by humans (i.e., selected the 
small dot encircled by the large ring).  
Although these results suggest that monkeys perceived the Delboeuf illusion in a reversed 
direction from humans, we were concerned that these results were instead driven by a bias 
towards selecting the dot that was encircled by a large ring. This bias would result in the same 
findings that we have reported here. Nothing in our training routine had necessarily instructed 
the monkeys that rings were not relevant to the discrimination (i.e., dots and rings were identical 
in color and presented equally in training and testing), thus, we were concerned that the monkeys 
may have approached the task as one in which the rings and dots were to be discriminated as one 
stimulus. Large rings would generally be more attractive than small rings, a bias that would work 
against any possible Delboeuf illusion. The design of Experiment 1 may have limited our ability 
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to interpret the resulting response patterns with regard to the Delboeuf illusion. To resolve this 
problem, and to better assess any possible illusion, we extended our investigation of the 
Delboeuf illusion to an absolute classification task with a range of ring sizes. 
3.2 Experiment 2 
Here, we introduced a task in which participants classified a target dot of variable size as 
either ‘small’ or ‘large’ in comparison to a never presented central target size (Level 7). This 
differed from Experiment 1 in which participants made a relative judgment, selecting the larger 
of two black dots sometimes encircled by a ring. Now there was only ever one dot present on a 
given trial, reducing the reliance on a rule such as ‘choose the larger of two dots and/or rings.’ 
As in the former experiment, we presented a condition with no ring. We also presented a 
condition with a .50 dot diameter to ring diameter ratio. Previous studies have shown that a .50 
ratio does not induce an illusion (e.g., Van Ittersum & Wansink, 2012), and thus served as an 
additional baseline beyond the no ring condition in the current study. Other conditions involved 
rings that could serve to disrupt perceptual processing of the target dot. To avoid the concerns in 
Experiment 1 that the monkeys might not have understood that the rings were not part of the 
discrimination, we introduced a continuum of ring sizes. In Experiment 1, the standard dot 
(Level 7 – 3 cm in diameter) was presented in a .67 ratio with the small ring (4.5 cm in diameter) 
and a .33 ratio with the large ring (9 cm in diameter). Here, we introduced eight different dot-to-
ring ratios 0 (no ring), .25, .33, .45, .50, .55, .67, and .75 that were proportional to each 
individual target dot. We predicted that if the Delboeuf illusion was perceived, then 
underestimation of dot size would be most likely to occur at lower ratios (< .50) as these 
produced larger rings relative to the target dots. Alternatively, overestimation of dot size would 
be most likely to occur at higher ratios (> .50) as these produced smaller rings relative to the 
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target dots. This manipulation was critical to establishing whether the Delboeuf illusion emerges 
using a wider range of ratios within nonhumans, and how these ratios compared to the optimal 
ratio for demonstrating the Delboeuf illusion using this task with humans. 
3.2.1 Methods 
3.2.1.1 Participants 
Nonhuman Primates 
The same seven rhesus monkeys were tested. Eleven of the thirteen capuchin monkeys 
from Experiment 1 (excluding Gabe and Widget, who were assigned to other unrelated 
experimental tasks) participated in the current study.  
Humans 
Twenty-four new human participants were recruited from GSU’s undergraduate student 
body (average age: 19.41 years old ± 2.24, 22 females). Participants were tested using the 
computerized system described in Experiment 1. Again, all participants were required to give 
informed consent prior to participating in the experiment(s) and received course credit for their 
participation. Testing complied with procedures and protocols approved by the GSU IRB. 
3.2.1.2 Design and Procedure 
Nonhuman Primates 
Each trial proceeded as described in Experiment 1 (i.e., trial initiation, reinforcement, 
inter-trial interval) with one major difference. Now, a single target stimulus (a central dot that 
was sometimes surrounded by a concentric ring) was presented at the top middle of the screen, 
and participants were required to classify the central dot as ‘small’ (by moving the cursor to the 
bottom left of the screen to a blue rectangle) or ‘large’ (by moving the cursor to the bottom right 
of the screen to a green rectangle). Testing stimuli included the same 13 levels of dots that were 
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used in Experiment 1. A concentric ring sometimes surrounded the central dot at the top of the 
screen, and these rings could generate the following target dot to ring ratios: .25, .33, .45, .50, 
.55, .67, and .75. The baseline conditions were the 0 (no ring) ratio and the .50 ratio. These were 
used to establish classification performance without the effects of any inducing stimuli (0) or 
with a non-illusory ring size (.50). All other ring sizes were presented randomly with each of the 
target dot sizes (Levels 1-13, excluding Level 7). We oversampled the more difficult levels to 
increase the number of critical test trials presented (44% of test trials presented a randomly 
selected Level 4 to Level 10 trial whereas the remaining trials randomly sampled from the full 
range of levels).  
3.2.1.2.1 Training 
Monkeys completed a set of training trials to learn the rule of selecting the appropriate 
classification icon (small or large) using the three easiest difficulty levels.  These were presented 
in half of the trials in the 0 (no ring) ratio condition and in half of the trials in the .50 ratio.  The 
criterion for passing the training phase was set to 85% correct over the most recent 60 trials, at 
which point testing immediately began. One capuchin monkey (Gambit) failed to reach training 
criterion after 6,000 trials, and she was removed from the study.  
3.2.1.2.2 Testing 
Each monkey completed 12,000 testing trials including the following ratios presented in 
equal proportions: 0, .25, .33, .45, .50, .55, .67, and .75 ratios. Again, we analyzed the last 6,000 
test trials as we considered this mature performance on the task. 
Humans  
Human participants were tested using the same apparatus as was used in Experiment 1. 
The same general procedures were presented to humans as were used with the monkeys, 
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including the same absolute judgment task, classifying a central dot as ‘small’ or ‘large.’ 
Participants were presented with as many as 800 trials, and we used data from those participants 
who completed at least 600 trials in the task. Seven participants failed to complete at least 600 
trials, and the data from those participants were not included in the following analyses.  
Minimal written instructions were provided instead of a training phase to maximize the 
number of test trials completed per session with each participant. Before starting the experiment, 
participants read the following text: 
In this experiment, you will see a black dot at the top center of the screen.  Then, 
you must assign that dot as being either ‘Small’ or ‘Large’ by clicking on one of those 
two words on the screen. Click the Start button, and then click on one of the two options.  
You need to make these responses fairly quickly. Correct responses move you right to the 
next trial. Incorrect responses lead to a short period where the task is frozen.  You need to 
complete 800 trials, so the better you do, the faster you will finish. When you are ready, 
click on the START button. 
3.2.2 Results 
For all analyses, we reduced the number of levels from 13 levels to 6 levels. The new 
Levels 1 – 3 included all “small” dots (Level 1 combined former Levels 1 and 2, Level 2 
combined former Levels 3 and 4, Level 3 combined Levels 5 and 6). The new Levels 4 – 6 
included all “large” dots (Level 4 combined former Levels 8 and 9, Level 5 combined former 
Levels 10 and 11, Level 6 combined Levels 12 and 13). Thus, Levels 1 – 6 ranged from the 
smallest central dots to the largest central dots, with Level 1 (smallest) to Level 6 (largest). 
 
 
108 
Nonhuman Primates 
Again, we removed any trials on which the monkeys timed-out of a trial because they did 
not respond quickly enough. These were extremely infrequent throughout all testing in the 
current experiment (ranging from 0.49% to 4.14% of trials across all monkeys).     
We used a mixed-design analysis of variance (ANOVA) to examine the effect of ratio (0, 
.25, .33, .45, .50, .55, .67, and .75) and absolute difficulty level (1-6) on the proportion of trials 
where the participants made a dot classification of ‘small’ with species (capuchin monkeys and 
rhesus monkeys) as the between-subjects variable. There was a significant main effect of ratio, F 
(7, 105) = 2.71, p = .01, η2p = .15, difficulty level, F (5, 75) = 106.63, p < .001, η2p = .88, and of 
species, F (1, 15) = 6.89, p = .02, η2p = .32. There was a significant interaction between ratio and 
difficulty level, F (35, 525) = 4.17, p < .001, η2p = .22, and between difficulty level and species, 
F (5, 75) = 5.62, p < .001, η2p  = .27. There was not a significant interaction between ratio and 
species F (7, 105) = .54, p = .80, η2p = .04. There was a three-way interaction between ratio, 
level, and species, F (35, 525) = 1.94, p = .001, η2p = .11. Figure 3 depicts group-level 
performance (i.e., selection of the larger central dot) as a function of target dot to ring ratio and 
difficulty level for capuchin monkeys and rhesus monkeys. 
Given the three-way interaction, we conducted separate within-subjects repeated-
measures ANOVAs for each species with ratio and difficulty level as within-subjects variables. 
For capuchin monkeys, there was a significant main effect of ratio, F (7, 63) = 7.67, p < .001, η2p 
= .46 and of difficulty level, F (5, 45) = 291.93, p < .001, η2p = .97, and a significant interaction 
between ratio and difficulty level, F (35, 315) = 4.12, p < .001, η2p = .31. For rhesus monkeys, 
the repeated-measures ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of difficulty level, F (5, 30) = 
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13.48, p < .001, η2p = 0.69, but not of ratio, F (35, 210) = 2.13, p = .75, η2p = .09. There was a 
significant interaction between ratio and difficulty level, F (35, 210) = 2.13, p = .001, η2p = .26.   
Based on a visual inspection of Figure 3, the clearest examples of deviation from baseline 
were the .75 and .25 ring ratios. Here, and for the human participants, we used the .50 ratio as the 
baseline to compare against our critical test trials (.25 and .75 ratios) instead of the 0 (no ring) 
ratio as monkeys and human participants often over-classified the 0 (no ring) ratio as ‘small.’ 
Thus, the .50 ring ratio appeared to be a truer reflection of baseline performance given the full 
distribution of data across all ring ratios. A Bonferroni adjusted alpha level of .016 was used per 
test (.05/3). For capuchin monkeys, central dots were classified as ‘small’ significantly less often 
in the .75 ratio than in the .50 ratio (t(9) = 7.18, p < .001) or in the .25 ratio (t(9) = 3.72, p = 
.005), but there was not a significant difference between the .25 ratio and .50 ratio (t(9) = 1.02, p 
= .33). For rhesus monkeys, performance did not differ significantly for the .50 and .25 ratios 
t(6) = .86, p = .42), for the .50 and .75 ratios t(6) = .72, p = .50), nor for the .25 and .75 ratios t(6) 
= 1.06, p = .33). Thus, capuchin monkeys over-classified dots as ‘small’ when surrounded by 
large rings as would be expected in a human-like perception of this illusion, but rhesus did not as 
a group. We also explored individual differences by comparing each animal’s performance 
(percentage correct) in the critical test trials (.25 versus .75 ratios). Individual data are provided 
in the online appendices. 
Humans 
We conducted a within-subjects ANOVA to examine the effect of target dot to ring ratio 
(0, .25, .33, .45, .50, .55, .67, and .75) and absolute difficulty level (1-6; as described in 
Experiment 1) on the proportion of trials where the participants made a dot classification of 
‘small.’  There was a significant main effect of ring ratio, F (7, 112) = 9.19, p < .001, η2p = .37, 
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and difficulty level, F (5, 80) = 351.07, p < .001, η2p = .97.  There was a significant interaction 
between ring ratio and difficulty level, F (35, 560) = 2.26, p < .001, η2p = .12. Figure 3 depicts 
group-level performance as a function of condition and difficulty level for human participants. 
Collapsing across levels using the average mean percentage of small choices, we used a 
paired-samples t-test to compare the .50 ratio to the .25 ratio and .75 ratio. We also compared the 
.25 ratio to the .75 ratio. Finally, we compared the .75 and .67 ratios and the .25 and .33 ratios to 
establish whether there was an ‘optimal’ ratio at which under- or overestimation occurred as has 
been listed in the previous literature (e.g., Nicolas, 1995; Ogasawara, 1952; Piaget et al., 1942; 
Van Ittersum & Wansink, 2012). A Bonferroni adjusted alpha level of .01 was used per test 
(.05/5). Central dots were classified as ‘small’ significantly more in the .25 ratio than in the .33 
ratio (t(16) = 4.66, p < .001), and in the .50 ratio (t(16) = 5.35, p < .001), and in the .75 ratio 
(t(16) = 5.02, p < .001). Performance did not differ significantly for the .50 and .75 ratios (t(16) 
= -1.73, p = .10), nor for the .67 and .75 ratios (t(16) = -1.14, p = .27). Data for individual 
participants are provided in the online appendices. 
3.2.3 Discussion 
As expected, the presence of smaller rings led to overestimation of dot size and larger 
rings led to underestimation of dot size for human participants. Ultimately, the .25 ratio led to the 
highest cases of underestimation in the present experiment, and did so significantly more often 
than the .33 ratio. Although previous studies reported that a ratio close to .33 led to maximal 
underestimation and a ratio close to .67 led to maximal overestimation of the central dot (e.g., 
Nicolas, 1995; Ogasawara, 1952; Piaget et al., 1942; Van Ittersum & Wansink, 2012), we did not 
find evidence of these as optimal ratios in the current experiment.  Rather, the even more 
extreme ratios produced even greater evidence of the illusion.  
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Capuchin monkeys and some rhesus monkeys showed very similar performance patterns 
to the human participants, overestimating dots encircled by a small ring (.75 ratio) and 
underestimating dots encircled by a large ring (.25 ratio). The ratios of .25 and .75 appeared to be 
most effective for monkeys and humans, although there may be other ratios leading to a stronger 
illusion if the range were extended beyond the ratios presented here. Interestingly, an increased 
number of individual monkeys (14 of 17) perceived the illusion in Experiment 2 as compared to 
Experiment 1 (2 of 19; see Supplementary Materials). We did find evidence of a reversed 
illusion among three monkeys, but this was much less common than in Experiment 1 (where 6 
monkeys showed evidence of the reversed illusion). This difference in results between 
Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 suggested that the classification task assisted in isolating the 
central dot, reducing the possible reliance that the monkeys had on using the outer ring to help 
guide choice behavior in the first experiment. The results from Experiment 2 suggest that two 
nonhuman primate species other than chimpanzees (Parrish & Beran, 2014) perceive the 
Delboeuf illusion in a human-like fashion when tested using an absolute classification task.  
3.3 General Discussion 
Humans and both species of monkeys were proficient in the current set of size-judgment 
experiments, successfully choosing the larger of two central dots in the relative discrimination 
task (Experiment 1) and the absolute classification task (Experiment 2). The introduction of 
Delboeuf rings impacted perception of central dot size to varying degrees. In Experiment 1, 
humans demonstrated evidence of the illusion, choosing the dot surrounded by the small ring as 
larger than the same-sized dot in the larger ring. The monkeys did not show the same evidence of 
this illusion in Experiment 1. Rather, several of the monkeys revealed a pattern indicative of a 
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potential reversed illusion (i.e., they preferred a dot in a large ring relative to an identical dot in a 
small ring).  
Following Experiment 1, we were concerned that the monkeys may have had a bias to 
choose the larger of two stimuli when incorporating both dot size and ring size into the 
discrimination when differently sized rings were presented. This bias would conflict with the 
task demand to select only on the basis of target dot size. This large-ring bias could account for 
the current pattern of results, leading to a potential misidentification of a reversed Delboeuf 
illusion among monkey species. In Experiment 1, we presented stimuli (central dots and 
concentric rings) that were identical in their presentation (black on a white background). Further, 
we used a training procedure that presented dots and rings at equal rates to minimize enhanced 
attention towards either of these elements within the illusory array. This approach differed from 
similar illusion studies with animals using the Ebbinghaus-Titchener illusion that presented 
target and inducer features with different colors, or purposefully trained the animals to ignore the 
illusory-inducing stimuli (e.g., Nakamura et al., 2008, 2014; Parron & Fagot, 2007).  
We chose our approach in Experiment 1 because there was sufficient evidence that 
differential attention to various elements within an array leads to differences in the perception 
and magnitude of many geometric illusions within humans, even leading to their complete 
elimination or reversal (e.g., Coren & Girgus, 1972; Ebert & Pollack, 1972, 1973; Girgus, et al., 
1972; Martin, 1979; Massaro & Anderson, 1971; Weintraub & Cooper, 1972; Yamazaki, Otsuka, 
Kanazawa, & Yamaguchi, 2010). Further, positive comparative evidence for the Ebbinghaus-
Titchener illusion has been cited in tasks that do not isolate the different features of the visual 
array during training or testing (e.g., Murayama et al., 2012; Rosa Salva et al., 2013; Sovrano et 
al., 2015). Thus, we deliberately did not enhance attention towards the central dot to avoid 
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inadvertently reducing the natural emergence of the Delboeuf illusion. However, our training 
paradigm and the results of Experiment 1 suggested that the monkeys may have inappropriately 
incorporated rings into their size judgments of central dots because we did not visually 
differentiate the feature of interest (dot or ring). This could have led to a reversed illusion.   
In Experiment 2, we used an absolute classification task to eliminate this concern. In the 
classification task, the monkeys could no longer choose the stimulus with the larger ring, but 
instead had to learn to classify dot sizes surrounded by a continuum of outer ring sizes when only 
the target dot mattered to determining the correct classification. Human participants 
overestimated dot sizes surrounded by smaller rings and underestimated dot sizes surrounded by 
larger rings – this is the traditional illusion. We also found positive evidence of the illusion in 
capuchin monkeys at the group level and at the individual level for most capuchin and rhesus 
monkeys. These positive results matched evidence of the Delboeuf illusion in chimpanzees 
(Parrish & Beran, 2014) and of other geometric illusions among capuchin monkeys and rhesus 
monkeys (e.g., Agrillo et al., Bayne & Davis, 1993; Fujita, 1996; Suganuma et al., 2007; 
Zivotofsky et al., 2005). 
Illusions rely on the simultaneous processing of multiple parts of a visual array. Humans 
with an increased global or holistic perceptual mode of processing demonstrate greater degrees 
of perceiving illusions (e.g., Berry, 1968, 1971; Dawson, 1967; Witkin, 1967), whereas humans 
who are more locally oriented failed to perceive illusions as readily (e.g., Dakin & Frith, 2005; 
de Fockert, Davidoff, Fagot, Parron, & Goldstein, 2007; Happé, 1996; Happé, Briskman, & 
Frith, 2001). Of interest to the current study, comparative evidence supports a more locally-
oriented processing style for capuchin monkeys (De Lillo, Spinozzi, Truppa, & Naylor, 2005; 
Spinozzi, De Lillo, & Salvi, 2006; Spinozzi, De Lillo, & Truppa, 2003) and rhesus monkeys 
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(Hopkins & Washburn, 2002, but see Tanaka & Fujita, 2000; Tanaka, Onoe, Tsukada, & Fujita, 
2001). Processing style plays a large role in the emergence of geometric illusions, but the 
methodology used to elicit these illusions can favor one style of processing over the other. 
Critically, using procedures that do not isolate or enhance attention to different elements may be 
an important feature for illusion emergence, especially among species that are more locally-
oriented (see Rosa Salva et al., 2013, for more discussion). Of course, therein lies the challenge 
of instructing nonverbal species to attend to one specific element of interest in a complex multi-
element array, especially if that one element is not visually differentiated from the other(s). This 
can inadvertently lead to a different, but equally challenging problem that we encountered in the 
first experiment, in which monkeys might have incorporated the inducer into their size judgment. 
The absolute classification task that we used in Experiment 2 allowed us to overcome these 
concerns, but this cannot eliminate these concerns completely.  
Studies presenting the Delboeuf illusion (and other size illusions) to additional nonhuman 
species will be needed for establishing when, why, and for whom these illusions emerge and the 
mechanisms that lead to their emergence. Through the current and related investigations, we can 
begin to disentangle competing hypotheses of illusion perception among nonhuman animals, and 
the complementary roles that methodology and perceptual processing mode play. 
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3.5 Figures 
 
A. Delboeuf illusion 
 
B. Ebbinghaus-Titchener illusion 
 
Figure 1. The Delboeuf (A) and Ebbinghaus-Titchener (B) illusions, both depicting identically 
sized central dots surrounded by differently sized inducers. The size of the central dot 
surrounded by a small inducer(s) (at left; ring: Delboeuf illusion or circles: Ebbinghaus-
Titchener illusion) is typically overestimated relative to an identical dot surrounded by a large 
inducer (at right).  
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C. 
 
Figure 2. Mean percentage correct (i.e., selection of the larger central dot) for capuchin monkeys 
(A), rhesus monkeys (B), and human participants (C) in Experiment 1, including the following 
conditions: Baseline, Small Control, Large Control, Congruent Test, and Incongruent Test. 
Absolute difficulty levels progress from 1 (hardest) to 6 (easiest).  
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C.  
Figure 3. Mean percentage of ‘small’ responses for capuchin monkeys (A), rhesus monkeys (B), 
and human participants (C) in Experiment 2, including the following ratios: 0, .25, .33, .45, .50, 
.55, .67, and .75. Difficulty levels progress from 1 (smallest dot) to 6 (largest dot).  
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ABSTRACT 
In the current set of studies, we investigated whether chimpanzees, rhesus monkeys, and 
capuchin monkeys perceived the Ebbinghaus-Titchener illusion in a similar manner as human 
adults. The Ebbinghaus illusion is a geometric size illusion that occurs because of contrast 
effects – large inducers lead to central dot size underestimation and small inducers lead to central 
dot size overestimation. In Experiment 1, we presented chimpanzees with a two-choice 
discrimination task where they selected the larger of two round food items on each trial. Round 
inedible inducers of different size surrounded the food items to create an illusory context. 
Chimpanzees did not experience the illusion, as they accurately selected the larger food portion 
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across control and test conditions. In Experiments 2 and 3, monkeys and humans were presented 
with a computerized task that required subjects to classify a central dot that was sometimes 
surrounded by small or large inducers as being either ‘small’ or ‘large.’ We found evidence of 
the Ebbinghaus-Titchener illusion as it typically manifests among human participants, but we did 
not find evidence of the illusion among monkeys. Rather, most monkeys demonstrated a 
response bias to incorporate outer inducers into their dot classification. The current results and 
previous comparative findings suggest that the Ebbinghaus-Titchener illusion presents a 
challenging test case for nonverbal species. Specifically, subjects tended to incorporate the 
inducers into target discrimination, which can lead to a non-illusion or a reversed illusion as a 
byproduct of misunderstanding the task rule.   
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4 INVESTIGATING THE EBBINGHAUS-TITCHENER ILLUSION:  
LESSONS FROM NONHUMAN PRIMATES 
Seeing is believing – we assess and react to the veridical nature of visual sensation, with 
our perceptual systems rarely misleading our subsequent thoughts and actions. Thus, visual 
illusions, when they occur, are an intriguing phenomenon in the world of perceptual science. 
Illusions emerge when we misperceive the most basic physical properties of our external world, 
such as object size, shape, and color, as a function of the context in which we perceive those 
objects. Intriguing as illusory phenomena are, they also function to provide information on the 
organization and processes by which we perceive physical stimuli. Further, studying illusions 
among nonhuman animals allows for the comparison of different species’ perception. If an 
animal misperceives the world in a similar fashion to humans, perhaps those species share 
commonalities in their visual and perceptual systems (Agrillo, Petrazzini, & Dadda, 2013; 
Wasserman, 2012).  
Geometric illusions comprise the largest category of perceptual illusions, and they 
emerge when a target’s physical properties (e.g., size, shape, length, width, diameter, orientation, 
etc.) are distorted on the basis of the target’s surrounding context. Because of their seemingly 
simple 2-dimensional format, geometric illusions have been presented to several species of 
nonhuman animals including a number of nonhuman primates (hereafter primates). Typically, 
primates perceive these geometric illusions in a similar fashion to humans, including the 
Delboeuf illusion (Cebus apella and Macaca mulatta: Parrish, Brosnan, & Beran, 2015; Pan 
troglodytes: Parrish & Beran, 2014a), the Horizontal-Vertical illusion (Cercopithecinae and 
Cebus: Dominguez, 1954), the Zöllner illusion (Macaca mulatta: Agrillo, Parrish, & Beran, 
2014; Papio papio: Benhar & Samuel, 1982), the Ponzo illusion (Macaca mulatta: Bayne & 
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Davis, 1993; Fujita, 1996; Pan troglodytes: Fujita, 1997, 2001), the Mueller-Lyer illusion (Cebus 
apella: Suganuma, Pessoa, Monge-Fuentes, Castro, & Tavares, 2007), the Duncker illusion 
(Macaca mulatta: Zivotofsky, Goldberg, & Powell, 2005), the rectangle illusion 
(Cercopithecinae and Cebus: Dominquez, 1954; Harris, 1968) and the corridor illusion (Papio 
papio: Barbet & Fagot, 2002; Pan troglodytes: Imura, Tomonaga, & Yagi, 2008). Overall, 
comparative research reveals similarity of illusory perception across several primate species and 
humans, suggesting commonalities in the perceptual systems of these highly related species.  
The Delboeuf illusion emerges when a central dot encircled by a small ring is perceived 
to be larger than the same-sized dot encircled by a large ring (Delboeuf, 1869). Chimpanzees 
demonstrated perception of this illusion in a food choice task, selecting the larger of two circular 
food portions (mimicking central dot) when plated on same-sized plates (creating the ring; 
Parrish & Beran, 2014a). However, small plates were preferred to large plates when identical 
portions were presented, much like the Delboeuf illusion demonstrates. Further, we tested 
capuchin and rhesus monkeys on a computerized two-choice task similar to the chimpanzee task, 
but with 2-dimensional dots and rings (Parrish et al., 2015). The monkeys developed a response 
bias, erroneously incorporating outer ring size into the dot discrimination, leading to what might 
be interpreted as a reversed illusion (a preference for the dot encircled by the large ring). We 
extended our work with monkeys to a computerized classification task in which monkeys 
classified a central dot as ‘small’ or ‘large.’ Monkeys’ judgments of dot size varied as a function 
of ring size similarly to humans, such that larger rings led to dot underestimation and smaller 
rings led to dot overestimation. Transforming the question from a relative discrimination task to 
a classification task removed the possibility for monkeys to simply choose the dot with the 
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bigger ring. The classification task helped to isolate the target of interest (the dot), which then 
allowed for a fairer assessment of the Delboeuf illusion. 
In the related Ebbinghaus-Titchener illusion (Ebbinghaus, 1902) a central dot surrounded 
by several small outer dots is perceived as larger than the same-sized central dot surrounded by 
several large outer dots (see Figure 1). The Delboeuf and Ebbinghaus illusions are highly similar 
geometric size illusions that occur due to contrast effects – large contexts lead to underestimation 
of target size and small contexts lead to overestimation of target size (e.g., Nicolas, 1995). 
Although the Ebbinghaus-Titchener illusion quite literally is the textbook example of visual 
illusions and has been widely studied among human adults (e.g., Coren & Enns, 1993; Girgus, 
Coren, & Agdern, 1972; Massaro & Anderson, 1971; Weintraub, 1979), there is relatively little 
research on this illusion in nonhuman animals.  
The single primate study investigating the Ebbinghaus-Titchener illusion revealed a non-
effect in which baboons accurately perceived target circle size in control trials and were 
indifferent to the illusion probe trials presenting the illusory-inducing circles (Parron & Fagot, 
2007). That study presented the baboons with different colored target and inducer circles with 
the specific intent to promote attention to the bright yellow central target over the inducing 
circles. Additional negative evidence for the existence of the illusion among animals comes from 
a study that used a fading procedure to gradually introduce the inducer circles after pigeons 
(Columbidae) had been trained to discriminate a range of target diameters (Nakamura, 
Watanabe, & Fujita, 2008).  
Arguably, these previous procedures may have enhanced attention towards the target and 
trained animals to ignore the inducers, leading to a decrease in the likelihood of illusion 
emergence. Positive evidence of a human-like Ebbinghaus-Titchener illusion among nonhumans 
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comes from a dolphin (Tursiops truncatus: Murayama, Usui, Takeda, Kato, & Maejima, 2012) 
and four-day-old chicks (Gallus gallus: Rosa Salva, Rugani, Cavazzana, Regolin, Vallortigara, 
2013) using procedures that did not enhance attention to the target or inducing stimuli, but rather 
presented both features throughout the entire experiment. Because of our recent studies of the 
Delboeuf illusion (Parrish & Beran, 2014a, Parrish et al., 2015), and given the positive evidence 
among monkeys using a computerized classification task, we introduced the Ebbinghaus-
Titchener illusion to chimpanzees, rhesus monkeys, and capuchin monkeys to test whether this 
illusion might emerge using different methodological approaches from those used previously 
with other nonhuman species.   
In Experiment 1, chimpanzees were presented with a relative quantity judgment paradigm 
that required subjects to choose between two sets of food that differed based on their relative 
size. Also known as the natural choice paradigm, this procedure has many advantages, including 
the requirement of little to no training, high levels of motivation, establishment of subjective 
food preferences, and the demonstration of perceptual sensitivity to quantity, size, or amount of 
food arrays (see Beran, Ratliff, & Evans, 2009; Silberberg, Widholm, Bresler, Fujita, & 
Anderson, 1998). Menzel (1961) discussed the utility of this direct choice paradigm in that it 
facilitates reliable and rapid measures of food-size preferences that are stable across time and 
other variables (e.g., aging, etc.). This paradigm also was successful in testing the Delboeuf 
illusion among chimpanzees in our previous work (Parrish & Beran, 2014a). 
In Experiment 2, we extended these questions to rhesus monkeys and capuchin monkeys 
using a computerized methodology to further establish whether other, more distantly related 
primate species perceived the Ebbinghaus-Titchener illusion. Here, we tested monkeys using a 
computerized classification task, in which subjects had to classify target size when surrounded 
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by inducing circles of variable size. A classification task was used because this methodology had 
proven to be successful in testing similar illusions among nonhuman primate species, such as the 
Delboeuf illusion (Parrish et al., 2015). In Experiment 3, human adults were presented with the 
same computerized task to establish how monkey illusion perception related to that of human 
adults. 
4.1 Experiment 1 
4.1.1 Methods – Phase 1 
4.1.1.1 Participants 
The primates included in all studies were housed and tested at the Language Research 
Center (LRC) of Georgia State University (GSU) in Atlanta, Georgia. LRC primates were never 
food deprived for testing purposes and had 24-hour access to water, including during test 
sessions. They received a daily diet of fruits, vegetables, and primate chow regardless of 
participation in testing, and caloric intake was kept consistent by taking into account the amount 
of food earned from testing when determining the diet. All testing protocols complied with 
guidelines for working with primates as established by protocols approved by the GSU 
Institutional Animal Care and Use Committee. GSU is accredited by the Association for 
Assessment and Accreditation of Laboratory Animal Care.  
Three chimpanzees participated in this study including one female (Lana – 44 years) and 
two males (Sherman – 41 years, Mercury – 28 years). All chimpanzees were housed together in 
the same building and spent time together in social groups daily, but they voluntarily separated 
for test sessions. All chimpanzees had extensive prior experience making choices between 
different quantities of foods (e.g., Beran 2001, 2004, 2012; Beran et al., 2009; Parrish & Beran, 
2014a, 2014b; Parrish, Evans, & Beran, 2015; Rumbaugh, Savage-Rumbaugh, & Hegel, 1987). 
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4.1.1.2 Apparatus 
 Chimpanzees were presented with two food quantities via an 80 cm wide by 28 cm deep 
sliding tray mounted to a 45 cm high bench outside of their enclosure. The test bench also 
included an opaque blind that could be lowered completely to prevent the chimpanzee from 
viewing the food items before the beginning of the trials. During the choice phase, the blind was 
lowered partially so the chimpanzee could only view the choices and the experimenter could 
only view the chimpanzee’s hands once a response had been made (to prevent the experimenter 
from providing inadvertent cues to the chimpanzee). To further prevent cuing, the experimenter 
closed her eyes during the choice phase and a second experimenter out of view of the 
chimpanzees announced the chimpanzee’s choice. These response choices by the chimpanzees 
were unambiguous in terms of direct points to one of the two options. 
4.1.1.3 General Procedure 
The testing setup included two choice arrays from which the chimpanzees chose one of 
those arrays. Choice stimuli were comprised of an edible central target dot (lunchmeat slices) 
that in some conditions were surrounded by several inedible inducer circles of variable size. The 
lunchmeat was cut into a round shape using a circular cookie cutter. When present, the inducing 
circles were comprised of smaller circular pieces of felt material that were similar in color to the 
lunchmeat. In critical test trials, the inducing circles served to create a potential illusory inducing 
context in which the participants might misperceive the size of the central target.  
Two different sizes of lunchmeat were used, including a larger portion (7.3 cm in 
diameter) and a smaller portion (6.35 cm in diameter). When present, several small and large 
inedible circles surrounded the target dots. The small inducing circles were 2.8 cm in diameter 
and the large inducing circles were 7.9 cm in diameter. Inducing circles were positioned so that 
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they were equidistant from the center of the lunchmeat. Large inducing circles were positioned 
approximately 5.1 cm away from the center point of the food portion. Small inducing circles 
were positioned approximately 3.8 cm away from the center point of the food portion. 
After preparing the food choices, Experimenter 1 (E1) raised the blind approximately 10 
cm and slid the shelf (and food choices) toward the chimpanzee after 3 s.  The second 
experimenter (E2) observed and recorded the chimpanzee’s selection of the left or right food 
choice. Following the chimpanzee’s selection, E1 immediately delivered the contents of the 
chosen food option to the chimpanzee for consumption.  
Table 1 outlines the seven trial types and predicted performance patterns for each trial 
type. Baseline trials presented two target dots with no inducer circles, and this established 
baseline performance regarding how well the chimpanzees could select the larger of two pieces 
of lunchmeat without any illusory inducing circles. The two dot sizes were always different, and 
thus there was always an objectively correct choice in these trials.  
Small Control trials presented the two different target dots, each surrounded by the small 
inducer circles. Large Control trials presented the two different target dots, each surrounded by 
the large inducer circles. These arrays served as control trials as they presented two objectively 
different-sized food portions that should be easily differentiated, as the inducers were identical in 
size between the two arrays, and thus should not generate an illusory context.  
Four test trial types were presented, including Small Mixed trials, Large Mixed trials, 
Inducer Control trials, and Ebbinghaus-Titchener Illusion trials. In the Small Mixed and Large 
Mixed trials, inducers surrounded one dot in the array whereas inducers did not surround the 
second dot. In both of these trial types, the two different lunchmeat portions were presented. The 
Small Mixed trials presented the smaller portion with no inducers versus the larger portion 
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surrounded by small inducers. If the illusion were to occur, these trials should increase accuracy 
in the task compared to baseline and control trials, as the large portion may be over-estimated 
because it would appear even larger when surrounded by small inducers. The Large Mixed trials 
presented the smaller food portion with no inducers versus the larger portion surrounded by 
larger inducers. This trial type should decrease accuracy in the task relative to baseline and 
control trials, as the large target may be under-estimated, as it would appear smaller than its true 
size when surrounded by large inducers. Subjects may perceive these two dots as being close to 
equal in size rather than perceiving their true difference.   
The Inducer Control trials presented the small portion surrounded by large inducers and 
the large portion with no inducers. In this trial type, the chimpanzees should select the large 
portion at even greater levels than Baseline or Control trials as the small portion would appear 
even smaller inside of the large context. This trial type introduced a trial in which the large 
portion was not located inside of inducers, which was true for all other test trial types. We 
included this trial type to prevent the animals from learning a simple rule such as ‘select the 
portion surrounded by inducers.’  
Finally, the Ebbinghaus-Titchener Illusion test trials presented two identical food 
portions surrounded by different-sized inducers. This array typically generates the Ebbinghaus-
Titchener illusion in humans such that the target dot surrounded by small inducers appears larger 
than the equal-sized target surrounded by large inducers.  
Chimpanzees completed a total of 66 testing trials, including 30 Baseline trials, 10 
Control trials (5 Large Control and 5 Small Control), 10 Mixed trials (5 Small Mixed and 5 
Large Mixed), 6 Inducer Control trials, and 10 Ebbinghaus-Titchener Illusion trials. Trial types 
were pseudo-randomly presented, with at least one inducer trial presented in every block of three 
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trials and at least one Inducer Control in a test session. Chimpanzees completed 10 to 20 trials 
per day, depending upon their motivation to continue working on the task. 
4.1.2 Methods - Phase 2 
Phase 2 was identical to Phase 1, except for the introduction of different food portion 
sizes. Because we documented a ceiling effect in Phase 1 in which the animals were highly 
proficient in selecting the larger portion of meat across all trial types, we introduced slightly 
more difficult discriminations in Phase 2. In Phase 1, the larger portion of lunchmeat measured 
53.3 sq. cm and the smaller portion measured 40.4 sq. cm. Here, the larger portion of lunchmeat 
measured 64 sq. cm and the smaller portion measured 53.3 sq. cm. 
 Chimpanzees completed a total of 124 testing trials, including 24 Baseline trials, 32 
Control trials (16 Large Control and 16 Small Control), 32 Mixed trials (16 Small Mixed and 16 
Large Mixed), 12 Inducer Control trials, and 24 Ebbinghaus-Titchener Illusion trials. Trial types 
were randomly presented. Chimpanzees completed 10 to 20 trials per day, depending upon their 
motivation to continue working on the task. 
4.1.3 Results - Phase 1 
First, we examined performance in the non-illusion trial types, including Baseline and 
Control trials. Chimpanzees performed very well in Baseline trials, significantly preferring the 
larger portion of food to the smaller portion of food in Baseline trials: Binomial tests, all 
chimpanzees p < .0001 (see Figure 2). The same was true for Control trials for Mercury and 
Lana. Collapsing across control trial type (Small Control and Large Control), Mercury and Lana 
significantly preferred the larger food portion over the smaller portion in Control trials; Binomial 
tests, both chimpanzees: p = .02. Sherman chose the larger food portion in 70% of Control trials, 
but this did not exceed levels of statistical significance.  
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Chimpanzees continued to choose the largest portion of food in all test trials that 
presented a true difference in food amount despite the illusory contexts. Because of the high 
performance rates across Small Mixed, Large Mixed, and Inducer Control trials, we collapsed 
across trial types. All chimpanzees performed significantly better than chance; Binomial tests: 
Sherman p < .001, Mercury p = .02, and Lana p = .04. 
In the test of the Ebbinghaus-Titchener illusion, we compared each chimpanzee’s 
percentage of trials selecting the food portion surrounded by small inducers to chance levels. 
None of the chimpanzees chose the food surrounded by small inducers at levels exceeding 
chance; Binomial tests: all chimpanzees p > .05. 
4.1.4 Results - Phase 2 
Again, we first examined performance in the non-illusion trial types, including Baseline 
and Control trials for Phase 2. Chimpanzees performed very well in Baseline trials, significantly 
preferring the larger portion of food to the smaller portion of food: Binomial tests: Sherman p = 
.02, Mercury p < .0001, and Lana p < .001 (see Figure 3). Collapsing across control trial type, all 
three chimpanzees significantly preferred the larger food portion over the smaller portion; 
Binomial tests: Sherman p = .002, Mercury p < .001, and Lana p < .001.  
To examine performance in the test trials that presented a true difference in food amount, 
we compared performance in the Small Mixed, Large Mixed, and Inducer Control trials to 
performance in the Baseline trials for each chimpanzee. Large Mixed trials should have 
decreased performance relative to Baseline as the large portion should be underestimated in the 
large inducers. However, chimpanzees were equally proficient in choosing the larger portion in 
Large Mixed and Baseline trials (Fisher’s Exact test: Sherman p = .73, Mercury p = .09, Lana p 
= .23). Small Mixed trials should have increased performance relative to Baseline, as the large 
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portion should be overestimated in the small inducers. The opposite was true for Sherman; he 
selected the smaller portion of food significantly more often in the Small Mixed trials versus 
Baseline trials (Fisher’s Exact test: Sherman p = .02). The other two chimpanzees again did not 
show a difference in performance for this comparison (Fisher’s Exact test: Mercury p = .20 and 
Lana p = 1.0). Finally, Inducer Control trials should have increased performance relative to 
Baseline as the small portion should be judged as even smaller than it truly was in the large 
inducers. Chimpanzees again were equally proficient in selecting the larger food portion across 
trial type (Fisher’s Exact test: Sherman p = .69, Mercury p = .31, Lana p = 1.0). 
For Ebbinghaus-Titchener illusion trials, we compared each chimpanzee’s selection of 
the food portion surrounded by small inducers to chance levels. As in Phase 1, none of the 
chimpanzees chose the food surrounded by small inducers at levels exceeding chance; Binomial 
tests: all chimpanzees p > .05. 
4.1.5 Discussion 
Chimpanzees were highly proficient in choosing the larger of two food portions across 
baseline, control, and test conditions in both Phase 1 and Phase 2. These high performance rates 
mirrored performance by these chimpanzees and others in various tests of quantity judgment 
(Beran, 2001, 2004, 2012; Beran & Beran, 2004; Boysen & Berntson, 1995; Dooley & Gill, 
1977; Hanus & Call, 2007; Menzel, 1960, 1961; Menzel & Davenport, 1962; Menzel & Draper, 
1965; Rumbaugh et al., 1987). Ultimately, the chimpanzees did not perceive the illusion in this 
food choice context despite recent successful efforts to induce the Delboeuf illusion in the same 
chimpanzees using a food choice task (Parrish & Beran, 2014a). In addition to misjudgments of 
quantity in the Delboeuf illusion, other misleading contexts have impacted chimpanzee quantity 
judgment, including container size, cohesiveness of food sets, and the presence and location of 
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the largest single item (Beran, Evans, & Harris, 2008; Boysen, Berntson, Mukobi, 2001; Parrish 
& Beran, 2014a).  
That the Ebbinghaus-Titchener array does not lead to similar quantity biases and errors is 
intriguing. Qualitatively speaking, the Ebbinghaus-Titchener inducers were quite salient in 
comparison to previous contexts that have produced quantity misjudgments or biases. Although 
we presented inducers that were color-matched to the lunchmeat slices in the current task to 
increase similarity between target and inducers, the inducers were still visually distinctive, 
whereas the previous studies reported above incorporated subtle differences to the context or 
food arrangement (e.g., plate size and spatial arrangement of food items within sets). Further, the 
chimpanzees may have actively discounted the inducers as they were clearly inedible, whereas 
the contexts were less overt and perhaps more difficult to discount in previous illusory studies 
(Beran et al., 2008; Boysen et al., 2001; Parrish & Beran, 2014a). The Ebbinghaus-Titchener 
illusion is, by definition, a more complex array than the Delboeuf array, with multiple large 
stimuli from which it is difficult to visually isolate the target of interest (the central dot). This 
unique characteristic of the Ebbinghaus-Titchener array creates a particularly challenging 
methodological task to present to nonverbal species.  
We thought that perhaps more difficult food size discriminations would evoke the 
Ebbinghaus-Titchener illusion in Phase 2 due to the ceiling effect documented in Phase 1. 
Chimpanzees remained proficient in selecting the larger portion of food across trial types and, 
again, did not fall prey to the illusion even with less discrepant portion sizes. These results 
suggest that chimpanzees do not perceive the Ebbinghaus-Titchener illusion in the current food-
choice task. Future studies with chimpanzees and other great apes that extend the illusion to 
different contexts (e.g., computerized psychophysics task) are needed to establish whether the 
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illusion emerges under different methodological circumstances. We next extended this 
investigation to other primate species, including rhesus monkeys and capuchin monkeys, to 
establish whether monkey species also fail to perceive the illusion, or if perhaps, they perceive 
the illusion similarly to how humans perceive it. 
4.2 Experiment 2 
4.2.1 Methods 
4.2.1.1 Participants 
Six adult rhesus macaques (all males) and eight adult capuchin monkeys (4 females) were 
included in the following experiments. Rhesus monkeys were individually housed and had 24-
hour access to a computerized testing apparatus within their home cage. Rhesus monkeys had 
constant visual and auditory access to conspecifics and received weekly access to an indoor-
outdoor enclosure with another monkey. Capuchin monkeys were group housed in indoor-
outdoor enclosures, and they separated voluntarily into individual testing enclosures for 
computerized testing (with visual and auditory access to conspecifics). These monkeys have 
participated in several computerized perceptual discrimination tasks (e.g., Agrillo et al., 2014; 
Beran & Parrish, 2013; Beran, Smith, Coutinho, Couchman, & Boomer, 2009; Parrish et al., 
2015). 
4.2.1.2 Apparatus  
Nonhuman primates included in this study were joystick trained for computerized testing 
using the Language Research Center’s Computerized Test System consisting of a color monitor, 
personal computer, digital joystick, and food pellet dispenser (Evans, Beran, Chan, Klein, & 
Menzel, 2008; Richardson, Washburn, Hopkins, Savage-Rumbaugh, & Rumbaugh, 1990). 
Primates manipulated the joystick with their hands to isomorphically control a small round 
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cursor on the computer screen. Monkeys were not restrained during testing, and thus the viewing 
distance from the monitor was approximately 30.5 cm to 40.5 cm. Correct responses led to 
banana-flavored pellet rewards (45-mg pellets for capuchins and 94-mg pellets for rhesus 
monkeys: Bio-Serv, Frenchtown, NJ) via a pellet dispenser interfaced to the computer through a 
digital I/O board (PDISO8A; Keithley Instruments, Cleveland, OH). Programs were written in 
Visual Basic 6.0.  
4.2.1.3 Stimuli 
 On all trials, the stimulus, including a central dot and (when present) inducing circles, 
was black presented on a white background, to minimize enhanced attention to one of these array 
elements over the other. Using a psychophysical step procedure, a range of 13 possible target 
dots was established.  Levels 1-6 were all smaller than the Level 7 dot, and their size was 
generated by the following equation: Level = 3cm*0.98(7-TrialLevel). Levels 8-13 were all larger 
than the Level 7 dot, and their size was generated by the following equation: Level = 
3cm*1.02(TrialLevel-7). This made Level 1 and Level 13 dots the easiest to discriminate from Level 
7 and Level 6 and Level 8 dots the hardest to discriminate from Level 7. When they were 
present, small or large inducing circles surrounded the target dot. Small inducing circles were 1 
cm in diameter. Large inducing circles were 4 cm in diameter. 
4.2.1.4 Design and Procedure 
At the outset of each trial, participants moved a small round cursor that they controlled 
into contact with a grey button at the top center of the computer screen.  Then, that button 
disappeared, the cursor re-centered, and the test stimulus and two classification icons appeared as 
choice options. Each trial presented a single target stimulus (a central dot that was sometimes 
surrounded by inducing dots) at the top middle of the screen. Participants were required to 
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classify the central dot as ‘small’ (by moving the cursor to the bottom left of the screen to a blue 
rectangle) or ‘large’ (by moving the cursor to the bottom right of the screen to a green rectangle). 
Participants were required to select one of the classification icons within 3 s, or the trial was 
scored as an error. After selection of a stimulus or after 3 s of inactivity, the screen was cleared 
completely.  Selection of the correct classification icon led to a melodic chime and a pellet 
reward.  Selection of the incorrect classification icon led to a buzz tone and a 20-s timeout period 
during which the screen remained blank. The inter-trial interval was 1 second. Monkeys worked 
on the task between 4- and 6-hours per day, completing as many trials as possible within a 
testing session given their motivation to engage the task.  
There were three conditions.  Trials in the Baseline condition presented a central target 
dot on each trial with no inducing circles, and this established the baseline performance rate in 
classifying dot sizes when inducing circles could not make any impact on the perception of the 
dot sizes.  Trials in the Large Inducer condition presented a target dot on each trial surrounded by 
six large inducing circles. Trials in the Small Inducer condition presented a target dot on each 
trial surrounded by eight small inducing circles.  
4.2.1.4.1 Training 
Monkeys completed a set of training trials to learn the rule of classifying the central 
target dot as ‘large’ or ‘small.’ This was done using the three easiest absolute levels for each 
classification (Levels 1-3 and Levels 11-13), divided into 50% Baseline trials, 25% Large 
Control trials, and 25% Small Control trials. The criterion was set to 85% correct over the most 
recent 60 trials. After monkeys reached criterion, they immediately entered the test phase during 
that session.  
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4.2.1.4.2 Pilot Test Data 
Four capuchin monkeys completed a pre-study test in which they were randomly 
presented with all conditions within a test session (50% Baseline trials, 25% Small Inducer trials, 
and 25% Large Inducer trials). Pilot data suggested that the monkeys were classifying central dot 
size according to the inducing circle size in test trials, with Large Inducer trials posing a 
particular problem for animals. Overall, monkeys performed well in classifying central dot size 
in the Baseline and Small Inducer conditions, with an average accuracy of 86.5% for Baseline 
trials and 70.43% for Small Inducer trials (with a slight tendency to over-classify Small Inducer 
trials as ‘small’). On average, monkeys classified nearly all of Large Inducer trials as large 
(79.84% ‘large’ responses). Because of this early evidence of a response bias towards 
classification based on inducer size (especially for Large Inducer trials), we presented conditions 
in the formal testing phase sequentially rather than intermixed. Thus, the monkeys now 
completed 3,000 Baseline trials followed by 3,000 Small Inducer or 3,000 Large Inducer trials 
rather than trial-by-trial randomization of condition type.  This blocked-presentation style was 
introduced in an attempt to reduce the reliance on inducer size during classification because, 
now, each trial presented the same inducer type for a larger number of trials. Three out of four of 
these monkeys who completed the pilot testing advanced to the formal testing phase. One 
monkey (Liam) was discontinued from the study for reasons unrelated to this experiment. 
4.2.1.4.3 Testing 
In the formal testing phase, we introduced the full continuum of levels (Levels 1 – 13, 
excluding Level 7 which never was presented). We oversampled the more difficult levels to 
increase the number of critical test trials presented (44% of test trials presented a randomly 
selected Level 4 to Level 10 trial whereas the remaining trials randomly sampled from the full 
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range of levels). Monkeys iterated between the three conditions, completing approximately 3,000 
trials per block. Monkeys were required to meet criterion (85% correct over the most recent 60 
trials) prior to the start of each new block using that condition type only and the three easiest 
small and large levels (Levels 1-3 and Levels 11-13).  
We analyzed the first block of each condition (Baseline, Small Inducer, and Large 
Inducer) for the monkeys who completed all conditions (seven animals). Half of the animals did 
not pass training for the Large Inducer condition, displaying a response bias to classify all Large 
Inducer training trials as ‘large’, and thus they were not included in any of the following 
analyses.  
4.2.2 Results 
For all subsequent analyses in Experiment 2 and Experiment 3, we reduced the number of 
dot size levels from 13 levels to 6 levels, binning Levels 1 and 2 as the new Level 1, Levels 3 
and 4 as the new Level 2, Levels 5 and 6 as the new Level 3, Levels 8 and 9 as the new Level 4, 
Levels 10 and 11 as the new Level 5, and Levels 12 and 13 as the new Level 6. Thus, Levels 1-6 
progressed from smallest to largest. 
We removed any trials in which the monkeys timed-out because they did not respond 
quickly enough. These were infrequent throughout all testing in the current experiment (1.7% of 
all trials).     
Figure 4 depicts group-level performance (i.e., selection of the larger central dot) as a 
function of condition and dot size for the seven monkeys who completed all three conditions 
(Baseline, Large Inducer, Small Inducer). We used a mixed-design repeated-measures analysis of 
variance (ANOVA) to examine the effect of level (1-6) and condition (Baseline, Large Inducer, 
and Small Inducer) on the proportion of trials where the participants made a dot classification of 
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‘small’ with species (capuchin monkey and rhesus monkey) as the between-subjects variable. 
There was a significant main effect of level, F (5, 25) = 407.27, p < .001, η2p = .99, but not of 
condition, F (2, 10) = 1.42, p = .29, η2p = .22, nor of species, F (1, 5) = .06, p = .82, η2p = .01. 
There was a significant interaction between level and condition, F (10, 50) = 37.49, p < .001, η2p 
= .88. There was not a significant interaction between level and species, F (5, 25) = .19, p = .96, 
η2p = .04, nor between condition and species, F (2, 10) = 40.73, p = .33, η2p = .20. There was not 
a three-way interaction between level, condition, and species, F (10, 50) = .48, p = .90, η2p = .09. 
Based on a visual inspection of Figure 4, we collapsed across species, small dot size 
levels (Levels 1-3) and large dot size levels (Levels 4-6) and compared all conditions to one 
another to explore the interaction of condition by level. A Bonferroni adjusted alpha level of .016 
was used per test for the small and large levels (.05/3). For small levels, central dots were 
classified as ‘small’ significantly less often in the Large Inducer condition than in the Baseline 
condition (t(6) = 8.04, p < .001) and in the Small Inducer condition (t(6) = 6.34, p = .001), but 
there was not a significant difference between the Baseline and Small Inducer conditions (t(6) = -
1.02, p = .35). For large levels, central dots were classified as ‘small’ significantly more often in 
the Large Inducer condition than in the Baseline condition (t(6) = -4.14, p = .006) and in the 
Small Inducer conditions (t(6) = =10.67, p < .001), but there was not a significant difference 
between the Baseline and Small Inducer conditions (t(6) = 3.05, p = .02).  
4.2.3 Discussion 
Rhesus monkeys and capuchin monkeys performed well in the basic classification task, 
accurately classifying central dot size in the Baseline condition when a dot was presented 
without outer inducers. Pilot data revealed that inducer size presented a unique challenge to the 
monkeys when conditions were intermixed randomly within a test session. Monkeys classified 
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central dots according to outer inducer size, with a tendency to classify Small Inducer trials as 
‘small’ and Large Inducer trials as ‘large.’ Using these pilot data to guide modifications to the 
task, we introduced a testing phase that presented only one condition type per 3,000 trial block.  
Using this blocked procedure, monkey performance improved somewhat; half of the 
monkeys successfully completed the training for all conditions and engaged the testing phase for 
all trial types, including Baseline trials, Small Inducer trials, and Large Inducer trials. However, 
these animals did not show evidence of the illusion. An effect of level was observed for all 
conditions, but the function appeared shallower for the Large Inducer condition. This 
performance pattern can be accounted for if one considers the amount of pixilation on screen for 
each condition.  
The proportion increase in pixel amount between central dot size levels (Level 1 to Level 
2 to Level 3 and so on until Level 13) in the Baseline condition is larger than the proportion 
increase in pixel amount between levels in the Small Inducer condition, which again is larger 
than the proportion increase in pixel amount between levels in the Large Inducer condition. 
Thus, as predicted by Weber’s law, it would be most difficult to discriminate pixel number in the 
Large Inducer condition because discriminations become more difficult as the difference 
between sets is reduced (see Brannon & Roitman, 2003; Gallistel & Gelman, 2000). Using the 
number of pixels onscreen to guide discrimination behavior would reproduce the findings 
reported here by the animals that learned to discriminate dot size in all three trial types. Animals 
using a rule such as ‘classify stimuli based on total pixel amount’ would be immune to an 
illusion that instead requires one to discriminate pixel amount in the central dot size alone, while 
ignoring the contribution of pixel amount by the outer inducing circles. We explore potential 
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explanations for a non-illusion among monkeys for the Ebbinghaus-Titchener array in the 
General Discussion. 
4.3 Experiment 3 
In Experiment 3, we extended the computerized classification task to human participants to 
compare performance with monkeys in the current experiment and to specifically assess whether 
human adults reproduced the response biases observed among monkeys using the current 
procedure.  
4.3.1 Methods 
4.3.1.1 Participants 
Twenty-four human participants were recruited from GSU’s undergraduate population 
(average age: 21 years old ± 4, 12 females). Participants were required to give informed consent 
prior to participating in the experiment(s) and received course credit for their participation. 
Testing complied with the procedures and protocols that were approved by GSU’s Institutional 
Review Board. 
4.3.1.2 Apparatus 
Human participants were tested at individual computer carrels with a personal computer, 
a digital monitor, and a mouse for responding. They were not given food reward but were given 
written feedback on the computer screen regarding the accuracy of their responses. 
4.3.1.3 Stimuli and General Procedure 
The same stimuli and general procedures were presented to humans as were used with the 
monkeys. Participants were presented with 50% Baseline trials, 25% Small Inducer trials, and 
25% Large Inducer trials, randomly presented within the test session.  Participants first were 
required to contact a trial-initiation stimulus and then used the computer mouse to select one of 
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the two stimuli. Correct responses led to a flashing stimulus that said ‘Correct!’ in the middle of 
the screen, whereas incorrect responses led to a flashing stimulus that said ‘Incorrect’ in the 
middle of the screen. We shortened the timeout period for incorrect trials to 8 s. Failure to 
respond within 3 seconds of stimuli presentation led to an instruction to respond more quickly to 
the trials. The inter-trial interval was 1 s. Participants were presented with as many as 800 trials, 
and we used data from those participants who completed at least 500 trials in the task. One 
participant failed to complete at least 500 trials, and the data from that participant was not 
included in the following analyses.  
Minimal written instructions were provided instead of a training phase to maximize the 
number of test trials completed per session with each participant. Before starting the experiment, 
participants read the following text: 
In this experiment, you will see a black dot at the top center of the screen. 
Sometimes, the dot will be surrounded by other dots of a different size. You must assign 
that central dot as being either ‘Small’ or ‘Large’ by clicking on one of those two words 
on the screen. Click the Start button, and then click on one of the two options.  You need 
to make these responses fairly quickly. Correct responses move you right to the next trial. 
Incorrect responses lead to a short period where the task is frozen.  You need to complete 
800 trials, so the better you do, the faster you will finish. When you are ready, click on 
the START button. 
4.3.2 Results 
Figure 5 depicts group-level performance as a function of condition and difficulty level 
for human participants. We conducted a within-subjects ANOVA to examine the effect of 
condition (Baseline, Small Inducer, and Large Inducer) and absolute difficulty level (1-6) on the 
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proportion of trials where the participants made a dot classification of ‘small.’  There was a 
significant main effect of condition, F (2, 44) = 39.26, p < .001, η2p = .64, and difficulty level, F 
(5, 110) = 221.05, p < .001, η2p = .91.  There was a significant interaction between condition and 
difficulty level, F (10, 220) = 20.47, p < .001, η2p = .48.  
Collapsing across levels using the average mean percentage of small choices, a paired-
samples t-test was used to compare the Baseline condition to the Small Inducer. A Bonferroni 
adjusted alpha level of .0167 was used per test (.05/3). Central dots were classified as ‘small’ 
significantly less often in the Small Inducer condition than in the Baseline condition (t(22) = 
6.54, p < .001), and in the Large Inducer condition (t(22) = -7.70, p < .001). Central dots were 
classified as ‘small’ significantly more in the Large Inducer condition than in the Baseline 
condition (t(22) = -3.37, p = .003).  
4.3.3 Discussion 
Human participants perceived the Ebbinghaus-Titchener illusion in the current 
classification task, underestimating central dot size when surrounded by large inducers and 
overestimating central dot sized when surrounded by small inducers. These results matched 
previous reports of the Ebbinghaus-Titchener illusion among human adults (e.g., Coren & Enns, 
1993; Girgus et al., 1972; Massaro & Anderson, 1971; Weintraub, 1979). Humans did not reveal 
the same response bias to classify central dot size based on inducer size, likely due to the verbal 
instructions provided prior to testing. Future research might address whether human adults also 
struggle to isolate the target of interest without explicit verbal instructions on the task’s rule. 
4.4 General Discussion 
Like other size illusions (e.g., Delboeuf illusion, Badlwin illusion), the Ebbinghaus-
Titchener illusion emerges due to contrast effects – objects surrounded by large inducers are 
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underestimated in size relative to objects surrounded by small inducers (e.g., Ebbinghaus, 1902; 
Nicolas, 1995).  Despite this similarity, the Ebbinghaus-Titchener illusion is unique among its 
peers in that the target (central black dot) is identical in form to the surrounding inducers (outer 
black dots). This similarity between target and inducer form presents a unique challenge in 
instructing nonverbal species to the task rule – discriminate the stimuli based on the central black 
dot alone. In the current study, chimpanzees, rhesus monkeys, and capuchin monkeys were 
presented with a range of experimental procedures in attempts evoke the classic Ebbinghaus-
Titchener effect.  
Primates were proficient in discriminating the central target in the absence of outer 
inducers in Experiment 1 and Experiment 2. Chimpanzees persisted in selecting the larger of two 
edible targets regardless of the ‘illusory’ context in which they were presented in Experiment 1. 
The monkeys that passed the training phase for all conditions in Experiment 2 (Baseline, Small 
Inducer, and Large Inducer) revealed an interesting pattern of results in which the function for 
classifying stimuli correctly was shallower for the Large Inducer condition relative to the 
Baseline and Small Inducer conditions. This phenomenon could be explained using a simple rule 
such as ‘classify stimuli according to total pixel amount.’ Monkeys would be very successful 
using such a rule; however, this would not result in illusion emergence or address whether this 
illusion emerges within these species of monkey.   
When given almost identical procedures to those presented to the monkeys, human 
participants demonstrated the predicted performance patterns in Experiment 3, overestimating 
central dot size when surrounded by small inducers and underestimating central dot size when 
surrounded by large inducers. Thus, using such a rule (i.e., classify based on total pixel amount) 
is not inherent in this task, but only emerged within nonverbal species that could not be 
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instructed explicitly as to the task objective.  Future studies that isolate the target of interest from 
the inducers without using explicit instructions will be key in understanding these null results. 
We think that the current absence of evidence of the Ebbinghaus-Titchener illusion among 
nonhuman primates does not translate into evidence of absence, at least not without more testing 
and new methodological approaches.  
Moreover, the process by which animals perceive complex visual arrays likely 
contributes to the emergence (or non-emergence) of geometric size illusions, like the 
Ebbinghaus-Titchener illusion. Illusions are comprised of multiple elements (e.g., outer inducing 
circles and target central dot) that must be perceived simultaneously in order for the illusion to 
emerge. For example, perceiving the central dot of the Ebbinghaus-Titchener array in the 
absence of the illusory inducers would lead to a non-illusion. The tendency to perceive complex 
arrays as one cohesive figure (i.e., all elements first are perceived simultaneously) versus 
individual elements (i.e., all elements first are perceived as separate units) can be determined via 
perceptual processing mode tasks. Our own work (Chapter 2) and previous studies demonstrate a 
robust local-precedence (i.e., individual elements perceived prior to cohesive figure) among 
rhesus and capuchin monkeys (De Lillo, Spinozzi, Truppa, & Naylor, 2005; Hopkins & 
Washburn, 2002; Spinozzi, De Lillo, & Salvi, 2006; Spinozzi, De Lillo, & Truppa, 2003). These 
results stand in contrast to widespread evidence of a global precedence among human 
participants (e.g., Broadbent, 1977; Kimchi, 1992; Lamb & Robertson, 1988; Navon, 1977, 
1981).  
Despite a local-precedence, monkeys have shown susceptibility to illusory stimuli in 
tasks designed to minimize (but not completely ignore) the illusory array (e.g., Parrish et al., 
2015). In the current set of experiments, we were cautious not to train the animals to disregard 
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the inducers as this has produced null results for the Ebbinghaus-Titchener illusion in previous 
comparative studies (Nakamura et al., 2008; Parron & Fagot, 2007), whereas human-like patterns 
of illusion perception were documented among various species using experimental procedures 
that did not specifically train animals to ignore inducing stimuli (Murayama et al., 2012; Rosa 
Salva et al., 2013). Illusions such as the Ebbinghaus-Titchener illusion appear highly sensitive to 
task design and stimuli presentation, likely due to the large overlap in target and inducer features 
(i.e., both large black dots). Thus, future studies that balance rule training, stimuli presentation 
and design, and species’ perceptual processing mode are necessary to uncover the elusive 
Ebbinghaus-Titchener illusion. 
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4.6 Tables 
Table 1. Experiment 1 trial types outlined with predicted performance patterns. 
Trial Type Description Prediction 
Baseline 
Large portion (no inducers) 
vs. 
Small portion (no inducers) 
Choose large portion. 
No illusion. 
Small Control 
Large portion  (small inducers) 
vs. 
Small portion (small inducers) 
Choose large portion. 
No illusion. 
Large Control 
Large portion (large inducers) 
vs. 
Small portion (large inducers) 
Choose large portion. 
No Illusion 
Small Mixed 
Large portion (with small inducers)  
vs.  
Small portion (no inducers) 
Choose large portion at 
levels exceeding 
Baseline. 
Large Mixed 
Large portion (with large inducers) 
vs.  
Small portion (no inducers) 
Erroneously choose 
small portion at levels 
exceeding Baseline. 
Inducer Control 
Large portion (no inducers)  
vs.  
Small portion (large inducers) 
Choose large portion at 
levels exceeding 
Baseline. 
Ebbinghaus 
Illusion 
Large portion (small inducers)  
vs. 
Large portion (large inducers) 
Bias to choose large 
portion with small 
inducers. 
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4.7 Figures 
 
Figure 1. The Ebbinghaus-Titchener illusion. Humans typically perceive the central dot 
surrounded by small inducers (to the right) to be larger than the same-sized central dot 
surrounded by large inducers (to the left).  
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Figure 2. The percentage of large food choices for the four trial types in Experiment 1.The three 
bars at left in grey shading are statistically different from chance levels of responding, but the 
black bar (Illusion trials) is not.   
164 
 
 
Figure 3. The percentage of large food choices for the seven trial types in Experiment 2.   
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Figure 4. Mean percentage of ‘small’ responses for dot size for the Baseline, Small Inducer, and 
Large Inducer conditions for monkey participants in Experiment 2. Dot size levels progress from 
1 (smallest) to 6 (largest). Error bars depict corrected 95% confidence intervals for repeated 
measures tests (Cousineau, 2005). 
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Figure 5. Mean percentage of ‘small’ responses for dot size for the Baseline, Small Inducer, and 
Large Inducer conditions for human participants in Experiment 3. Dot size levels progress from 
1 (smallest) to 6 (largest). Error bars depict corrected 95% confidence intervals for repeated 
measures tests (Cousineau, 2005). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
167 
RESPONSE BIASES IN THE BALDWIN ILLUSION IN RHESUS MONKEYS (MACACA 
MULATTA) AND CAPUCHIN MONKEYS (CEBUS APELLA) 
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ABSTRACT 
In the current set of studies, we investigated whether rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) 
and capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) perceived the Baldwin illusion in a similar manner as 
human adults (Homo sapiens). The Baldwin illusion emerges when line length is misperceived as 
a function of flanking square size. Large squares lead to line length underestimation and small 
squares lead to line length overestimation. In Experiment 1, we presented monkeys with an 
absolute classification task that required monkeys to classify a horizontal line that was 
sometimes flanked by small or large squares as being either ‘short’ or ‘long.’ We did not find 
evidence of the Baldwin illusion. Rather, most monkeys demonstrated a response bias in which 
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they incorporated square size into their line classification, classifying lines flanked by large 
squares as ‘long’ and lines flanked by small squares as ‘short.’ To isolate the horizontal line, we 
presented an extended training procedure in Experiment 2. Squares were presented first at a 
distance from the line and then moved progressively closer to the horizontal line in attempts to 
isolate the target of interest. We found more promising evidence of the Baldwin illusion in 
Experiment 2, with some monkeys showing less response bias and performance patterns 
indicative of a human-like illusion.  
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5 RESPONSE BIASES IN THE BALDWIN ILLUSION IN RHESUS MONKEYS 
(MACACA MULATTA) AND CAPUCHIN MONKEYS (CEBUS APELLA) 
Whether, and to what extent, we share commonalities in our perceptual systems across 
species has captured the attention of comparative scientists for many decades (see Lazareva, 
Shimizu, & Wasserman, 2012, for a review). Specifically, the extent to which we misperceive 
our external worlds was a topic of intense study even prior to the establishment of psychology as 
a formal discipline (Boring, 1942; Luckiesh, 1922). A natural question in comparative perception 
is whether animals fall prey to visual illusions in a similar fashion as humans. Similarities across 
visual processing would suggest commonalities in the visual and perceptual systems of closely-
related, or perhaps even distantly-related, species (Agrillo, Petrazzini, & Dadda, 2013; 
Wasserman, 2012).  
Nonhuman primates (hereafter primates) have been at the forefront of comparative visual 
illusion research as they are our closest-related living relatives, and they share many features of 
the visual system with humans, including anatomical structure of the eye and how information is 
processed in the brain (e.g., De Valois & De Valois, 1988; Essock, 1977; Fobes & King, 1982; 
Matsuzawa, 1990; see Matsuno & Fujita, 2009 for a review). Not surprisingly, given these 
similarities, several species of primates also have demonstrated visual illusion perception similar 
to humans, including but not limited to the Delboeuf illusion (Parrish, Brosnan, & Beran, 2015), 
the Ebbinghaus-Titchener illusion (Parron & Fagot, 2007), the Ponzo illusion (Bayne & Davis, 
1993; Fujita, 1996, 1997), the Zollner illusion (Benhar & Samuel, 1982), and the corridor 
illusion (Barbet & Fagot, 2007).  
It is interesting that some studies have revealed differences in visual illusion emergence 
across different primate species. For example, baboons do not perceive the Ebbinghaus-
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Titchener illusion in a human-like manner, but instead perceive the anti-illusion (Parron & Fagot, 
2007). Our own work on the similar Delboeuf illusion suggests that monkeys perceive the 
illusion in a human-like manner, but only under certain methodological circumstances (Parrish et 
al., 2015). When given a relative-discrimination task, many animals erroneously incorporated the 
outer ring inducers into the dot judgment, leading to a performance pattern indicative of an anti-
illusion as reported by Parron and Fagot. However, we established a task in which reliance on 
outer ring size would not be beneficial – we introduced a classification task in which animals 
were required to assign dots a value of ‘small’ or ‘large.’ In that context, monkeys readily 
perceived the illusion as do humans, overestimating dot size encircled by small rings and 
underestimating dot size encircled by large rings. These different results among the same 
individuals were interesting and informative regarding the nature of visual illusion testing among 
nonverbal species. Isolating the target of interest (and reducing the chances for a response bias 
towards inclusion of inducing stimuli) is key for a species-fair test of visual illusion perception. 
In the current study, we extended our research of geometric size illusions and 
investigated the emergence of the Baldwin illusion in rhesus monkeys and capuchin monkeys. 
This illusion is relatively understudied in the human literature (e.g., Baldwin, 1895; Pressey & 
Smith, 1986; Pressey & Wilson, 1980) in comparison to other size illusions, and it has never 
been presented to a nonhuman animal species. Similar to the Delboeuf and Ebbinghaus-
Titchener size illusions, a contrast effect occurs in the Baldwin illusion in which target stimulus 
size (line length) is misperceived as a function of inducer stimuli size (flanking squares). In the 
Baldwin array, two equal-length horizontal lines appear to be unequal such that the line flanked 
by large squares is underestimated in comparison to an equal-length line flanked by small 
squares (see Figure 1).  
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We noted an interesting response bias in Experiment 1 of the current work, in which 
several animals incorporated the flanker squares into their line classification. For example, lines 
with large squares on either end were classified as ‘long’ and lines with small squares on either 
end were classified as ‘short.’ This response pattern is indicative of a reversed human-like 
illusion. Reversed patterns have been reported within nonhuman primates for similar, size 
illusions, including the Ebbinghaus-Titchener illusion (Parron & Fagot, 2007) and the Delboeuf 
illusion (Parrish et al., 2015). Although these reversed patterns could suggest a different 
perceptual experience across primates, an alternative hypothesis is that the animals confused the 
rule, erroneously incorporating inducing squares into the total line length. To explore this 
secondary hypothesis, we introduced an extended training procedure to the monkeys in 
Experiment 2. The animals were trained to isolate target line length as squares were moved 
progressively closer to the line. This method of progressively introducing the inducers so that the 
target might be isolated as the stimulus of interest has been used in several nonhuman animal 
studies investigating visual illusions (e.g., Salva, Rugani, Cavazzana, Regolin, & Vallortigara, 
2013). We predicted that this extended training procedure would reduce the response bias of 
square inclusion observed in Experiment 1.   
5.1 Experiment 1  
5.1.1 Methods 
5.1.1.1 Participants 
The nonhuman primates included in all experiments were housed and tested at the 
Language Research Center (LRC) of Georgia State University (GSU) in Atlanta, Georgia. LRC 
primates were never food or water deprived for testing purposes and had 24-hour access to water, 
including during test sessions. They received a daily diet of fruits, vegetables, and primate chow 
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regardless of participation in testing, and caloric intake was kept consistent by taking into 
account the amount of food earned from testing when determining the daily diet. All testing 
protocols complied with guidelines for working with nonhuman primates as established by 
protocols approved by the GSU Institutional Animal Care and Use Committee. GSU is 
accredited by the Association for Assessment and Accreditation of Laboratory Animal Care.  
We tested five adult male rhesus macaques and nine adult capuchin monkeys (4 males) in 
the following experiments. Capuchin monkeys were group housed in indoor-outdoor enclosures, 
and they separated voluntarily into individual testing enclosures for computerized testing (with 
constant visual and auditory access to conspecifics). Rhesus monkeys were individually housed 
and had 24-hour access to a computerized testing apparatus within their home cage. Rhesus 
monkeys had constant visual and auditory access to conspecifics and received one-a-week access 
to an indoor-outdoor enclosure with another monkey during which both monkeys spent 
approximately 12 hours together and not engaged in computerized testing. These monkeys have 
participated in several computerized perceptual discrimination tasks (e.g., Agrillo et al., 2014; 
Beran, 2006; Beran & Parrish, 2013; Beran, Smith, Coutinho, Couchman, & Boomer, 2009; 
Parrish et al., 2015). 
5.1.1.2 Apparatus 
  Nonhuman primates included in this study were joystick trained for computerized testing 
using the LRC’s Computerized Test System consisting of a color monitor, personal computer, 
digital joystick, and food pellet dispenser (Evans, Beran, Chan, Klein, & Menzel, 2008; 
Richardson, Washburn, Hopkins, Savage-Rumbaugh, & Rumbaugh, 1990). Primates 
manipulated the joystick with their hands to isomorphically control a small round cursor on the 
computer screen. Monkeys were not restrained during testing. The viewing distance from the 
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monitor was approximately 30.5 cm to 40.5 cm. Correct responses led to banana-flavored pellet 
rewards (45-mg pellets for capuchins and 94-mg pellets for rhesus monkeys: Bio-Serv, 
Frenchtown, NJ) via a pellet dispenser interfaced to the computer through a digital I/O board 
(PDISO8A; Keithley Instruments, Cleveland, OH). Programs were written in Visual Basic 6.0.  
5.1.1.3 Stimuli 
The Baldwin stimuli consisted of a horizontal line (target) flanked on both sides by 
square inducers (see Figure 1). On all trials, a stimulus was presented in the middle of the screen, 
and subjects were required to classify the central line as ‘short’ (by moving the cursor to the 
bottom left of the screen to a orange rectangle) or ‘long’ (by moving the cursor to the bottom 
right of the screen to a green rectangle). The line and the inducing squares were black, presented 
on a white background. The squares that flanked either side of the horizontal line were both 
small (1 x 1 cm) or were both large (3 x 3 cm). In some phases these squares were positioned 
flush against the end of either side of the horizontal line (no gap between line and square).  In 
Experiment 2, the squares were near to the line but not in contact with it in some phases. 
Using a psychophysical step procedure, a range of 11 possible target line lengths was 
established.  A Level 6 (midpoint) line was established with a length of 4 cm. Level 6 stimuli 
were never presented as they were neither long nor short lines. Levels 1 to 5 were all shorter than 
the Level 6 line, and their length was generated by the following equation: Level = 3*0.98(6-
TrialLevel). Levels 7 to 11 were all longer than the Level 6 line, and their length was generated by 
the following equation: Level = 3*1.02(TrialLevel-6). Thus, Levels 1 to 11 were progressively longer 
lines for which the Level 5 and Level 7 lines were the objectively hardest to discriminate from 
the midpoint (Level 6). Level 1 (shortest) and Level 11 (longest) were the objectively easiest to 
discriminate.  
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5.1.1.4 General Procedure 
At the outset of each trial, subjects directed the cursor into a trial initiation stimulus at the 
center of the computer screen (‘Start’ button). That button disappeared and the test stimulus and 
the two classification icons appeared as choice options. Test stimuli were presented in the center 
of the screen with the classification icons left-justified (‘short’) and right-justified (‘long’) at the 
bottom of the screen. Subjects used the joystick to direct the cursor into contact with one of the 
two classification icons, thereby classifying horizontal line length on each trial. Monkeys were 
required to make their response within 3 seconds of the test stimuli appearing onscreen. After 
selection of a stimulus or after 3 seconds of inactivity, the screen then cleared completely.  
Correct responses led to a pellet reward and a melodic tone, whereas incorrect responses led to a 
buzz tone and a timeout period of 20 s. Failure to respond within 3 seconds of stimuli 
presentation led to a timeout period of 20 s. The inter-trial interval was 1 s.  
Three conditions were included. The Baseline condition presented a horizontal line with 
no flanking squares. This condition was used to establish classification performance without the 
effects of any inducing stimuli. The Small Square condition presented two small squares flanking 
either side of the horizontal line. The Large Square condition presented two large squares 
flanking either side of the horizontal line. We never presented a line with flanking squares of 
different sizes on opposite ends of the line.  
5.1.1.4.1 Training 
Monkeys completed a set of training trials to learn the rule of selecting the appropriate 
classification icon using the three easiest short levels (Levels 1 to 3) and the three easiest long 
levels (Levels 9 to 11) in the Baseline condition.  The criterion for passing the training phase was 
set to 85% correct over the most recent 60 trials, at which point testing immediately began. One 
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rhesus monkey and four capuchin monkeys failed to reach training criterion after 6,000 trials and 
were removed from the study.  
5.1.1.4.2 Testing 
In the testing phase, we introduced the full continuum of levels (Levels 1 to 11).  We 
randomly intermixed all conditions, presenting the Baseline condition in 33.3% of trials, the 
Small Square condition in 33.3% of trials, and the Large Square condition in 33.3% of trials. We 
oversampled the more difficult levels to increase the number of critical test trials presented (50% 
of test trials presented a randomly selected Level 3 to Level 9 trial whereas the remaining trials 
randomly sampled from the full range of levels). The true midpoint line (Level 6) was never 
presented. Monkeys completed approximately 6,000 trials, except for rhesus monkey Murph, 
who completed approximately 2,500 trials. 
5.1.2 Results 
Because we oversampled the more critical test levels (Levels 3 to 9), for all subsequent 
analyses, we reduced the number of line length levels from 10 levels to 8 levels, binning the 
easiest ‘short’ levels (Level 1 and Level 2) and the easiest ‘long’ levels (Level 10 and Level 11).  
Figure 2 depicts group-level performance (i.e., classification of the line as short) as a 
function of condition (Baseline, Small Square, and Large Square) and line length (1 to 8). We 
conducted a mixed-design analysis of variance (ANOVA) to examine the effect of condition and 
line length (8 levels) on the proportion of trials in which the participants made a line 
classification of ‘short’ with species (capuchin monkeys and rhesus monkeys) as the between-
subjects variable. There was a significant main effect of line length, F (7, 84) = 14.38, p < .001, 
η2p = .55. There was not a significant effect of condition, F (2, 24) = 2.27, p = .13, η2p = .16, nor 
of species, F (1, 12) = .13, p = .72, η2p = .01. There was a significant interaction of line length 
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and condition, F (14, 168) = 24.57, p < .001, η2p = .67. There was not a significant interaction of 
species and condition, F (2, 24) = 1.07, p = .36, η2p = .08, nor an interaction of species and line 
length, F (7, 84) = .12, p = 1.0, η2p = .01. There was not a three-way interaction, F (14, 168) = 
.72, p = .75, η2p = .06. 
Given that the factor of interest was condition, we collapsed across line lengths (and 
species) using the mean percentage of short choices across line lengths. We conducted a paired-
samples t-test to compare the Baseline condition to the Small Square and Large Square 
conditions. We also compared the Small Square and Large Square conditions to one another. A 
Bonferroni adjusted alpha level of .016 was used given the three comparisons of interest (.05/3). 
Lines were classified as ‘short’ significantly more in the Small Square condition (M = 65.52, SD 
= 24.26) than in the Large Square condition (M = 55.84, SD = 27.60), t(13) = 3.27, p = .006. 
Performance did not differ significantly for the Baseline (M = 51.85, SD = 12.50) and Small 
Square conditions, t(13) = -1.89, p = .08, nor for the Baseline and Large Square conditions, t(13) 
= -.49, p = .63. 
We plotted several monkeys’ performance to highlight the representative individual 
differences in this experiment (see Figure 3). Two patterns that emerged among several monkeys 
(e.g., capuchin monkeys Gonzo and Widget), despite good Baseline performance, were 1) a 
tendency to over-classify any trial presenting a square as ‘long’ (Gonzo) and 2) to over-classify 
Small Square trials as ‘short’ and Large Square trials as ‘long’ (Widget). Similar response biases 
to over-incorporate inducers into target classification were seen among the six other capuchin 
monkeys, including Bailey, Liam, Mason, Nala, Nkima and Wren, and the four other rhesus 
monkeys, including Obi, Chewie, Han, and Murph. Despite widespread response biases, 
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capuchin monkey Logan and rhesus monkey Lou showed the best performance patterns across 
all three conditions, without an overt response bias to classify trials based on inducer square size.  
5.1.3 Discussion 
As expected, monkeys performed well in the basic line classification task in the Baseline 
condition, which did not present inducing squares. The addition of inducing squares in the test 
conditions (Small Square and Large Square) disrupted classification performance for both 
species, but not in the predicted direction. Markedly, most monkeys over-classified lines in the 
Small Square condition as ‘short’ and the Large Square condition as ‘long.’ This performance 
pattern is indicative of an inversed Baldwin illusion. Human participants typically perceive lines 
surrounded by Small Squares as longer than their true length and lines surrounded by Large 
Squares as shorter than their true length (e.g., Brigell, Uhlarik, Goldhorn, 1977; Clavadetscher & 
Anderson, 1977; Wilson & Pressey, 1988).  
Because of the biases displayed by several monkeys in Experiment 1, we were concerned 
that they may have included the inducing squares in their classifications in the test conditions or 
classified each trial based on inducer size alone. A response bias towards using inducer size or 
incorporating the illusory inducers into target classification has been documented in other 
illusion tasks in monkeys (Parrish et al., 2015) and young children (Hanley & Zerbolio, 1965; 
Pressey & Wilson, 1978). These response biases might reflect a misunderstanding of the rule to 
isolate the target of interest (Hanley & Zerbolio, 1965; Pressey & Wilson, 1978). To address this 
concern, we extended our training procedure in Experiment 2 to highlight the line as the stimulus 
for classification. We did this through a series of training steps that positioned the outer inducing 
squares progressively closer to the horizontal line. At each training stage, the monkeys had to 
pass criterion in the line classification task.   
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5.2 Experiment 2  
5.2.1 Methods  
5.2.1.1 Participants 
Half of the original subjects (five capuchin monkeys and two rhesus monkeys; those that 
were first to complete Experiment 1) continued to Experiment 2. All methods and materials were 
identical to Study 1 (i.e., Apparatus, Stimuli, and General Procedure) with one exception – 
training.  
We introduced four training conditions. As before, all training phases used the three 
easiest short levels (Levels 1 to 3) and the three easiest long levels (Levels 9 to 11).  Criterion for 
passing to the next training phase or to testing following the final training phase was set to 80% 
correct over the most recent 40 trials, at which point the next phase immediately began. A lower 
criterion was used here so that the monkeys potentially could advance through all four training 
phases in one session as these procedures were designed to aid in response biases during testing. 
Training Phase 1 was identical to Experiment 1 Training – only the Baseline condition was 
presented (no inducing squares). Training Phases 2 to 4 introduced the inducing squares, such 
that half of training trials in each of these phases included Small Squares and half of trials 
included Large Squares. In Training Phase 2, the inducing squares were presented 4 cm away 
from either end of the horizontal line. This distance positioned the squares near the outer edges 
of the computer screen while the horizontal line remained in the middle. In Training Phase 3, the 
inducing squares were moved 2 cm away from either end of the line. In Training Phase 4, the 
inducing squares were 1 cm away from the either end of the horizontal line. Following training, 
monkeys completed approximately 6,000 test trials with the inducing squares touching the ends 
of the horizontal line as in Experiment 1.  
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5.2.2 Results 
Figure 4 depicts group-level performance (i.e., classification of the line as short) as a 
function of condition (Baseline, Small Square, and Large Square) and line length (1 to 8). We 
conducted a mixed-design analysis of variance (ANOVA) to examine the effect of condition and 
line length (8 levels) on the proportion of trials where the participants made a line classification 
of ‘short’ with species (capuchin monkeys and rhesus monkeys) as the between-subjects 
variable. There was a significant main effect of line length, F (7, 35) = 6.74, p < .001, η2p = .57. 
There was not a significant effect of condition, F (2, 10) = .91, p = .43, η2p = .15, nor of species, 
F (1, 5) = 1.75, p = .24, η2p = .26. There was a significant interaction of line length and condition, 
F (14, 70) = 12.44, p < .001, η2p = .71. There was not a significant interaction between species 
and condition, F (2, 10) = 1.48, p = .28, η2p = .23, nor between species and line length, F (7, 35) 
= .01, p = 1.0, η2p = .002. There was not a three-way interaction, F (14, 70) = .28, p = 1.0, η2p = 
.05. 
Given that the factor of interest was condition, we collapsed across line lengths (and 
species) using the mean percentage of short choices for all line lengths. We conducted a paired-
samples t-test to compare the Baseline condition to the Small Square and Large Square 
conditions. We also compared the Small Square and Large Square conditions to one another. A 
Bonferroni adjusted alpha level of .016 was used per test given the three comparisons of interest 
(.05/3). Performance did not differ significantly for the Baseline (M = 50.00, SD = 12.89) and 
Large Square (M = 56.77, SD = 23.12) conditions, t(6) = -.51, p = .63, nor for the Baseline and 
Small Square (M = 54.68, SD = 21.78) conditions, t(6) = -.39, p = .71, nor for the Small Square 
and Large Square conditions, t(6) = -.53, p = .62. 
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Again, we plotted several monkeys’ performance to highlight individual differences in 
this experiment (see Figure 5). Some monkeys (e.g., capuchin monkey Mason) persisted with the 
tendency to over-classify any trial presenting a square as “long.”  Similar response biases 
persisted for a number of monkeys not pictured, including rhesus monkey Chewie and capuchin 
monkeys Liam and Nkima as was the case in Experiment 1. Capuchin monkeys Wren and Logan 
and rhesus monkey Lou showed the best performance patterns across all three conditions (see 
Figure 5), with some indication of a human-like illusion pattern (over-classifying lines with 
Large Squares as small relative to Baseline and Small Square trials). 
5.2.3 Discussion 
Consistent with the results from Experiment 1, monkeys performed well in the basic 
classification task when only a line was present, appropriately classifying lines as ‘short’ or 
‘long’ based upon their true line lengths in the Baseline condition. We did see some overall 
improvements in the degree to which monkeys were biased to classify lines in the test conditions 
according to the square size. Whereas in Experiment 1 monkeys over-classified lines in the 
Small Square condition as ‘short’, we now documented no differences in line classification 
across conditions. Thus, the training procedure appeared to eliminate the bias for some animals 
to include the inducing squares as part of the line classification. Despite this improvement, we 
did not document evidence of the Baldwin illusion at the group level. Although some individual 
monkeys persisted in their response biases seen in Experiment 1, we documented promising 
individual results from capuchin monkeys Wren and Logan and rhesus monkey Lou with trends 
toward a human-like Baldwin illusion. 
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5.3 General Discussion 
Although inducer stimuli create context within an illusory array, they should not be 
included as part of the to-be-judged target, but without verbal instruction, it can be difficult to 
instantiate these task demands. Critically, response biases to include inducers into target 
judgment often lead to a reversed illusion, in which targets surrounded by large stimuli are 
classified as ‘large’ or judged to be greater in size in a relative task (Hanley & Zerbolio, 1965; 
Parrish et al., 2015; Pressey & Wilson, 1978). In contrast, targets surrounded by small stimuli are 
classified as ‘small’ or judged to be smaller in size in a relative task. These response biases 
fundamentally oppose geometric illusion emergence, especially size illusions, in which large 
contexts cause underestimation and small contexts create overestimation (Baldwin illusion: 
Baldwin, 1895; Delboeuf illusion: Delboeuf, 1892; Ebbinghaus-Titchener illusion: Ebbinghaus, 
1902; Mueller-Lyer illusion: Mueller-Lyer, 1889; Ponzo illusion: Ponzo, 1928). Interestingly, 
responses biases of this nature emerge within young children (e.g., Hanley & Zerbolio, 1965; 
Pressey & Wilson, 1978) and nonhuman animals (e.g., Nakamura, Watanabe, & Fujita, 2014; 
Parrish et al., 2015, Experiment 1; Parron & Fagot, 2007). The inability effectively to 
communicate the rule or isolate the stimulus of interest clearly is a greater risk in pre- or non-
verbal populations. Here, we report similar response biases in rhesus monkey and capuchin 
monkeys presented with the Baldwin illusion. 
Our extended training procedures in Experiment 2 mediated the inclusion of squares into 
line judgment to a degree for some monkeys. Interestingly, for the monkeys that no longer 
displayed a bias towards classifying stimuli according to square size (or simply classifying all 
squares with one response) in Experiment 2, we documented evidence of a human-like illusion in 
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which lines flanked by large squares were judged to be shorter in length than lines flanked by 
small squares.  
The training procedures introduced a variety of conditions in which the squares were 
moved progressively closer to the central line. When the squares were non-contiguous with the 
line, the animals progressed through training, meeting criterion for line classification. For the 
animals that persisted in the response bias, they passed training criterion, but their bias 
reemerged once the squares were contiguous with the line in testing trials. These results 
suggested that the animals perceived the Baldwin stimuli as one unit to be classified together 
(line with squares) rather than the target alone (just line flanked by squares). Follow-up studies 
could address whether the illusion emerges with distally placed squares, and this methodology 
offers a potentially advantageous route for future inquiry.  
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5.5 Figures 
 
Figure 1. The Baldwin illusion: humans typically perceive the horizontal line flanked by small 
squares (bottom) as longer than an idenitcal horizontal line flanked by large squares (top).  
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a. 
Figure 2. Mean percentage of ‘Short’ responses for the Baseline, Small Square, and Large 
Square conditions. Line Length levels progress from 1 (shortest) to 8 (longest) in Experiment 1. 
Error bars depict corrected 95% confidence intervals for repeated measures tests (Cousineau, 
2005). 
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Figure 3. Example individual monkey performance in Experiment 1. Gonzo and Widget 
displayed a response bias to classify test conditions according to one or both inducer square 
sizes. Lou and Logan showed the best performance across individuals, with no overt response 
biases. 
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a.  
 
Figure 4. Mean percentage of ‘Short’ responses for the Baseline, Small Square, and Large 
Square conditions. Line Length levels progress from 1 (shortest) to 8 (longest) in Experiment 2. 
Error bars depict corrected 95% confidence intervals for repeated measures tests (Cousineau, 
2005). 
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Figure 5. Example individual monkey performance in Experiment 2. Monkeys Lou, Logan, and 
Wren did not display a strong response bias to incorporate inducer squares into target 
classification as did monkey Mason.  
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LOOK THERE! 
MODULATING ATTENTION WITHIN THE BALDWIN ILLUSION  
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ABSTRACT 
Attention plays a vital role in the emergence of geometric size illusions. Attending to the 
illusion target increases illusion magnitude, whereas attention to the illusory-inducing stimuli 
typically decreases illusion magnitude or even reverses the direction of the illusion. Previous 
studies have successfully manipulated attention, altering illusion perception, through verbal 
instructions or featural changes (e.g., color, density, luminance) to the visual array. Here, we 
extended these questions to investigate the extent to which attention can be manipulated prior to 
viewing the Baldwin illusion. Using an interleaved task, participants completed a primary task 
with either squares (Baldwin inducers) or lines (Baldwin target). Participants then completed a 
secondary task with the Baldwin array, classifying lines flanked by squares of different size as 
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‘short’ or ‘long.’ Participants readily perceived the Baldwin illusion, underestimating line length 
when flanked by large squares and overestimating line length when flanked by small squares. 
Illusion magnitude was not impacted by the primary task designed to manipulate attention 
towards either the Baldwin squares or lines. Thus, although attention plays an important role in 
illusion emergence, manipulating attention prior to perceiving the illusory array was ineffective 
in mediating or increasing the magnitude of the Baldwin illusion.  
 
 
INDEX WORDS: Visual illusions; Baldwin illusion; Attention; Interleaved task; Dual task; 
Visual search 
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6 LOOK THERE!  
MODULATING ATTENTION WITHIN THE BALDWIN ILLUSION 
How we see the world and, ultimately, how we interact with our physical environments 
largely is driven by the context in which we perceive objects or events. Visual illusions provide a 
unique opportunity to understand better how context shapes our perception and, crucially, our 
(mis)perception of the world. Illusions have a long history in the perceptual and cognitive 
sciences and date back prior to the establishment of psychology as its own discipline (for 
reviews, see Coren & Girgus, 1978; Gregory, 2009; Luckiesh, 1922; Robinson, 1972). The study 
of visual illusions and how they impact high-risk real-world scenarios is one early translation of 
basic psychological research (e.g., explaining the fatal plane crash of a Boeing 707 and an 
Eastern Airlines Lockheed 1049C in 1965; Coren & Girgus, 1978). More recently, psychologists 
have focused on when and why visual illusions occur and which populations are most susceptible 
to misperceptions (e.g., Dakin & Frith, 2005; de Fockert, Davidoff, Fagot, Parron, & Goldstein, 
2007; Happé, 1996; Witkin, 1967). 
For example, some people more readily perceive geometric illusions than others based on 
their perceptual style of processing. Geometric illusions emerge when a target’s physical 
properties (e.g., size, shape, length, width, diameter, orientation, etc.) are distorted on the basis of 
the target’s surrounding figural context or its inducing elements.  The perception of multi-
element figures (e.g., an illusory array) is hierarchically organized such that stimuli are processed 
at the overall group level and at the individual element level. Depending upon the order of 
processing, a precedence effect emerges in which the whole configuration (global precedence) or 
the individual elements (local precedence) are first processed. Specifically, geometric illusions 
require global processing of the illusory array such that all individual elements are processed 
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simultaneously. Although humans primarily are classified as global-processors (e.g., Broadbent, 
1977; Navon, 1977, 1981), individual differences emerge. Those individuals with a stronger 
global precedence perceive visual illusions more readily than those with a stronger local 
precedence (e.g., Berry, 1966, 1968, 1971; Dawson, 1967; Witkin, 1967). In contrast, certain 
populations that are defined as local processors show evidence of reduced illusory perception 
relative to others (e.g., Himba tribesman of Namibia: de Fockert, Davidoff, Fagot, Parron, & 
Goldstein, 2007; children with autism spectrum disorder: Dakin & Frith, 2005; Happé, 1996; 
Happé, Briskman, & Frith, 2001).  
Beyond processing style, differential attention towards elements within an illusory array 
has a robust effect on the emergence and magnitude of visual illusions (e.g., Daini & Wenderoth, 
2008; Gardner & Long, 1961; Goryo, Robinson, & Wilson, 1984; Jordan & English, 1989; 
Lester & Dassonville, 2011; Predebon, 2004, Shulman, 1992; Tsal, 1984). Researchers have 
manipulated attentional focus via instructions to ignore certain elements within the visual array 
while focusing on others. Selective attention to only some features within an array interrupts the 
global processing that is necessary to perceive illusions. Illusion magnitude decreases when 
participants focus on the to-be-discriminated target element, but illusion magnitude tends to 
increase when participants focus on the contextual features (e.g., Bates, 1923; Gardner & Long, 
1961; Predebon, 2004; Restle, 1971).   
For example, Predebon (2004) demonstrated that the magnitude of the Muller-Lyer 
illusion decreases over the course of an experiment when participants are directly instructed to 
ignore the inducers (wings) and instead focus on the target stimulus (the horizontal line). Further, 
simple manipulations of stimulus properties (e.g., color, contrast, density) can direct attention 
towards or away from the target stimulus, effectively decreasing or increasing the illusion 
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magnitude (e.g., Coren & Girgus, 1972; Dewar, 1967; Ebert & Pollack, 1972, 1973; Weintraub 
& Cooper, 1972). Attention also is modulated via contextual cues; altering the color of 
surrounding features so that they match an illusory array can lead to increased instances of some 
visual illusions (e.g., Roelofs effect; Lester & Dassonville, 2011).  
Taken together, these findings demonstrate that modulating attention within a visual array 
serves to impact illusion perception by placing the focus on the target (reducing the illusion) or 
by placing the focus on the illusory inducing context (increasing the illusion). A question 
remains regarding the extent to which attentional cues impact illusion emergence. Specifically, is 
it possible to manipulate attention even before the illusory array is presented? Here, we tested 
this idea using an interleaved task paradigm to create a carryover effect between two tasks 
featuring similar stimuli.  
Dual tasks are used in psychological research to create a scenario in which performance 
or demands from one task may interfere or carryover to performance in a secondary task (e.g., 
Bourke & Duncan, 2005; He & McCarly, 2010; Olivers, Meijer, & Theeuwes, 2006; 
Pannebakker, Band, & Ridderinkhof, 2009; Soto, Hodsoll, & Rotshtein, 2008; Woodman & 
Luck, 2004). Primary tasks within an interleaved paradigm vary in their ability to create demands 
on cognitive resources (e.g., working memory), which subsequently impact which resources are 
available (or depleted) for a subsequent task. In the current study, we used a set of interleaved 
perceptual tasks in an attempt to manipulate attention and subsequently alter perception of the 
Baldwin illusion.  
The Baldwin illusion features two horizontal lines of equal length that are misperceived 
in terms of length on the basis of flanking squares (Baldwin, 1895; Pressey & Smith, 1986; 
Pressey & Wilson, 1980; see Figure 1). A line flanked by large squares on either end is perceived 
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to be shorter in length than an identical line flanked by small squares on either end. The primary 
task in the interleaved set was designed to direct attention towards either the target element 
(horizontal line) or the inducing elements (squares) within the Baldwin array, which was 
presented in the second task in the interleaved set. We predicted that participants would be less 
likely to perceive the Baldwin illusion when the primary task featured the target stimulus 
(horizontal line) as focusing on the to-be-discriminated stimulus reduces illusory perception. In 
contrast, we predicted that participants would be more likely to perceive the illusion when the 
concurrent task featured the inducing squares (squares) as attention to the illusory-inducing 
context increases illusory perception.  
6.1 Experiment 1  
6.1.1 Methods 
6.1.1.1 Participants 
Thirty-eight undergraduate participants were recruited from Georgia State University’s 
(GSU) Psychology Department participant pool (average age: 20.71 years old ± 5.05, 29 
females).  Participants were required to give informed consent prior to participating in the 
experiment(s) and received course credit for their participation. Testing complied with the 
procedures and protocols that were approved by the Institutional Review Board of GSU. 
6.1.1.2 Apparatus 
Participants were tested at individual computer carrels with a personal computer, a digital 
monitor, and a mouse for responding. They were given written feedback on the computer screen 
regarding the accuracy of their responses. 
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6.1.1.3 Illusion Task 
6.1.1.3.1 Stimuli 
The Baldwin stimuli consisted of a horizontal line (target) flanked on both sides by 
square inducers (see Figure 1). On all trials, a stimulus was presented in the middle of the screen, 
and participants were required to classify the central line as ‘short’ (by moving the cursor to the 
bottom left of the screen to a green rectangle including the word ‘short’) or ‘long’ (by moving 
the cursor to the bottom right of the screen to a green rectangle including the word ‘long’). The 
line and the inducing squares were black, presented on a white background. The squares that 
flanked either side of the horizontal line were both small (2.5 cm x 2.5 cm) or were both large (5 
x 5 cm). Squares were positioned flush against the end of either side of the horizontal line (no 
gap between line and square). 
Using a psychophysical step procedure, a range of 11 possible target line lengths was 
established.  A Level 6 (midpoint) line was established at 4 cm. Level 6 stimuli were never 
presented as they were neither long nor short lines. Levels 1-5 were all shorter than the Level 6 
line, and their length was generated by the following equation: Level = 3*0.98(6-TrialLevel). Levels 
7-11 were all longer than the Level 6 line, and their length was generated by the following 
equation: Level = 3*1.02(TrialLevel-6). Thus, Levels 1 – 11 were progressively longer lines for 
which the Level 5 and Level 7 lines were the objectively hardest to discriminate from the 
midpoint (Level 6). Level 1 (shortest) and Level 11 (longest) were the objectively easiest to 
discriminate.  
6.1.1.3.2 General Procedure 
Prior to beginning the study, participants were instructed that they would be working on 
two tasks. In the first task, they would see a horizontal line that could be presented in isolation or 
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surrounded by squares. They were told that they were to assign the line as being ‘short’ or ‘long’ 
using two buttons on the screen. In the second task, they were instructed that they would be 
presented with two lines or two squares. On those trials, participants were instructed to choose 
the line or square that was rotated to a greater degree relative to the other. Figure 2 presents the 
layout of trials. 
At the outset of each Illusion Task trial, participants clicked a trial initiation stimulus at 
the center of the computer screen (‘Start’ button). Then that button disappeared and the test 
stimulus and the two green classification icons appeared as choice options. Stimuli were 
presented in the center of the screen with the classification icons left-justified (‘short’) and right-
justified (‘long’) at the bottom of the screen. Participants used the mouse to contact one of the 
two classification icons, thereby classifying horizontal line length on each trial. Participants were 
required to make their response within 3 seconds of the stimuli appearing onscreen. After 
selection of a stimulus or after 3 seconds of inactivity, the screen then cleared completely.  
Correct responses led to a flashing stimulus that said ‘Correct!’ in the middle of the screen, 
whereas incorrect responses led to a flashing stimulus that said ‘Incorrect’ in the middle of the 
screen followed by a timeout period of 5 s. Failure to respond within 3 seconds of stimuli 
presentation led to an instruction to respond more quickly to the trials. The inter-trial interval 
was 1 s.  
Three Illusion Task conditions were included. The Baseline condition presented a 
horizontal line with no flanking squares. This condition was used to establish classification 
performance without the effects of any inducing stimuli. The Small Square condition presented 
two small squares flanking either side of the horizontal line. The Large Square condition 
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presented two large squares flanking either side of the horizontal line. We never presented a line 
with flanking squares of different sizes on either end of the line.  
We presented the Baseline condition in 33.3% of trials, the Small Square condition in 
33.3% of trials, and the Large Square condition in 33.3% of trials. We oversampled the more 
difficult levels to increase the number of critical test trials presented (50% of test trials presented 
a randomly selected Level 3 to Level 10 trial whereas the remaining trials randomly sampled 
from the full range of levels). The true midpoint line (Level 6) was never presented.  
6.1.1.4 Interleaved Task 
6.1.1.4.1 Stimuli 
Interleaved Task stimuli were comprised of either target elements (lines) or inducer 
elements (squares; see Figure 2). Line stimuli were identical in length and color to the standard 
target line described above at Level 6 (4 cm long; black), but were presented in one of nine 
different orientations with respect to the horizontal axis of the computer screen (0° or vertical, 
+/- 10°, +/- 20°, +/- 30°, +/- 40°). Square stimuli were presented in a range of nine different 
orientations with respect to the horizontal axis of the computer screen (0° or parallel, 10°, 20°, 
30°, 40°, 50°, 60°, 70°, 80°). Squares were 4 x 4 cm in size and were black presented on a white 
background. 
6.1.1.4.2 General Procedure  
At the outset of each Interleaved Task trial, participants clicked a trial initiation stimulus 
at the center of the computer screen (‘Start’ button). Then that button disappeared and two 
stimuli (two squares or two lines) appeared as choice options. Stimuli were presented top-left 
and top-right justified on the screen. Participants were required to select the line or square that 
had a greater degree of rotation than the other line or square on screen. One stimulus always was 
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presented with 0° of rotation and the second stimulus was presented with a randomly selected 
greater degree of rotation (see Stimuli section above for rotation options). Participants were not 
required to make a speeded response. Selecting the choice stimulus that had a greater degree of 
rotation led to a flashing stimulus that said ‘Correct!’ in the middle of the screen, whereas 
incorrect responses led to a flashing stimulus that said ‘Incorrect’ in the middle of the screen 
followed by a timeout period of 5 s. The inter-trial interval was 1 s. 
Two interleaved task conditions were established – Interleaved Square that presented two 
squares and Interleaved Line that presented two lines. The Interleaved Task and Illusion Task 
iterated back and forth trial by trial throughout the session, so that participants completed one 
Interleaved Task trial and then one Illusion Task trial. Each participant completed a total of 800 
trials – 400 Interleaved Task trials and 400 Illusion Task trials. Half of the participants began 
with 200 Interleaved Square trials iterated with 200 Illusion Task trials and then completed 200 
Interleaved Line trials iterated with 200 Illusion Task trials. The other half of participants began 
with 200 Interleaved Line trials iterated with 200 Illusion Task trials and then completed 200 
Interleaved Square trials iterated with 200 Illusion Task trials. 
All participants completed the 800 test trials in the experiment, and all data were included 
in the analyses.  Test sessions lasted as long as one hour. 
6.1.2 Results 
We first examined performance in the Interleaved Task. As predicted, participants 
performed very well, rarely making mistakes in choosing the stimulus with a greater degree of 
rotation (99.4% accuracy for the Interleaved Square condition and 99.1% accuracy for the 
Interleaved Line condition). 
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For all subsequent analyses for the Illusion Task, we reduced the number of line length 
levels from 10 levels to 8 levels, binning the easiest ‘short’ levels (Level 1 and Level 2) and the 
easiest ‘long’ levels (Level 10 and Level 11). We excluded all trials in which participants timed-
out (response times exceeding 3 seconds). These trials were very infrequent, occurring in only 
0.36% of the trials.  
Figure 3 depicts group-level performance in the Illusion Task (i.e., classification of the 
line as short) as a function of Illusion Task condition and Line Length for the (a) Interleaved 
Line condition and (b) Interleaved Square condition. We conducted a repeated-measures 
ANOVA with Interleaved Task condition (Line and Square), Illusion Task condition (Baseline, 
Small Square, Large Square), and Line Length (8 levels) as independent variables with 
proportion of trials where the participants made a line classification of ‘short’ as the dependent 
variable. There was a significant main effect of Line Length, F (7, 259) = 141.06, p < .001, η2p = 
.79, and Illusion Task condition, F (2, 74) = 104.52, p < .001, η2p = .74. Crucially, there was not 
a significant main effect of Interleaved Task condition, F (1, 37) = 2.04, p = .16, η2p = .05. There 
was a significant interaction of Line Length and Illusion Task condition, F (14, 518) = 16.33, p < 
.001, η2p = .31. There was not a significant interaction of Line Length and Interleaved Task 
condition, F (7, 259) = 1.02, p = .42, η2p = .03, nor of Interleaved Task condition and Illusion 
task condition, F (2, 74) = .29, p = .75, η2p = .08. There also was not a significant three-way 
interaction, F (14, 518) = .96, p = .49, η2p = .03.  
To explore the interaction between Line Length and Illusion Task, and based upon a 
visual inspection of Figure 3, we divided Line Length into short line levels (Levels 1-4) and long 
line levels (Levels 5-8). Because there was no effect of Interleaved Task, we collapsed 
performance across Interleaved Task condition (Line and Square). We used a paired-samples t-
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test to compare the Baseline condition to the Small Square and Large Square conditions for short 
and long lines levels. We also compared the Small Square and Large Square conditions to one 
another. A Bonferroni adjusted alpha level of .016 was used per test given the three comparisons 
of interest (.05/3) for short lines and long lines. For the short line lengths (Levels 1-4), lines were 
classified as ‘short’ significantly less in the Small Square condition (M = 38.35, SD = 16.65) than 
in the Baseline condition (M = 82.62, SD = 14.11), t(37) = -12.12, p < .001, and in the Large 
Square condition (M = 77.91, SD = 17.26), t(37) = -11.93, p < .001. Performance did not differ 
significantly for the Baseline and Large Square conditions, t(37) = 2.23, p = .03.  
For the long line lengths (Levels 5-8), lines again were classified as ‘short’ significantly 
less often in the Small Square condition (M = 11.91, SD = 13.09) than in the Baseline condition 
(M = 34.01, SD = 20.28), t(37) = -6.91, p < .001, and in the Large Square condition (M = 34.67, 
SD = 15.07), t(37) = -9.75, p < .001. Performance did not differ significantly for the Baseline and 
Large Square conditions t(37) = -.23, p = .82.  Thus, for both short and long line lengths, small 
squares flanking the horizontal line led to overestimations of line length relative to no squares or 
large squares flanking the line.  
6.1.3 Discussion 
Our findings from Experiment 1 matched previous reports of the Baldwin illusion among 
human adults in which participants overestimated line length when lines were flanked by small 
squares (e.g., Brigell, Uhlarik, Goldhorn, 1977; Clavadetscher & Anderson, 1977; Wilson & 
Pressey, 1988). Despite evidence that attentional focus impacts illusion perception (e.g., Coren & 
Girgus, 1972; Ebert & Pollack, 1972, 1973; Weintraub & Cooper, 1972), we did not document 
an effect of interleaved task performance in the present study. A crucial difference in our study 
from previous studies reporting attentional effects on illusion magnitude is that we manipulated 
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attention via a secondary task rather than directly within the illusory array itself. Perhaps we 
would have seen greater carryover between the interleaved tasks with more salient featural cues. 
However, our interest was in whether modulation of illusory perception could occur through 
sequential visual experiences in different contexts.  
To explore further whether an interleaved task modulates attention in a subsequent 
illusion task, we altered the features of both tasks via changes in stimuli color. Altering stimuli 
color within an illusory array has proven effective in changing the magnitude of several visual 
illusions (e.g., Coren & Girgus, 1972; Dewar, 1967; Ebert & Pollack, 1972, 1973; Weintraub & 
Cooper, 1972). In Experiment 2, we presented the same set of interleaved tasks, but we changed 
the color of the stimuli across tasks so that the interleaved tasks shared more in common in terms 
of visual features. For example, in the Interleaved Line condition, we presented red lines. We 
also presented a red center line in the Illusion Task, but the inducing squares remained black. In 
the Interleaved Square condition, we presented red squares, and in the Illusion Task, we also 
presented red inducing squares but a black center line. We predicted that further increasing the 
salience of the to-be-oriented stimuli across interleaved tasks may enhance our efforts to direct 
attention within the illusory array.  
6.2 Experiment 2  
6.2.1 Methods 
6.2.1.1 Participants 
Sixteen different undergraduate participants were recruited from GSU’s Psychology 
Department participant pool (demographic information is not available for this experiment 
because of an error in collecting those data; however, anecdotally these participants were highly 
similar to those tested in Experiment 1). Participants were required to give informed consent 
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prior to participating in the experiment(s) and received course credit for their participation. 
Testing complied with the procedures and protocols that were approved by the IRB of GSU. 
All methods and materials were identical to Study 1 (i.e., Apparatus, Stimuli, and General 
Procedure) except for one difference – stimuli color. In Study 1, all stimuli were black presented 
on a white background. In Study 2, stimuli could either be black or red presented on a white 
background depending upon the condition. In the Interleaved Square condition, the squares were 
red and, in the Illusion Task, the squares also were red but the line was black. In the Interleaved 
Line condition, the lines were red, and in the Illusion Task, the center line also was red but the 
inducing squares were black.  Essentially, the Interleaved Task and Illusion Task contained 
corresponding color stimuli.  
A testing session was 60 minutes or until the participant completed the 800 test trials. We 
only used data from those participants who completed at least 600 trials in the task because fewer 
trials than this would not have allowed for enough trials at each difficulty level for each 
condition. All but one participant met this trial requirement. 
6.2.2 Results 
Participant performance was excellent in the Interleaved Task (99.13% accuracy for the 
Interleaved Square condition and 98.97% accuracy for the Interleaved Line condition). 
In this experiment, no trials timed out due to participants not responding within three 
seconds. Figure 4 depicts group-level performance (i.e., classification of the line as ‘short’) as a 
function of Illusion Task condition and Line Length for the (a) Interleaved Line condition and 
(b) Interleaved Square condition. Again, we conducted a repeated-measures ANOVA with 
Interleaved Task condition (Line and Square), Illusion Task condition (Baseline, Small Square, 
Large Square), and Line Length (8 levels) as variables on the proportion of trials where the 
209 
participants made a line classification of ‘short.’ There was a significant main effect of Line 
Length, F (7, 98) = 126.86, p < .001, η2p = .90, and Illusion Task condition, F (2, 28) = 48.85, p 
< .001, η2p = .78. As in Experiment 1, there was not a significant main effect of Interleaved Task 
condition, F (1, 14) = .01, p = .91, η2p = .001. There was a significant interaction between Line 
Length and Illusion Task condition, F (14, 196) = 7.88, p < .001, η2p = .36. There was not a 
significant interaction of Line Length and Interleaved Task condition, F (7, 98) = .68, p = .69, η2p 
= .05, nor of Interleaved Task condition and Illusion Task condition, F (2, 28) = .90, p = .42, η2p 
= .06. There was not a significant three-way interaction, F (14, 196) = 1.43, p = .14, η2p = .09.  
To explore the interaction between Line Length and Illusion Task, and based upon a 
visual inspection of Figure 4, we divided Line Length into short line levels (Levels 1-4) and long 
line levels (Levels 5-8). Because there was no effect of Interleaved Task, we collapsed 
performance across Interleaved Task condition (Line and Square). We used a paired-samples t-
test to compare the Baseline condition to the Small Square and Large Square conditions for short 
and long line levels. We also compared the Small Square and Large Square conditions to one 
another. A Bonferroni adjusted alpha level of .016 was used per test given the three comparisons 
of interest (.05/3) for short lines and long lines. For the short line lengths (Levels 1-4), lines were 
classified as ‘short’ significantly less often in the Small Square condition (M = 40.99, SD = 
12.96) than in the Baseline condition (M = 82.76, SD = 7.65), t(14) = -9.83, p < .001 and in the 
Large Square condition (M = 79.74, SD = 10.58), t(14) = -11.70, p < .001. Performance did not 
differ significantly for the Baseline and Large Square conditions, t(14) = .98, p = .35. For the 
long line lengths (Levels 5-8), lines again were classified as ‘short’ significantly less often in the 
Small Square condition (M = 12.73, SD = 9.84) than in the Baseline condition (M = 33.06, SD = 
14.35), t(14) = -4.12, p = .001, and in the Large Square condition (M = 29.69, SD = 14.98), t(14) 
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= -3.82, p = .002. Performance did not differ significantly for the Baseline and Large Square 
conditions t(14) = .86, p = .40. For short and long line lengths, small squares flanking the 
horizontal line led to overestimations of line length relative to no squares or large squares 
flanking the target line.  
6.2.3 Discussion 
We replicated our findings from Experiment 1 for Baldwin illusion perception among 
human adults. Despite further featural changes (i.e., stimuli color) to the interleaved task 
paradigm, viewing squares or lines prior to the illusion task did not differentially impact 
participant performance. The illusion emerged readily, but not differentially, for both Interleaved 
Task conditions. To further investigate the role, if any, that an interleaved task might play in the 
magnitude of subsequent illusion perception, we extended our attempts to modulate attention via 
a more active attentional task in our primary task in the interleaved set – a visual search task.  
6.3 Experiment 3 
6.3.1 Methods 
6.3.1.1 Participants 
Forty-nine different undergraduate participants were recruited from GSU’s Psychology 
Department participant pool (average age: 20.69 years old ± 8.53, 40 females). Participants were 
required to give informed consent prior to participating in the experiment(s) and received course 
credit for their participation. Testing complied with the procedures and protocols that were 
approved by the IRB of GSU. The apparatus and testing location were identical to Study 1 and 
Study 2. 
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6.3.1.2 Illusion Task 
Illusion task stimuli and General Procedures were identical to those from Study 1 and 
Study 2, except that we no longer included Large Square trials in which large squares flanked the 
horizontal line. Instead, we presented the Baseline condition in 50% of trials and the Small 
Square condition in 50% of trials. Again, we oversampled the more difficult levels to increase 
the number of critical test trials presented (50% of test trials presented a randomly selected Level 
3 to Level 10 trial whereas the remaining trials randomly sampled from the full range of levels). 
The true midpoint line (Level 6) was never presented. We did not include Large Square trials in 
Experiment 3 because this condition did not lead to a difference in performance patterns relative 
to the Baseline condition in Experiment 1 or Experiment 2. Eliminating this condition from 
Experiment 3 allowed us to increase the critical trial types as this study required more time to 
complete than the previous experiments.  
6.3.1.3 Visual Search Task 
6.3.1.3.1 Stimuli 
 Visual Search Task stimuli were comprised of either target elements (lines) or inducer 
elements (squares; see Figure 2). Lines in the Visual Search task were identical in length and 
color to the standard target line described above at Level 6 (4 cm long; black). Squares were 
identical in size and color to the small squares in the Small Square condition from the Illusion 
task (2.5 cm x 2.5 cm).  
6.3.1.3.2 General Procedure 
  At the outset of each Visual Search Task trial, participants clicked a trial initiation 
stimulus at the center of the computer screen (‘Start’ button). Then that button disappeared and 
stimuli (squares or lines) appeared onscreen. On each trial, participants were required to identify 
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whether a target that differed from all other stimuli onscreen was present among a set of 
distractors (which all were identical to each other). Participants were presented with either 
squares (Visual Search Square task) or lines (Visual Search Line task). Two conditions were 
established for Visual Search trials, including Target-Present trials (target present among a set of 
distractors) and Target-Absent trials (target absent among distractors). Participants were 
instructed to select the “Z” key if they did not locate a target (i.e., if all stimuli were identical to 
one another) or the “M” key on the computer keyboard if they located the target (i.e., the 
stimulus set contained one stimulus that differed in its visual properties from all others). The 
Visual Search trials presented 8, 16, 32, or 64 stimuli. All distractor stimuli (squares and lines) 
had a border width of 3 mm but, if a target was present, one of the stimuli had a slightly larger 
border width of 5 mm. Stimuli were presented in one of 64 randomly selected locations on 
screen, equidistant from one another.  
 Participants were not required to make a speeded response. If a participant correctly 
identified target-present trials as containing a visually distinct stimulus (via the “M” key) or if a 
participant correctly identified target-absent trials (via the “Z” key), a flashing stimulus that said 
‘Correct!’ in the middle of the screen appeared. Incorrect responses led to a flashing stimulus 
that said ‘Incorrect’ in the middle of the screen followed by a timeout period of 5 s. The inter-
trial interval was 1 s. 
As in Experiment 1 and Experiment 2, the Visual Search Task and the Illusion Task 
iterated back and forth trial by trial throughout the session, so that participants completed one 
Visual Search Task trial and then one Illusion Task trial. Each participant completed a total of 
800 trials – 400 Visual Search Task and 400 Illusion Task. Half of the participants began with 
the 200 Visual Search Square trials iterated with 200 Illusion Task trials and then completed 200 
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Visual Search Line trials iterated with 200 Illusion Task trials. The other half of participants 
began with 200 Visual Search Line trials iterated with 200 Illusion Task trials and then 
completed 200 Visual Search Square trials iterated with 200 Illusion Task trials. A testing 
session was 60 minutes or until the participant completed the 800 test trials. Data from 
participants completing fewer than half of the classify trials were not included in the following 
analyses. All but one participant met this requirement. 
6.3.2 Results 
Table 1 depicts group level performance in the Visual Search Line and Visual Search 
Square tasks as a function of correctly identifying target presence among the distractors and the 
response times for each trial type. Participants performed above chance in each task, but did not 
reach accuracy levels documented in Experiments 1 and 2 for the primary task (>98% accuracy). 
Average group performance for the Visual Search Line task was 65.92%. Average group 
performance for the Visual Search Square task was 66.86%. As predicted, there was a negative 
correlation of performance and set size for Visual Search Line Target-Present trials, r(2) = -.99, p 
= .005. There was a similar trend in performance as a function of set size for Line Target-Absent 
trials, r(2) = -.64, p = .18, Square Target-Present trials, r(2) = -.72, p = .14, and Square Target-
Absent trials, r(2) = -.48, p = .26, but none of these conditions were statistically significant.   
For the Illusion Task, we excluded all trials in which participants timed-out (response 
times exceeding 3 seconds). These trials were very infrequent, occurring in only 2.10% of the 
trials.  
Figure 5 depicts group-level performance (i.e., classification of the line as ‘short’) as a 
function of Illusion Task condition and Line Length for the (a) Visual Search Line task and (b) 
Visual Search Square task. We conducted a repeated-measures ANOVA with Visual Search 
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Task condition (Line and Square), Illusion Task condition (Baseline and Small Square), and Line 
Length (8 levels) as variables on the proportion of trials where the participants made a line 
classification of ‘short.’ There was a significant main effect of Line Length, F (7, 322) = 82.02, p 
< .001, η2p = .64, and Illusion Task condition, F (1, 46) = 54.54, p < .001, η2p = .54. As in 
Experiment 1 and Experiment 2, there was not a significant main effect of Visual Search Task 
condition, F (1, 46) = 1.99, p = .17, η2p = .04. There was a significant interaction between Line 
Length and Illusion Task condition, F (7, 322) = 9.86, p < .001, η2p = .18. There was not a 
significant interaction of Line Length and Interleaved Task condition, F (7, 322) = 1.48, p =  .17, 
η2p = .03, nor of Interleaved Task condition and Illusion Task condition, F (1, 46) = 1.36, p = .25, 
η2p = .25. There was not a significant three-way interaction, F (7, 322) = 1.38, p = .21, η2p = .03. 
Based on a visual inspection of Figure 5, the effect of condition appeared to be driven by 
the more difficult levels, and less so at the easier short levels (Levels 1-2) and the easier long 
levels (Levels 7-8), likely due to ceiling effects. Because there was no effect of Visual Search 
Task, we collapsed performance across conditions (Line and Square). We used a paired-samples 
t-test to compare the Baseline condition to the Small Square condition at the more difficult test 
levels (Levels 3-6). Lines were classified as ‘short’ significantly less in the Small Square 
condition (M = 37.61, SD = 12.99) than in the Baseline condition (M = 63.15, SD = 15.63), t(47) 
= 9.34, p < .001. 
6.3.3 Discussion 
 The Baldwin illusion, again, readily emerged in a classification task among human adults 
despite the completion of an interleaved visual search task that featured illusion targets (lines) or 
inducers (squares). Taken together with the results from Experiment 1 and Experiment 2, the 
emergence of the Baldwin illusion is robust and not impacted via an interleaved task presenting 
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perceptually similar stimuli. These results indicate that effective attempts to manipulate attention 
within a visual illusion array may only occur when the array is physically present. Efforts to 
manipulate attention in this manner have been effective in past studies using verbal instructions 
to attend to different features within the array and through simple manipulations of illusory 
elements (e.g., Daini & Wenderoth, 2008; Gardner & Long, 1961; Goryo, Robinson, & Wilson, 
1984; Jordan & English, 1989; Lester & Dassonville, 2011; Predebon, 2004, Shulman, 1992; 
Tsal, 1984). 
6.4 General Discussion 
Attention plays a critical role in the emergence of perceptual illusions. Increased attention 
towards an illusory-inducing context, unsurprisingly, increases illusion magnitude and 
inattention towards this context reduces or even reverses illusion magnitude or direction (e.g., 
Bates, 1923; Coren & Girgus, 1972; Dewar, 1967; Ebert & Pollack, 1972, 1973; Gardner & 
Long, 1961; Predebon, 2004; Restle, 1971; Weintraub & Cooper, 1972). In the current study, we 
introduced an interleaved task paradigm that included a primary task presenting either targets 
(lines) or inducers (squares) followed by a secondary task to classify horizontal lines as ‘short’ or 
‘long’ when presented as part of the illusory array. Illusion perception was robust among 
participants, with human adults overestimating line length when presented with small flanker 
squares. The magnitude of the illusion did not differ as a function of primary task in the current 
experiments – the illusion was perceived to the same extent whether squares or lines were 
presented prior to the classification task.  
We utilized an interleaved task in which participants completed a two-choice 
discrimination or a visual search task and then completed the illusion classification task. A dual 
task paradigm is used to assess whether performance or demands from one task interfere or 
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carryover to performance in a second, perhaps related task (e.g., Bourke & Duncan, 2005; He & 
McCarly, 2010; Pannebakker et al., 2009;Woodman & Luck, 2004). Often, a concurrent task 
design is used when implementing a dual task paradigm versus the interleaved task adopted here. 
Concurrent tasks introduce the secondary task during the completion of the primary task, rather 
than the iterated procedure used here. Thus, the concurrent task creates a demand on cognitive 
resources as the tasks are completed simultanously. This higher demand of a concurrent task may 
have increased the liklihood of interference from the primary task with the illusion task. For 
example, requiring participants to store an image of a horizontal line (target) or square (inducer) 
in working memory while completing the illusion classification task may create differences in 
illusion perception if the stimulus differs from that of the classification task.  
Future studies also might consider the role of perceptual processing mode when studying 
attentional effects in illusions. Specifically, geometric illusions require the simultaneous 
processing of the entire figure rather than perceiveing each element individually (Coren & 
Girgus, 1978). Previous research has demonstrated that human adults with a stronger global 
precedence perceive geometric illusions more readily than those participants with a more locally-
oriented processing mode, presumably because they have a stronger tendency to perceive multi-
element arrays as one larger configuration rather than individual parts (e.g., Berry, 1966, 1968, 
1971; Dawson, 1967; Witkin, 1967). An interesting question concerns whether these individual 
diffences in procssing mode influence the liklihood for attentional biases within an illusory array. 
Perhaps those with a stronger global precendence are immune to attentional manipulation as 
investigated in the current work. In contrast, a local processor might be subject to greater 
manipulations of a secondary task that directs attention to the individual elements.  
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Further, certain species (e.g., monkeys or pigeons) or populations such as children with 
Autism Spectrum Disorder display a more locally-oriented processing style and subsequently fail 
to perceive some geometric illusions (e.g., Dakin & Frith, 2005; Happé, 1996; Happé, Briskman, 
& Frith, 2001). Thus, their perceptions of visual illusions may be more pliable via a secondary 
task than typically-developing children and adults. Attentional manipulations as tested here in an 
interleaved paradigm would likely result in slight differences in illusion perception that interact 
with base perceptual processing styles. 
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6.6 Tables 
Table 1. Group performance for the Visual Search task in Experiment 3, including average 
performance (accuracy in identifying target presence) and average response times for each trial 
type (in seconds).  
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6.7 Figures 
 
Figure 1. The Baldwin illusion: humans typically perceive the horizontal line flanked by small 
squares (bottom) as longer than an identical horizontal line flanked by large squares (top).  
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Figure 2. Example of trial progression between the Interleaved Task-Squares (select the square 
with the greater degree of rotation) and the Illusion Task (classify the central line as ‘Short’ or 
‘Long’). The cursor arrow present in each frame is used to illustrate selection by the participant; 
arrows were not present during testing. Participants alternated between one Interleaved Task 
followed by one Illusion Task throughout testing.  
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a. 
 
b. 
Figure 3. Mean percentage of ‘Short’ responses for the Baseline, Small Square, and Large 
Square conditions for the (a) Interleaved Line task and the (b) Interleaved Square task. Line 
Length levels progress from 1 (shortest) to 8 (longest) in Experiment 1. Error bars depict 
corrected 95% confidence intervals for repeated measures tests (Cousineau, 2005). 
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a. 
 
b.  
Figure 4. Mean percentage of ‘Short’ responses for the Baseline, Small Square, and Large 
Square conditions for the (a) Interleaved Line task and the (b) Interleaved Square task. Line 
Length levels progress from 1 (shortest) to 8 (longest) in Experiment 2. Error bars depict 
corrected 95% confidence intervals for repeated measures tests (Cousineau, 2005). 
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a. 
 
b. 
Figure 5. Mean percentage of ‘Short’ responses for the Baseline, Small Square, and Large 
Square conditions for the (a) Visual Search Line task and the (b) Visual Search Square task. Line 
Length levels progress from 1 (shortest) to 8 (longest) in Experiment 3. Error bars depict 
corrected 95% confidence intervals for repeated measures tests (Cousineau, 2005). 
 
 
227 
DOES PERCEPTION OF THE TWO-DIMENSIONAL DELBOEUF ILLUSION PREDICT 
FOOD CHOICE BIASES IN PRESCHOOLERS? 
 
 
 
By 
 
 
 
AUDREY E. PARRISH 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
The Delboeuf illusion is a 2-dimensional geometric illusion in which people typically 
perceive a central black dot as being larger when encircled by a small outer ring than the same 
sized dot encircled by a large outer ring. Interestingly, food on round plates mimics this visual 
illusion in a 3-dimensional setting. Food portions on small plates are overestimated in size 
relative to same-sized food portions on large plates. Although a number of studies have 
investigated the Delboeuf illusion in 2-dimensional format, less research has investigated the 
application of this illusion in food-choice scenarios. Moreover, there is no research explicitly 
linking illusory experiences in these two contexts within the same individuals. To explore this 
potential link, preschool children first completed a psychophysical method-of-adjustment 
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computer task in Experiment 1 and then a food-choice task in Experiment 2. Children showed 
evidence of the Delboeuf illusion in the computerized task, but did not show evidence of the 
illusion in the food-choice task. Thus, the degree to which these children perceived the 2-
dimensional Delboeuf illusion using psychophysical procedures in Experiment 1 did not predict 
whether they also were more or less likely to see food items on small plates as constituting more 
food than the same amounts on large plates. Future research is needed to determine the 
mechanisms that underlie illusory emergence as it manifests in real-world, decision-making 
settings and the potential role of motivation and other factors impacting illusory biases.  
 
INDEX WORDS:  Delboeuf illusion; Perception; Children; Visual illusion; Food choice; 
Consumption; Method of Adjustment 
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7 DOES PERCEPTION OF THE TWO-DIMENSIONAL DELBOEUF ILLUSION 
PREDICT FOOD CHOICE BIASES IN PRESCHOOLERS? 
Consumer research is heavily influenced by basic psychological science (see Ariely, 
2008, 2010).  One excellent example lies within the human consumption domain. What we eat, 
how much we eat, what we serve ourselves, whether we clean our plates, and how much money 
we spend on food is directly influenced by how we perceive food quantities (e.g., Wansink 2004, 
2006). Food quantity perception is directly influenced by the context in which food items or 
portions are presented.  For example, tall thin glassware often is perceived to hold more liquid 
than short, squat glassware holding the exact same amount of liquid (e.g., Chandon & 
Ordabayeva, 2009; Piaget, Inhelder, & Szeminska, 1960; Raghubir & Krishna, 1999; Wansink & 
Van Ittersum, 2003, 2005). People also are willing to pay more for less food based on the 
appearance of that food. For example, overflowing ice cream cups are valued more highly than a 
larger amount of ice cream that does not overflow a larger container (Hsee, 1998).  
These mistakes are ubiquitous – children (e.g., DiSantis, Birch, Davey, Serrano, Zhang, 
Bruton, & Fisher, 2013; Wansink, Payne, & Werle, 2008; Wansink, Van Ittersum, & Payne 
2014) and adults alike fall prey to these food-choice biases (e.g., Van Ittesum & Wansink, 2012; 
Wansink & Van Ittersum, 2013). Even nutritional and food service experts are not immune to 
quantity perception errors despite their extensive experience in measuring and serving food 
portions (Wansink & Van Ittersum, 2003; Wansink, Van Ittersum, & Painter, 2006). Finally, 
animals such as chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) make errors in food maximization based on 
presentation style in ways that are similar to the choices of humans (Beran, Evans, & Harris, 
2008; Boysen, Berntson, & Mukobi, 2001; Parrish & Beran, 2014a, 2014b).  
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 Ultimately, overconsumption has detrimental effects on our waistlines and wallets, 
leading to overeating and overspending, further contributing to chronic illnesses such as obesity, 
diabetes, and heart disease (e.g., Allison, Fontaine, Manson, Stevens, & VanItallie, 1999; Calle, 
Rodriguez, Walker-Thurmond, & Thun, 2003; Rolls, 2003). Because of the universality of errors 
in food quantity judgment and the detrimental consequences of overconsumption, researchers 
have begun to explore the mechanisms that underlie these biases. Recently, one illusion has 
received much attention in terms of how we perceive food on plates and, subsequently, how 
much food we consume. The Delboeuf illusion is a 2-dimensionsal geometric visual illusion that 
causes most people to perceive a central black dot as larger when encircled by a small outer ring 
than the same sized dot encircled by a large outer ring (Delboeuf, 1865; see Figure 1). 
Interestingly, food on round plates mimics this visual illusion in a 3-dimensional, decision-
making setting, and the choice of people when faced with such plates suggests that a similar 
perceptual bias may be at work. Food portions on small plates are overestimated in size relative 
to food portions on large plates, much like dot size misperception (see Figure 1). 
Although a number of studies with adult humans (e.g., Coren & Girgus, 1978; Nicolas, 
1995; Ward & Lockhead, 1970) and children (e.g., Hanley & Zerbolio, 1965; Piaget, 
Lambercier, Boesch, & van Albertini, 1942; Pressey & Wilson, 1978; Weintraub & Cooper, 
1972) have investigated the Delboeuf illusion in the 2-dimensional format via pen-and-paper or 
computerized testing, less research has investigated the application of this illusion in food-choice 
scenarios. Van Ittersum and Wansink (2012) first appealed to the Delboeuf illusion when 
reporting food choice biases in their work investigating serving behavior among human adults. 
They reported that bowl size influenced serving behavior in a manner in line with the visual 
illusion. People over-served food into large bowls (underestimating portion size in the large 
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context) and under-served food into small bowls (overestimating portion size in the small 
context). Recent studies have reported similar findings among human adults and children in a 
variety of scenarios, including serving tasks and food-choice scenarios (e.g., DiSantis et al., 
2013; Murphy, Lusby, Bartges, & Kirk, 2012; Robinson & Matheson, 2014; Van Ittersum & 
Wansink, 2007, 2011; Wansink & Cheney, 2005; Wansink et al. 2008, 2014).   
We have tested this phenomenon in chimpanzees using a two-choice discrimination food 
task (Parrish & Beran, 2014b). Chimpanzees were presented with two different food portions on 
the same sized plates (control conditions) or different sized plates (test conditions). They were 
excellent in choosing the larger amount of food in control conditions; however, like human 
adults, chimpanzees overestimated foods presented on small plates (even if it sometimes meant 
choosing a smaller amount of food) relative to the same-sized or larger portion on a large plate. 
Furthermore, we have documented the 2-dimensional Delboeuf illusion using a computerized 
dot-discrimination task in rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) and capuchin monkeys (Cebus 
apella), and those monkeys performed much as human adults do when shown these stimuli 
(Parrish, Brosnan, & Beran, 2015). These comparative results suggested that the phenomena 
underlying the food choice biases and the 2-dimensional Delboeuf illusion are perhaps linked to 
basic perceptual mechanisms that we share with closely related species, such as nonhuman 
primates. 
Despite the seemingly clear link between the Delboeuf illusion and errors in food 
quantity judgment, there is no research explicitly linking these two perceptual experiences within 
the same individuals. We do not know whether individuals would perceive the Delboeuf illusion 
to the same degree in the traditional, 2-dimensional task as they do in a 3-dimensional, food-
choice task. If this were true, then perhaps one could predict which individuals will fall prey to 
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food biases based on their 2-dimensional perceptions or misperceptions of the illusion. The 
current study served to assess the link between perception of the 2-dimensional Delboeuf illusion 
and the biases that emerge within food-choice tasks. Further, because food-choice studies have 
revealed interesting results among children who also demonstrate biases to over-serve, misjudge, 
and over-eat based on dish size (e.g., DiSantis et al., 2013; Robinson & Matheson, 2014; 
Wansink et al., 2008 2014), the current research was conducted with preschool children who 
might be subject to early interventions that mediate these biases.  
To explore the link between 2-dimensional and 3-dimensional illusion perception, a 
within-subjects, repeated testing design was used, in which the same children were tested on the 
black-and-white Delboeuf illusion presented on computer screen followed by a food-choice task 
that presented real food items on plates, mimicking the dots and rings of the 2-dimensional 
illusion. The within-subjects design allowed for testing a predictive relationship between the two 
tasks. 
To test the Delboeuf illusion in 2-dimensional format, children 3 to 5.5 years old were 
tested on a computerized task in which they had to judge and manipulate dots surrounded by 
outer rings of variable size. The psychophysical method of adjustment procedure was introduced 
in which participants were presented with a standard dot of one size and a second dot that had to 
be adjusted in size so that it matched the standard dot. Control trials were presented with the 
same sized rings (both were small rings or both were large rings) encircling each dot. Control 
performance was contrasted against test trials with variable sized rings (one large ring and one 
small ring) around each dot. The method of adjustment has proven to be successful with children 
as it offers an intuitive task in which the child controls the size of the target (Hanley & Zerbolio, 
1965; Pressey & Wilson, 1978). Because of this, the method of adjustment isolates the target of 
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interest (in this case, the central dot) and reduces a bias to include the inducers (the outer ring) 
into the size judgment (Hanley & Zerbolio, 1965; Pressey & Wilson, 1978). It has been 
demonstrated that the method of adjustment is a particularly robust measure for the Delboeuf 
illusion as it yields highly stable results over time within the same individuals and requires a 
smaller number of trials than other psychophysical measures (Pressey, 1977).  
In Experiment 2, the same children participated in a food-choice task in which food 
portions mimicked inner dots and plates mimicked the outer rings that created the context in 
which those portions were assessed. Participants were presented with two types of food choices 
on different plates and were instructed to select the larger of the two food portions. Control trials 
presented identical plates (both large plates or both small plates), whereas test trials presented 
different-sized plates (one large plate and one small plate). Children’s performance was 
compared across both experiments to test for a predictive link between perceiving the illusion in 
the computerized task and perceiving the illusion in the food choice task. Establishing whether 
such a link exists for illusion perception across domains is crucial to understanding better the 
mechanisms that drive erroneous, and potentially costly, errors in judgment and decision-
making.  
7.1 Experiment 1 
Preschool children between 3 and 5.5 years of age were presented with a computerized 
method of adjustment task. Two dots were presented on a computer screen, one of which was 
established at a standard size of 3 cm in diameter and one of which could be adjusted to increase 
or decrease in size through key presses. The objective was to adjust this dot until it was 
determined to be equal in size to the standard-sized 3 cm dot.  
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7.1.1 Methods 
7.1.1.1 Participants 
  Twenty-seven typically-developing preschool children (11 females) between the ages of 
40 and 68 months (average = 53 months) were included in the current study. The age of one 
participant was unknown as this information was not provided in the parental demographic 
report. These children attended a daycare and preschool center near Atlanta, Georgia. 
Participants were recruited via monthly newsletters from the preschool.  Parental permission 
forms were distributed, and signed consent forms from parents were required prior to children 
participating in the experiment. Testing complied with the procedures and protocols that were 
approved by the Institutional Review Board of Georgia State University.  
7.1.1.2 Materials and Procedure 
    Testing occurred on a voluntary basis and the children were allowed to stop testing and 
return to their classroom at any point during a test session. Children received a small toy 
following test sessions as a prize regardless of performance. Testing took place in the 
preschool’s lunchroom, and test sessions lasted approximately 10 minutes with children typically 
working one time per week.  Children were tested in pairs, seated across from one another at a 
lunchroom table with their own experimenter. Children could not see each other’s computer 
monitor during testing.  
Children were tested using a 13.5 in HP Pavilion laptop touch-screen computer. They 
viewed the monitor from a distance of approximately 40 cm to 50 cm. Children were 
familiarized with the laptop and touch-screen monitor prior to testing to ensure they understood 
the contingency between key presses and the responses of the computer program (see below).  
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Children were presented with two dots on screen – a standard dot (3 cm in diameter) 
presented on the right side of the screen and an adjustable dot presented on the left side of the 
screen that varied in its starting size. To provide equal experience increasing and decreasing the 
adjustable dot size, the adjustable dot was presented as larger than the standard dot (5.02 cm in 
diameter) in half of the trials and smaller than the standard dot (1.77 cm in diameter) in half of 
the trials.  Children were given verbal instructions to first indicate whether the adjustable dot was 
smaller or larger than the standard dot. Next, they were instructed that they could make this dot 
bigger or smaller and that the rule was to indicate when the dots were equal in size or exactly the 
same in size. The experimenter then demonstrated the key presses that controlled the dot size by 
pressing the “M” key which made the dot bigger (a .05 cm increase in the diameter with each 
key press) and the “Z” key, which made the dot smaller (a .05 cm decrease in diameter with each 
key press). When a child indicated that he or she believed the dots were equal in size, pressing 
the space bar advanced the program to the next test trial.  
To keep the response method consistent across children, the experimenter controlled the 
key presses for all participants because pilot testing had indicated that children varied widely in 
their capacity to make key presses while simultaneously attending to the screen and making a 
judgment about dot size. Children verbally instructed the experimenter to make the dot bigger or 
smaller and indicated when the dots were equal in size. To prevent inadvertent bias or 
expectation on the part of the experimenter, he or she did not look at the screen during the trials 
but rather pressed the keys according to the child’s verbal instruction. There was no onscreen 
feedback at trial’s end other than the experimenter consistently praising the child’s efforts. 
Children were not required to complete a trial in any pre-set amount of time. Because the 
adjustable dot began at different sizes relative to the standard dot and because children differed 
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in the pace at which they gave instructions to grow or shrink the dot, response time data were not 
collected in this experiment. 
Four test conditions were established - Small Control, Large Control, Small Mixed, and 
Large Mixed trials. Control trials established baseline performance in this task and presented 
both dots encircled by the same-sized rings. Small Control trials presented the standard dot and 
the adjustable dot encircled by small rings (4.5 cm in diameter). Large Control trials presented 
the standard dot and the adjustable dot encircled by large rings (9 cm in diameter). Mixed trials 
presented a large ring encircling one dot and a small ring encircling the other dot. Small Mixed 
trials presented the standard dot encircled by a large ring and the adjustable dot encircled by a 
small ring. If the Delboeuf illusion were to occur, participants would not make the adjustable dot 
large enough relative to the standard dot on these trials because the adjustable dot presented in 
the small context (i.e., small ring) would be over-estimated. Conversely, Large Mixed trials 
presented the standard dot encircled by a small ring and the adjustable dot encircled by a large 
ring. If the Delboeuf illusion were to occur, participants would make the adjustable dot too large 
relative to the standard dot on these trials because the adjustable dot presented in the large 
context (i.e., large ring) would be under-estimated.   
Participants completed a total of 20 trials (5 trials per condition). Children worked on the 
task until they completed the test session (20 test trials) or until they asked to return to the 
classroom. All children completed the test trials within one or two test sessions (conducted on 
separate days). Two children completed only 19 out of 20 trials due to computer malfunction.  
7.1.2 Results 
  Each child’s average difference score was established for each condition. To do this, on 
each trial the difference between the standard dot and the adjusted dot was recorded, and then the 
238 
average of this difference was calculated across all trials in a given condition. Figure 2 depicts 
group-level performance (i.e., mean difference score) as a function of condition (Small Control, 
Large Control, Small Mixed, Large Mixed). A repeated-measures ANOVA was conducted to 
examine the effect of condition on adjusted dot size. There was a significant main effect of 
condition, F (3, 78) = 43.45, p < .001, η2p = .63.  
Based on a visual inspection of Figure 2, paired-samples t-tests were used to compare the 
size of the adjusted dot in the test conditions (Small Mixed and Large Mixed) to one another and 
to the two control conditions (Small Control and Large Control). A Bonferroni adjusted alpha 
level of .01 was used per test given the five comparisons of interest (.05/5). As predicted, 
adjusted dot size was significantly smaller in the Small Mixed condition relative to the Large 
Mixed condition: t(26) = -11.77, p < .001, Small Control condition: t(26) = -5.39, p < .001, and 
Large Control condition: t(26) = -4.89, p < .001. As predicted, adjusted dot size was 
significantly larger in the Large Mixed condition relative to the Small Control condition: t(26) = 
7.58, p < .001, and Large Control condition: t(26) = 6.16, p < .001. 
7.1.3 Discussion 
Overall, children performed very well in the control conditions, adjusting dot size within 
1 mm of the standard dot size. In contrast, the rings that surrounded the dots in the test conditions 
led to greater degrees of over- or under-estimation of dot size, depending on outer ring size. As 
predicted, a small ring encircling the adjustable dot led children to overestimate dot size and 
subsequently undersize the adjustable dot. In contrast, a large ring encircling the adjustable dot 
led children to underestimate how large the dot was and this led children to make the dot too 
large. These results match previous reports of the 2-dimensional Delboeuf illusion among 
children (e.g., Hanley & Zerbolio, 1965; Piaget et al., 1942; Pressey & Wilson, 1978; Weintraub 
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& Cooper, 1972), adults (e.g., Coren & Girgus, 1978; Nicolas, 1995; Ward & Lockhead, 1970), 
and nonhuman primates (Parrish et al., 2015). Next, the children were presented with the 
Delboeuf illusion in a different domain (i.e., a food choice task) to determine whether these same 
children perceived the illusion in a 3-dimensional, real-world choice setting. 
7.2 Experiment 2 
Children were shown two food portions presented on same-sized or different-sized plates. 
These plates created the context in which the food portions were judged, potentially leading to 
over- or under-estimation of food size depending on the size of the plate. Several studies have 
referenced the Delboeuf illusion as potentially underlying decisional biases that often are 
observed during food judgments or food serving scenarios (e.g., McClain, van den Bos, 
Matheson, McClue, & Robinson, 2014; Van Ittersum & Wansink, 2012).  
7.2.1 Method 
7.2.1.1 Participants  
The same participants from Experiment 1 were tested in Experiment 2. One participant 
from Experiment 1 was not included in Experiment 2 as this child moved to a different school 
before Experiment 2 began. Testing again took place in the preschool’s lunchroom.  
Materials and Procedure   Children were presented with a two-choice discrimination 
task in which they chose between two plates of food on a bench, each containing a separate 
portion of food. Plates were baited and covered prior to the children entering the lunchroom so 
that they could not see the plates or food until the test trial began. Children did not consume the 
food items in this experiment. Instead, a stuffed animal was shown to the participants during the 
instructions, and they were allowed to hold the stuffed animal at this time. A stuffed kitten was 
used for half of the trials (cereal trials – see below) and a stuffed puppy was used for the other 
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half of the trials (lunchmeat trials – see below). Experimenter 1 then provided children with the 
following scenario and instructions prior to testing: “We are going to play a game with Kitty and 
Puppy today. Kitty and Puppy forgot their breakfast and they are very hungry! I am going to 
show you two different plates of food. Your job is simple – point to the plate that has the bigger 
amount of food. Make sure you look at both plates before you choose. It is very important to find 
the biggest amount of food for Kitty and Puppy!”  Within this script, children were told that the 
kitty ate cereal and the puppy ate lunch meat.  Following these instructions, children were shown 
8 pairs of plates in succession.  For each pair, both lids were lifted off those plates, revealing the 
food on those plates simultaneously. Participants indicated which plate contained the estimated 
larger amount of food through pointing and/or verbal reports.   
To prevent cuing, the experimenter removed the plate covers for the two plates under 
comparison at the start of each trial and then stood behind the child during this choice phase (out 
of view of the child). Experimenter 2 sat at a table behind the testing area and recorded the 
selected food item and recorded the response latency for each trial. Experimenter 2 also was out 
of view during the choice phase. Children were not required to complete the trial in any pre-set 
amount of time, but rather completed each trial at their own pace, working through each of the 8 
pairs of plates.  Trial-by-trial feedback was not given other than the experimenter consistently 
praising the child’s efforts. 
Testing involved two types of foods, a discrete type (cereal pieces) and a continuous type 
(round pieces of lunch meat). These food types were used as previous studies have included a 
range of foods and we were interested in the generality of any emerging illusion across different 
food types. Only one food type was ever used in a given trial, thus lunch meat and cereal were 
never directly compared within a trial.   
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Two different portion sizes were used. For the discrete food type (cereal), round cookie 
cutters were used to mold the cereal pieces into a round presentation form.  For the large cereal 
amount, the cutter had an area of 64 sq cm (holding 30 cereal pieces) and for the smaller cereal 
amount the area of the cutter was 53.3 sq cm (holding 25 cereal pieces). For the continuous food 
type (lunchmeat slices), cookie cutters were used to cut the lunchmeat into a round presentation 
form. The large lunchmeat portion was cut to an area of 64 sq. cm and the small lunchmeat 
portion was cut to an area of 53.3 sq. cm. Figure 1 provides examples of the food and plate 
combinations for some test trials. Two different sizes of identical white dinner plates were used 
for both food types. The larger plates measured 26 cm in diameter and the smaller plates 
measured 18 cm in diameter. 
Four trial types were introduced: Small Plate Control trials, Large Plate Control trials, 
Standard Illusion trials, and Non-Standard Illusion trials. All trial types were presented for both 
types of food, continuous and discrete. Control trials involved presenting two different food 
portions on the same sized plates (both small plates or both large plates) to determine whether 
the children could discriminate between the two portion sizes when presented in an identical 
context. Standard Illusion trials used a mixed-plate design in which equal food portions were 
presented. These trials matched the standard Delboeuf illusion in which different-sized rings 
(i.e., plates) encircled the same-sized dot (i.e., food portions) so that the food should appear 
larger when placed on the smaller plate if the illusion was in effect. The Non-Standard Illusion 
trials used a mixed-plate, mixed-portion design in which a smaller portion of food was placed on 
a smaller plate in comparison to a larger food portion on the larger plate. In this case, the illusion 
would occur when the different-sized foods appeared to be equal in size.  
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Each participant completed a total of 16 test trials, eight trials with each food type. 
Participants completed two sessions (one per day), with four trials (Small Plate Control, Large 
Plate Control, Standard Illusion, and Non-Standard Illusion) of each food type (continuous and 
discrete) per session. In Session 1, participants completed the four continuous trials (lunchmeat) 
prior to the four discrete trials. In Session 2, participants completed the four discrete trials 
(cereal) prior to the four continuous trials. Within each four-trial block, both control trials were 
presented first followed by the Standard Illusion and then the Non-Standard Illusion trials. Plate 
position and food portion location were randomized in each trial (i.e., right versus left placement 
on the bench and small versus large portion on the plates).  
7.2.2 Results and Discussion 
Figure 3 presents group-level performance in Experiment 2. The first question was whether 
participants performed differently depending on the type of food that was presented (continuous 
versus discrete). There was not a significant difference across food types in the number of large-
food selections in Small Control trials, Χ2 (1) = .38, p = .54, Large Control trials, Χ2 (1) = 2.23, p 
= .14, and Non-Standard Illusion trials Χ2 (1) = 3.04, p = .08. Standard Illusion trials were not 
included here because the food sizes were identical and thus, there was not a larger food portion 
to select. Because choice behavior was consistent across the two food types, all remaining 
analyses combined the two food types.  
The second question concerned whether performance differed across the control 
conditions – Large Control versus Small Control. Overall performance was good; children chose 
the large food portion in 88.5% of trials in the Small Control condition and in 80.8% of trials in 
the Large Control condition. There was not a significant difference between control trials, Χ2 (1) 
= 2.36, p = .12. 
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The third question was whether the children showed a bias towards a particular plate size 
when identical food portions were presented on large and small plates in the Standard Illusion 
condition.  Preferring the small plate would be an indication of the Delboeuf illusion.  At the 
group level, participants did not select the portion that was on the small plate at levels that were 
significantly above chance, one-sample t test: t(25) = -1.43, p = .16. Despite perception of the 
illusion in Experiment 1, the illusion did not emerge in Experiment 2 with food choices. 
Finally, children performed very well in the Non-Standard illusion trials, selecting the 
larger portion of food on the large plate on 91.3% of these trials. If any illusion were occurring, 
children should have performed below how they performed on control trials in this trial type.  
However, the children performed at their highest level of any trial type for this arrangement, 
despite the expected illusory context of different-sized plates. 
Finally, I investigated whether a link existed between performance in Experiment 1 and 
Experiment 2. For Experiment 1, an average difference score was calculated for the Small Mixed 
and Large Mixed test conditions by dividing the difference score (standard dot size minus 
adjusted dot size) by the standard dot size (3 cm). This score ranged from 0% to 100%, with a 
higher score reflecting a stronger illusion bias in which a participant over- or under-adjusted dot 
size to a greater degree. Similarly, for Experiment 2, a food-bias score was calculated for the 
Standard Illusion trials in which identical food portions were presented on a small plate and a 
large plate. This score ranged from 0% to 100%, with a higher score reflecting a stronger food 
bias. For example, a child with a food-bias score of 0% never selected the small plate in the 
Standard Illusion trials, whereas a child with a food-bias score of 100% selected the small plate 
in 4 of 4 Standard Illusion trials. Illusion perception did not correlate for Experiment 1 and 
Experiment 2 (Exp. 1 – Small Mixed condition and Exp. 2 – Standard Illusion condition: r(24) = 
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.02, p = .91; Exp. 1 – Large Mixed condition and Exp. 2 – Standard Illusion condition: r(24) = -
.16, p = .45). Thus, the degree to which these children perceived the 2-dimensional Delboeuf 
illusion using psychophysical procedures in Experiment 1 did not predict whether they were 
more or less likely to see food items on small plates as constituting more food than the same 
amounts on large plates. 
7.3 General Discussion 
Food choice behavior is impacted directly by the context in which food is judged, served, 
and eaten (e.g., Chandon & Ordabayeva, 2009; DiSantis et al., 2013; Raghubir & Krishna, 1999; 
Wansink 2004, 2006; Wansink & Van Ittersum, 2003, 2005, 2012). Similarly, visual illusions 
emerge when stimuli are misperceived due to the context in which they are judged, created, or 
measured (for reviews, see Coren & Girgus, 1978; Robinson, 1972). The link between the 
Delboeuf illusion as a 2-dimensonal dot illusion and food choice errors in a 3-dimensional choice 
setting seem clear – foods on plates mimic dots inside of rings, both of which create the context 
for misperceptions and erroneous choices. However, whether actual performance by participants 
on the 2-dimensional Delboeuf illusion correlates with food choice behavior in a 3-dimensional 
setting had yet to be tested. The current study assessed this potential link among preschool 
children.  
Children perceived the 2-dimensional Delboeuf illusion using the method of adjustment 
procedure in Experiment 1. The current results of the Delboeuf illusion match previous findings 
among children (Hanley & Zerbolio, 1965; Piaget et al., 1942; Pressey & Wilson, 1978; 
Weintraub & Cooper, 1972). Performance patterns also match those of human adults when 
presented with the 2-dimensional Delboeuf (e.g., Coren & Girgus, 1978; Nicolas, 1995; Ward & 
Lockhead, 1970). The method of adjustment used in the current study offered an intuitive 
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approach to testing perceptual size illusions among young children as it focused attention on the 
target (i.e., dot) as participants directly manipulated the size of the target itself. Isolating the 
target in this way may reduce biases to include the inducers (i.e., outer rings) into target 
discrimination (Hanley & Zerbolio, 1965; Pressey & Wilson, 1978). Reducing response bias of 
this nature is essential in pre- and non-verbal populations such as young children and nonhuman 
species because the bias to include the outer inducers into target judgment may erroneously lead 
to a reversed illusion as a byproduct of not understanding the task’s rule (see Parrish et al., 2015, 
for further discussion). 
Despite evidence of the 2-dimensional Delboeuf illusion using the computerized task in 
Experiment 1, children did not show the illusion in Experiment 2, with no preference for either 
the small or large plate when identical food portions were presented. Further, performance by 
children in Experiment 1 on the computerized illusion task was not predictive of their behavior 
in response to food choices in Experiment 2. These results are interesting in light of previous 
food choice studies among adults and children, demonstrating biases as a function of dishware 
size (DiSantis et al., 2013; Van Ittersum & Wansink, 2007; Wansink et al., 2008, 2014).  
A few key differences exist between the current two-choice food discrimination task and 
previous serving studies. In the current study, children made their food selections in 3 seconds or 
less in the vast majority of trials (75%). This approach served the children well in control trials 
with same-sized plates, but did not lead to illusion emergence in test trials. In contrast, serving 
studies require that participants spend more time manipulating the stimuli themselves. Perhaps 
an extended choice phase would have led to a different pattern of results in the current study. 
Specifically, illusory perception may have emerged with longer viewing times in which children 
could isolate the food to discriminate rather than potentially using external cues such as plate 
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size to guide choice behavior. Future studies should vary the presentation time during food 
choice tasks with young children (and older adults and other species) to explore whether there is 
a crucial viewing duration that is required for these decisional biases to emerge most robustly. 
A more likely factor in the emergence of food choice biases is motivational state. 
Previous studies have presented food-choice tasks using edible items that the participants 
consume during or immediately following the study. Research on the Delboeuf food illusion with 
chimpanzees presented food rewards that were highly salient and motivating, presumably leading 
the chimpanzees to point to the larger amount because of a prepotent response to do so (Parrish 
& Beran, 2014b). Relatedly, a recent study with children reported that a greater degree of food 
choice error (i.e., over-serving as a function of plate size) emerged as a function of household 
food-insecurity. Children from households where food was scarcer at times were more likely to 
fall prey to dishware illusions (DiSantis et al., 2013).  
It also has been suggested that positive findings of food biases are typically reflected in 
larger, more social settings with higher-preference, sugary foods like ice cream (see Rolls, Roe, 
Halverson, and Meengs, 2007). The current study presented a vignette regarding a toy animal 
that wanted to be fed the larger amount of food, rather than using edible foods that the child 
would consume. Future work comparing food choice behavior using different food types and 
under different motivational states regarding one’s own hunger state versus the imagined hunger 
state of others should be considered. Beyond presentation time and motivation, food biases are 
more widely documented in field settings (e.g., Wansink et al., 2006) versus laboratory settings 
(e.g., Rolls et al., 2007; Yip, Wiessing, Budgett, & Poppitt, 2013) where participants are more 
distracted and pay less attention to food that is served. An over-reliance on context (e.g., 
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dishware size) may increase in settings in which one is less focused on appropriate measures of 
food choice, serving, and consumption. 
Thus, like visual illusions, food choice biases that emerge as a function of contextual 
features such as dishware size are tenuous in nature. Internal factors (i.e., motivation, attention, 
rule maintenance/understanding) and external factors (i.e., social setting, food type, context 
properties) influence the degree to which these biases manifest (see Robinson et al., 2014). The 
current study opens up avenues of research into the link between perception and decision-
making, especially in situations where our perceptions mislead our judgments in real-world 
scenarios. Within-subjects approaches that allow one to track misperceptions across domains 
within the same individuals offer ways to study the mechanisms that underlie illusory emergence 
as it manifests in real-world, decision-making settings. Such research has clear translational 
impact for potential at-risk populations who fall prey to over-consumption and over-serving 
biases as a function of plate size and shape.  
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7.5 Figures  
 
Figure 1. (A) The Delboeuf illusion occurs when a central black dot is perceived as smaller when 
encircled by a large outer ring (at left) than the same sized dot encircled by a small outer ring (at 
right). (B) Test stimuli for the Standard Illusion trials are shown where equal-sized continuous 
food portions are presented on a large and small plate so that the food on the large plate (left) 
appears to be smaller than the food on the small plate (right). (C) Test stimuli for the Non-
Standard Illusion trials are shown where a larger discrete food portion on a large plate appears to 
be equal to the smaller portion on the small plate.  
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Figure 2. Group-level performance depicting final adjusted dot size (in cm) relative to standard 
dot size (3 cm) for each condition - Small Control (in black), Large Control (in white), Small 
Mixed (in dark gray), and Large Mixed (in light gray). Error bars depict corrected 95% 
confidence intervals for repeated measures tests (Cousineau, 2005). 
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Figure 3. The percentage of large food choices for the Large Control condition, Small Control 
condition, and Non-Standard illusion condition, in which two different-sized food portions were 
presented. The black bar shows the percentage of small plate choices in the Standard Illusion 
condition in which the same-sized food portion were presented on different-sized plates.  The 
three bars at left are statistically different from chance levels of responding, but the black bar is 
not. Error bars depict corrected 95% confidence intervals. 
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8 MORE THAN MEETS THE EYE: 
COMPARATIVE CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE STUDY 
OF VISUAL ILLUSIONS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS 
A perceptual system’s primary function is to feed sensory information upstream to be 
interpreted, manipulated, and utilized. A perceptual system that is fast (in terms of processing 
time), frugal (in terms of resource use), and efficient (in terms of precision) ultimately will be 
selected for above a system that does not balance these features. In fact, we rely on these very 
properties of our perceptual system when interacting with the physical world. The oft-used 
phrase ‘seeing is believing’ captures our dependence on the rapid veridicality of our perceptions 
when interpreting physical stimuli (Coren & Girgus, 1978). Such a system that prioritizes a 
balance between speed, frugality, and accuracy likely exists despite occasional costs for such 
efficiency. These tradeoffs manifest in the form of illusory phenomena when there is a disparity 
in sensory input and perception on the basis of misleading contexts. Crucially, illusions should 
be rare and universal, but not random. Because illusions emerge as a byproduct of an otherwise 
functional and efficient perceptual system, we should be able to predict the circumstances under 
which errors and biases might emerge.  
More broadly, visual illusions provide a window into the perceptual world of animals 
including humans. Mechanisms that facilitate fast and accurate visual perception would 
presumably have high ecological validity among visual organisms and would be under strong 
selective pressure in a range of species (Agrillo, Petrazzini, & Dadda, 2013). We would predict 
this to be true especially among closely related species that process their worlds similarly to 
humans, such as nonhuman primates. One of the defining characteristics of the Order Primates is 
an increased dependence on perceptual processing of visual information as primate species 
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evolved to navigate in a visually complex arboreal world (Strier, 2007; Sussman, 1999). 
Anatomically and functionally, the visual systems of human and nonhuman primates are highly 
congruent (e.g., De Valois & De Valois, 1988; Fagot & Deruelle, 1997; Fobes & King, 1982; 
Ungerleider & Mishkin, 1982; Weinstein & Grether, 1940; Wilson, Lavallee, Joossee, 
Hendrickson, Boothe, & Harwerth, 1989; see Matsuno & Fujita, 2009, for a review).  
Further, the study of visual illusions among primates has proven to be a fruitful field of 
inquiry, with a growing number of monkeys and apes demonstrating illusion perception similarly 
to one another and to humans, including the Zöllner illusion (Macaca mulatta: Agrillo, Parrish, 
& Beran, 2014; Papio papio: Benhar & Samuel, 1982), the Ebbinghaus-Titchener illusion (Papio 
papio: Parron & Fagot, 2007), the Ponzo illusion (Macaca mulatta: Bayne & Davis, 1993; Fujita, 
1996; Pan troglodytes: Fujita, 1997, 2001), the Mueller-Lyer illusion (Cebus apella: Suganuma, 
Pessoa, Monge-Fuentes, Castro, & Tavares, 2007), the Duncker illusion (Macaca mulatta: 
Zivotofsky, Goldberg, & Powell, 2005), the Delboeuf illusion (Cebus apella and Macaca 
mulatta: Parrish, Brosnan, & Beran, 2015; Pan troglodytes: Parrish & Beran, 2014a), the 
rectangle illusion (Cercopithecinae and Cebus: Dominguez, 1954; Harris, 1968) and the corridor 
illusion (Papio papio: Barbet & Fagot, 2002; Pan troglodytes: Imura, Tomonaga, & Yagi, 2008).  
Taken together, these findings suggest continuity in visual processing across primates, including 
the perception of illusory phenomena. 
My dissertation has expanded on and added to this line of research, with a focus on when, 
why and for whom visual illusions emerge. I have investigated these questions with specific 
attention to similarities and differences in basic perceptual mechanisms across primate species. I 
also focused on the significant, but often underestimated role of methodology, and the question 
of the translational impact of basic research into visual illusions on everyday decision-making. 
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Geometric illusions were the primary focus of the current work. These emerge when a target’s 
perceived properties (e.g., size, shape, color, orientation) are impacted by an illusory context. 
This context is comprised of one or more inducer stimuli that surround the target that is being 
evaluated. Because geometric illusions are multi-element, complex visual stimuli, they require 
the simultaneous processing of target and inducer elements (Coren & Girgus, 1978). Thus, these 
illusions do not emerge if target and inducers are processed sequentially or non-holistically. This 
defining characteristic of geometric illusions is critical to the development of this dissertation.  
8.1 Perceptual Processing Mode 
Processing mode is the manner in which complex visual arrays are perceived, such that 
global processing occurs if the array stimuli first are perceived as one cohesive unit, whereas 
local processing occurs if the stimuli first are perceived as individual elements. Humans typically 
display a global precedence, first perceiving the entire array as one holistic figure prior to 
processing individual details (e.g., Broadbent, 1977; Kimchi, 1992; Lamb & Robertson, 1988; 
Navon, 1977, 1981). Crucially, nonhuman primates vary in the degree to which they process 
stimuli at the global level. In fact, most monkey species that have been tested display a local 
processing style in which they perceive the individual elements in the array prior to the global 
figure (Cebus apella: De Lillo, Spinozzi, Truppa, & Naylor, 2005; Spinozzi, De Lillo, & Salvi, 
2006; Spinozzi, De Lillo, & Truppa, 2003; Macaca mulatta: Hopkins & Washburn, 2002; Papio 
papio: Deruelle & Fagot, 1997, 1998; Fagot & Deruelle, 1997; Fagot, Tomonaga, & Deruelle, 
2001; Parron & Fagot, 2007). However, chimpanzees appear more human-like in their 
processing style, often displaying a global-to-local precedence (Fagot & Tomonaga, 1999; Fujita 
& Matsuzawa, 1990; Hopkins, 1997; Hopkins & Washburn, 2002; Matsuno & Tomonaga, 2007; 
Matsuzawa, 1989; Tomonaga & Matsuzawa, 1992). Differences in perceptual processing mode 
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may impact illusion emergence, as explored across primate species in the current work. These 
predictions are supported by research with human adults demonstrating that individuals with a 
stronger global precedence also perceive certain illusions to a greater degree than individuals 
with weaker global processing (e.g., Berry, 1968, 1971; Dawson, 1967; Witkin, 1967).  
I first established perceptual processing mode in the primate subjects in Chapter 2. 
Rhesus monkeys and capuchin monkeys were given a delayed matching-to-sample task that 
presented hierarchical compound stimuli in which the larger, global configuration was comprised 
of smaller elements. The global configuration (e.g., large letter ‘E’) either matched (e.g., small 
letter ‘E’s) or differed (e.g., small letter ‘F’s) from the local elements from which it was 
comprised. The matching-to-sample task’s response set contained an identical match to the 
sample or a foil that differed in its global pattern, its local elements, or its global and local 
features. Both species of monkeys displayed a local precedence, showing significantly higher 
performance rates when stimuli matched on their local elements in comparison to when only 
their global features matched. These results were consistent with previous research (see above), 
and established the perceptual processing style of monkeys, a processing style that might impact 
how they perceive complex visual arrays, such as geometric visual illusions. 
8.2 The Delboeuf Illusion 
An important illusion to this program of research was the Delboeuf illusion, in which a 
central dot is overestimated when encircled by a small ring relative to the same sized dot 
encircled by a large ring (Delboeuf, 1865). I was interested in this illusion for several reasons. 
First, we previously documented evidence of the Delboeuf illusion in a food-choice task in 
chimpanzees (Parrish & Beran, 2014a). When discriminating round foods on round plates 
(mimicking central dots encircled by rings), chimpanzees were proficient in selecting the larger 
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of two foods if plate size was identical. However, if plate size differed, chimpanzees preferred an 
equal portion (or sometimes even a smaller portion) placed on a small plate relative to one places 
on a large plate. These results were reflective of the context in which the Delboeuf illusion 
occurs, as had been documented among humans using a similar food choice paradigm (Van 
Ittersum & Wansink, 2012).  
Previous comparative work revealed negative evidence for the highly similar 
Ebbinghaus-Titchener illusion among baboons (Parron & Fagot, 2007), which occurs when a 
central dot is overestimated in size when surrounded by small circles relative to an identical dot 
surrounded by large circles (Ebbinghaus, 1902). When presented with the Ebbinghaus-Titchener 
illusion, baboons accurately discriminated central dot size even in the presence of the outer 
illusory circles, leading the authors to argue that perhaps the neural substrate necessary for 
perceiving this illusion was lacking among Old World monkeys, instead evolving late in the 
primate lineage. This hypothesis was supported by a reversed Ebbinghaus-Titchener illusion 
documented in pigeons (Columba livia: Nakamura, Watanabe, & Fujita, 2008) and adult 
chickens (Gallus gallus domesticus: Nakamura, Watanabe, & Fujita, 2014). Complicating the 
question, however, is the finding that various non-primate species have shown evidence of 
perceiving the illusion as humans do, including a dolphin (Tursiops truncates: Murayama, Usui, 
Takeda, Kato, & Maejima, 2012), chicks (Gallus gallus domesticus: Rosa Salva, Rugani, 
Cavazzana, Regolin, Vallortigara, 2013), and redtail splitfin fish (Xenotoca eiseni: Sovrano, 
Albertazzi, & Rosa Salva, 2015).  
These discrepant findings for the Ebbinghaus-Titchener illusion among nonhuman 
animals and the positive evidence for the Delboeuf illusion among chimpanzees warranted 
additional comparative investigations among different species. Thus, in Chapter 3, I assessed the 
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Delboeuf illusion in rhesus macaques and capuchin monkeys. I was interested in whether these 
monkey species also might perceive this illusion in the way great apes and humans do, or if 
instead they might show patterns similar to Parron and Fagot’s (2007) investigation of the highly 
similar Ebbinghaus-Titchener illusion with a monkey species (baboons). In a computerized 
relative discrimination task, monkeys were proficient in selecting the larger of two dots in 
control trials (identical ring size). But, monkeys displayed a reversed illusion in critical test trials 
(different-sized rings) relative to human participants presented with an identical task. Both 
monkey species chose the dot surrounded by a large ring as larger than a dot surrounded by a 
small ring.  
Although these results suggested that monkeys perceived the Delboeuf illusion in an 
opposite manner from humans, I was concerned that these results were instead driven by a bias 
towards selecting the dot that was encircled by a large ring. This bias would result in the same 
pattern of results, disguising itself as a difference in illusion perception. To eliminate the concern 
that monkeys relied on outer ring size during the relative discrimination, I presented a 
classification task in which monkeys had to assign dot size as ‘small’ or ‘large’ on each trial. 
Because only one dot was ever presented at a time, monkeys no longer could select the larger of 
two rings in a given trial. Here, there was evidence of the Delboeuf illusion in both species of 
monkeys as it manifested in human adults, with dot classification varying as a function of outer 
ring size (large rings led to dot underestimation and small rings led to dot overestimation).  
Despite monkeys’ local precedence, the Delboeuf illusion emerged when monkeys were 
given a paradigm that reduced the likelihood of response bias to include inducer elements into 
target discrimination. A response bias of this nature may be increased in non-verbal species, in 
which one must rely on training procedures to instruct the subject to the target of interest in a 
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multi-element visual array. Biases of this type might further be enhanced in species that process 
stimuli at the local level prior to the global level. Thus, local processors likely first attend to the 
most salient feature of a complex array, which, in the case of the Delboeuf illusion, was the outer 
ring. Methods that reduce the possibility of a reliance on inducer elements during target 
discrimination, such as the classification task in Chapter 3, will be important in assessing 
geometric illusions in nonverbal species. Given the positive evidence of the Delboeuf illusion in 
monkeys in Chapter 3, I turned my attention to the Ebbinghaus-Titchener illusion, now equipped 
with a methodology that reduced a response bias to include outer inducers into target 
discrimination. 
8.3 The Elusive Ebbinghaus-Titchener Illusion 
In Chapter 4, I introduced the Ebbinghaus-Titchener illusion to human participants, rhesus 
monkeys, and capuchin monkeys using a computerized classification task as described above for 
Chapter 3. As predicted, humans misperceived central dot size as a function of inducer size, 
overestimating dots surrounded by small circles and underestimating dots surrounded by large 
circles. However, rhesus and capuchin monkeys did not show evidence of the illusion. The 
monkeys displayed a response bias to classify central dot size according to inducing circle size in 
pilot work. In an attempt to eliminate this bias, I introduced a blocked-presentation style that 
presented only one trial type at a time for a set of 3,000 trials (Baseline – no inducers, Small 
Inducer – small inducing circles, or Large Inducer – large inducing circles). This approach 
eliminated the ability to discriminate each trial exclusively by inducer size, as all trials within a 
testing session (or across several testing sessions) presented the same trial type. The blocked 
presentation was successful in eliminating the response bias to a degree.  
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When some monkeys no longer classified central dot size according to inducer size, I 
documented an interesting pattern of results. Although an effect of level was observed for all trial 
types (i.e., subjects classified central dots as a function of true dot size), the function was 
shallower for the Large Inducer trials. This performance pattern can be accounted for if one 
simply considers the total amount of pixilation on screen for each trial type. The proportion 
increase in pixel number between levels of central dot size was smallest between levels in the 
Large Inducer trials relative to Small Inducer and Baseline trials. Thus, it would have been most 
difficult to discriminate pixel number in the Large Inducer condition if one was taking into 
account both targets and inducers into the size discrimination.  Discriminating set size becomes 
more difficult as the difference between sets is reduced, which was truest for the Large Inducer 
condition (see Brannon & Roitman, 2003; Gallistel & Gelman, 2000). Crucially, an animal using 
such a rule would not perceive the illusion because it would be assessing the total size of the 
array, rather than simply the size of the target. I also introduced the Ebbinghaus-Titchener 
illusion to chimpanzees in a two-choice food discrimination task in which round foods were 
encircled by inedible inducers of variable size (either large or small circles). Regardless of 
inducer size, chimpanzees accurately selected the larger of the two food portions across control 
and test trial types.  
Despite positive evidence of the Delboeuf illusion in Chapter 3 (see Parrish & Beran, 
2014a; Parrish et al., 2015), the Ebbinghaus-Titchener illusion did not emerge among these same 
species in Chapter 4. Rather, it appeared that the Ebbinghaus-Titchener illusion introduced a 
unique challenge in instructing nonverbal animals to the target of interest (central dot) when 
displayed amongst nearly identical inducer circles (also black dots). Although the blocked-
presentation style corrected some monkeys’ bias towards classifying dot size according to outer 
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inducer size, it did not completely eliminate the bias. Instead, the animals shifted towards using 
entire array size into dot classification (target and inducers combined). This approach resulted in 
high performance levels across all conditions (albeit slightly lower performance patterns for 
Large Inducer trials), but did not circumvent the issue of inducer-inclusion into target 
discrimination.  
It is interesting to note the difference between strategies that mediated the bias to include 
inducers into target discrimination for the highly similar Delboeuf and Ebbinghaus-Titchener 
illusions. Simply eliminating the ability to select the larger of two inducers (i.e., rings) by 
transforming the problem set from a relative discrimination to an absolute classification was 
successful for reducing the bias in the Delboeuf illusion. Further, a rule of using total pixel 
amount cannot account for the Delboeuf results among monkeys, as monkeys underestimated 
central dot size to a progressively greater degree with progressively larger rings. Thus, such a 
rule (classify based on total pixel amount) would have resulted in an opposite pattern of results 
than was documented. My prediction that a similar approach to the Ebbinghaus-Titchener 
illusion would be successful in eliciting the illusion among monkeys did not hold. Instead, the 
monkeys persisted in a response bias to incorporate inducers into the target classification despite 
additional attempts to eliminate this bias (i.e., blocked presentation of trial type). There appears 
to be fundamental differences in the Delboeuf and Ebbinghaus-Titchener illusions, at least in so 
far as the interaction between target and inducers. Specifically, the relative size of target to 
inducers is more discrepant for the Ebbinghaus-Titchener illusion (i.e., inducers comprise an 
overall larger amount of the array) than the Delboeuf illusion in which the central dot is the 
larger and more salient stimulus. In the next chapter, I introduced the Baldwin illusion, which 
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was a third geometric size illusion to explore further the interaction between target and inducer 
stimuli. 
8.4 The Baldwin Array: Not All Illusions are Equally Perceived 
In Chapter 5, I investigated the Baldwin array, in which horizontal line length is 
underestimated when flanked by large squares and overestimated when flanked by small squares 
(Baldwin, 1895). Using a classification task, monkeys were trained to assign a horizontal line as 
‘short’ or ‘long;’ sometimes this line was flanked by small or large squares. Similar to the 
response bias shown in the Ebbinghaus-Titchener illusion, most monkeys demonstrated a bias to 
incorporate inducer squares into line length classification, classifying lines flanked by large 
squares as ‘long’ and lines flanked by small squares as ‘short.’ Using an extended training 
procedure, I isolated the target of interest in a follow-up experiment to decrease this response 
bias. Squares were presented first at the edges of the computer screen and were moved 
progressively closer to the line to isolate the target while maintaining exposure to the inducing 
squares. Following this extended training procedure, I found more promising evidence of the 
Baldwin illusion, with monkeys showing less response bias and a trend towards human-like 
illusion perception among some animals.   
Taken together, these findings revealed that not all illusions are equally experienced. The 
Delboeuf, Ebbinghaus-Titchener, and Baldwin illusions are geometric size illusions that emerge 
due to contrast and assimilation.  Contrast results in the underestimation of target stimuli when 
the differences between target and inducers are exaggerated and they are perceived as distinct 
entities (Weintraub, Wilson, & Greene, & Palmquist, 1969). When the target and inducers are 
similar in size and/or are proximally positioned, stimuli are pooled in the visual system as one 
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entity (Morinaga, 1956). This phenomenon, also known as assimilation, results in the 
overestimation of inner target size relative to a proximal or smaller target.  
Despite the similarity in mechanism and kind, these illusions are qualitatively different in 
the makeup of target and inducer elements. As mentioned, the target is the most salient feature 
within the Delboeuf array, whereas the inducers are the most salient feature within the 
Ebbinghaus-Titchener and Baldwin arrays. This difference in inducer quality appears to be key 
in whether nonhuman animals first orient to the target or inducer stimuli, which ultimately can 
lead to illusion emergence or a response bias. Furthermore, local processors perceive individual 
elements within the array prior to the cohesive unit, which likely enhances response bias towards 
particularly salient inducing stimuli. Thus, it is apparent that the focus within an array 
differentially impacts whether illusions are perceived. This focus is determined by processing 
style, but also may be directed through manipulations of attention as explored in the next section. 
8.5 Modulation of Attention 
Previous human work has demonstrated that attentional focus within a visual array has a 
direct impact on the emergence and magnitude of visual illusions (e.g., Daini & Wenderoth, 
2008; Gardner & Long, 1961; Jordan & English, 1989; Lester & Dassonville, 2011; Predebon, 
2004). A focus on the target stimulus decreases illusion magnitude, whereas a focus on the 
illusory-inducing context increases the magnitude of an illusion (e.g., Coren & Girgus, 1972; 
Ebert & Pollack, 1972, 1973; Gardner & Long, 1961; Predebon, 2004; Restle, 1971; Weintraub 
& Cooper, 1972). In the previous chapters, I designed methodologies to reduce enhanced 
attention towards either the target or inducer stimuli as this has led to a non- or reversed-illusion 
among nonverbal species, as one runs the risk of training participants to ignore the illusory 
context (e.g., Nakamura et al., 2008, 2014; Parron & Fagot, 2007). Further, a key difference in 
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the design of Chapter 6 concerned how attention was manipulated relative to other studies 
investigating attentional influences on illusion emergence. Past research exclusively directed 
attention when the figure of interest was visually present. For example, researchers instructed 
participants to focus on certain aspects of a figure as they were viewing the figure, or featural 
changes (e.g., color, density, etc.) were manipulated within the array itself.  
I tested the bounds of attentional control in Chapter 6 by investigating whether attention 
could be manipulated prior to viewing the illusory array via an interleaved task paradigm. Here, 
I examined whether one could create carryover effect between two tasks with highly similar 
stimuli, one of which presented a visual illusion and the other that presented inducer or target 
stimuli from the illusory array in a separate task. Whether a carryover effect of attention was 
possible in this scenario would increase our understanding of how illusions emerge, including 
how robust they are in the face of competing (and perhaps complementary) information. 
Participants were presented with the Baldwin array using a perceptual classification task, 
assigning horizontal lines as ‘short’ or ‘long’ that were presented alone or flanked by either small 
or large squares. A series of primary tasks were introduced prior to the classification task that 
contained either the Baldwin target (lines) or Baldwin squares (inducers). Illusion magnitude was 
robust, but not differentially impacted by the interleaved tasks presenting either the target or 
inducers of the Baldwin array. Although attention plays an important role in illusion emergence, 
manipulating attention prior to perceiving the illusory array was ineffective in mediating or 
increasing the magnitude of the Baldwin illusion. Of course, there may be influences of 
attentional carryover within geometric illusions that are less readily perceived than the Baldwin 
illusion or within populations that less-readily perceive geometric illusions. For example, locally 
processing monkeys may perceive illusions to a greater degree via an interleaved task paradigm 
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that presents target stimuli in a secondary task that is completed in conjunction with the illusion 
task.  
8.6 Deconstructing Illusion Perception 
The current research has demonstrated that perceptual processing mode and top-down 
modulation of attention shape and even constrain the perception of complex visual arrays, such 
as geometric illusions. Thus, it seems that illusory phenomena are the consequence of bottom-up 
processes that provide basic sensory stimuli to the perceptual system from the external world 
(see Gibson, 1979) and top-down contributions from our existing cognitions and experiences 
(see Neisser, 1976). I have demonstrated that certain methodological approaches can transcend 
these constraints within monkeys (local processors), providing a scaffold for the cohesive 
processing of complex stimuli. But, there are likely limits in the modulation of attention, as 
demonstrated in the interleaved task paradigm in Chapter 6. To understand why processing mode 
and attention play supporting roles in illusion perception, one must consider the role of executive 
functioning and neural organization.  
Research with Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) populations highlights this delicate 
interplay. Three hallmark perceptual features characterize ASD, including enhanced local 
processing of details, reduced global processing and an inability to ignore contextual 
information, and reduced motion perception (for a review, see Dakin & Frith, 2005). 
Subsequently, children with ASD reveal compromised illusion perception relative to typically 
developing children and adults (e.g., Happé, 1996; Happé, Briskman, & Frith, 2001) and an 
increased performance in tasks favoring local processing (i.e., visual search, O’Riordan, 2004; 
O’Riordan, Plaisted, Driver, & Baron-Cohen, 2001; featural detection, Jolliffe & Baron-Cohen, 
1997; Shah & Frith, 1983).  
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Several hypotheses have been put forth to account for global versus local processing 
among various human populations and different species. First, the right hemisphere has been 
deemed key in global processing whereas the left hemisphere is responsible for local processing. 
Neural research with split brain and lesion patients reveals an increased ability to perceive and 
recreate the global configuration of visual images by the right hemisphere and an increase in 
local processing by the left hemisphere (Bogen, 1969; Delis, Robertson, & Effron, 1986; 
Kimura, 1966, 1973). Further, evidence for abnormalities in the right hemisphere in ASD 
populations has been reported as partially responsible for enhanced local processing (McKelvey, 
Lambert, Mottron, & Shevell, 1995; Waiter, Williams, Murray, Gilchrist, Perrett, & Whiten, 
2005). Additional works suggests that an increase in the development of low-level perceptual 
operations leads to local processing whereas higher visual areas control global processing (e.g., 
Mottron & Burack, 2001). Comparative research complements these neural signatures in 
processing style. Hopkins (1997) reported evidence for a left hemisphere-advantage for 
processing local elements of hierarchical, compound stimuli in chimpanzees. These results were 
consistent with human research (e.g., Martin, 1979; Sergent, 1982; Van Kleek, 1989), suggesting 
homologous cerebral lateralization with chimpanzees and humans.  
Neural research also suggests that top-down attentional processes play an important role 
in global cohesion of complex visual stimuli. For example, reduced brain connectivity among 
ASD populations leads to a lack of synchrony of neural activity that is necessary for global 
processing (Brock, Brown, Boucher, & Rippon, 2002; Frith, 2004; Just, Cherkassky, Keller, & 
Minshew, 2004). Crucially, reduced connectivity and a reduction in white matter yield 
compromised top-down attentional processes that are key in perceiving complex stimuli (Just et 
al., 2004). Relatedly, research on executive functioning reveals general discrimination capacities 
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(e.g., distinguishing line length, circle size, etc.) are higher among participants with high 
working memory capacity in typically developing adults. These results are attributed to an 
increase in attentional control and rule maintenance within these individuals (R. Engle, personal 
communication). The ability to attend to the appropriate features within a complex visual array, 
the inhibition of responses to the illusory context, and the maintenance of task rules are 
necessary components within illusion perception. 
Thus, establishing when, why and who perceives visual illusions ultimately requires a 
broad approach that accounts for basic perceptual mechanisms, the role of executive function, 
and methodological design. Doing so is best served through a comparative approach that extends 
beyond WEIRD populations (Western, educated, industrialized, rich, and democratic; Henrich, 
Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010) and considers performance by different species, populations, age 
groups, and cultures. Comparative approaches that incorporate nonhuman primates are especially 
valuable in that one can sample different processing styles among closely related-species. 
Further, primates experienced a massive radiation in brain size relative to (most) other mammals, 
accompanied by complementary increases in executive functioning and global processing across 
the Order Primates. The great apes have larger brains than Old World monkeys, many of whom 
have larger brains than most New World monkeys, a pattern that is complementary to the extent 
of higher executive functions across these species (e.g., Rilling & Insel, 1999; Rumbaugh & 
Pate, 1984). Comparing different primate species offers appropriate models to test the role of 
these critical players in illusion emergence.  
8.7 Translational Illusions: Decision Errors in Food Choice 
Beyond the basic cognitive science underlying visual illusions, there remains the question 
of translational impact in studying and understanding these phenomena. Because illusions are 
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rare by nature, how might they impact everyday judgments and decision-making? Should we 
expect them to pervade our everyday experiences, or instead be constrained to the psychological 
laboratory and textbook? Recently, geometric size illusions have garnered the interest of 
decision-making scientists, nutritionists, and economists. For example, the Delboeuf illusion has 
contributed to our understanding of decisional biases in the food choice and consumption 
domain, leading to the recently popularized ‘small plate movement’ (e.g., DiSantis, Birch, 
Davey, Serrano, Zhang, Bruton, & Fisher, 2013; Parrish & Beran, 2014a; Van Ittesum & 
Wansink, 2012).  
Akin to central dots encircled by an outer ring, round food portions on circular 
dinnerware impact food quantity judgments such that people underestimate portions on large 
plates and overestimate portions on small plates. Misjudgments of food quantity have direct 
impacts on serving and consumption behavior, which subsequently impacts our dietary health. 
Obesity, diabetes, and heart disease play a critical role in the health disparities within the United 
States and throughout much of the industrialized world (e.g., Allison, Fontaine, Manson, 
Stevens, & VanItallie, 1999; Calle, Rodriguez, Walker-Thurmond, & Thun, 2003; Rolls, 2003). 
Thus, understanding the cognitive mechanisms that contribute to quantity misjudgment and 
subsequent overconsumption is critical to long-term health and wellbeing. However, much work 
remains in directly connecting perceptual illusions and decisional biases, and the connections 
between these areas may be tenuous and fragile in some cases. Other researchers have suggested 
that food choice biases may not be so easily related to simple perceptual phenomena (e.g., 
Robinson et al., 2015), and so there is great need to continue to examine choice behavior, 
perceptual experiences, and their interplay across contexts. 
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My research interests have centered on understanding the contextual contributions that 
impact perceived quantity and size of stimuli such as food sets. In an earlier study, we explored 
whether dishware size might influence chimpanzee food choice behavior to determine the role of 
cultural effects on overconsumption (e.g., ‘clear your plate’) versus perceptual mechanisms that 
lead to an over-contribution of context (e.g., plate size) on quantity judgments. It was observed 
that chimpanzee quantity judgments were directly influenced by plate size, leading to a bias for a 
small plate over a large plate when presented with equal portions and some errors in food 
judgments, selecting a small food portion when it was plated on a small plate relative to a larger 
portion on a large plate (Parrish & Beran, 2014a). Despite a growing body of evidence for food 
perception biases as a function of the context in which portions are presented among humans 
(e.g., DiSantis et al., 2013; Van Ittesum & Wansink, 2012; Wansink, Payne, & Werle, 2008 
Wansink & Van Ittersum, 2013; Wansink, Van Ittersum, & Payne 2014) and animals (Beran, 
Evans, & Harris, 2008; Boysen, Berntson, & Mukobi, 2001; Parrish & Beran, 2014a, 2014b), 
there has been virtually no work investigating whether actual perception of the 2-dimensional 
Delboeuf illusion correlates with food choice behavior in a 3-dimensional setting within the 
same participants.  
In Chapter 7, I examined this relationship by testing preschool children on the 2-
dimensional Delboeuf illusion via a computerized method of adjustment task and a food 
judgment task. Children were presented with two dots of different sizes and were instructed to 
adjust one dot in size (increasing or decreasing its diameter) until it matched the second dot on 
screen. Children’s performance reflected the standard illusion, with children underestimating 
(and thus over-adjusting) dot size when encircled by a large ring and overestimating (and thus 
under-adjusting) dot size when encircled by a small ring. Interestingly, children did not 
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demonstrate the Delboeuf illusion in the 3-dimensional food choice task in which they were 
presented with round foods on different sized plates. Several factors may have influenced the 
null results in the food-choice task, including speeded response times and motivational factors.  
Ultimately, the degree to which these children perceived the 2-dimensional Delboeuf 
illusion using psychophysical procedures did not predict whether they also were more or less 
likely to fall prey to the same biases in a food-choice task. Whether this relationship (or lack 
thereof) holds as executive function and attentional skill develop across the lifespan remains to 
be explored. Finding such an effect, if it exists, might be more likely in older age groups or under 
different circumstances. Secondarily, the role of culture and the increase in experiences choosing 
among food options among different contexts likely solidify these decisional biases. In a recent 
comparative study, we documented an age effect in which older children (> 53 months) 
perceived the Solitaire illusion more consistently than younger children and monkeys (Parrish, 
Agrillo, Perdue, & Beran, 2016). This age effect suggested that human-unique perceptual 
experiences with the world (i.e., experiences making quantity judgments, development of 
executive functions, maturation of Gestalt principles) play an important role in the emergence of 
the Solitaire illusion (and possibly others) in human adults. Future research exploring the 
relationship between 2-dimensional illusion perception and 3-dimensional decisional biases 
across development will address these questions, as will a broader assessment of other contexts 
in which illusory features may or may not affect choice behavior. 
8.8 Concluding Thoughts and Future Directions 
Visual illusions emerge as a byproduct of an otherwise functional and efficient system, 
providing a window into the inner workings of perception within and across species, populations, 
and across the lifespan. Crucially, our perceptions are relative – relative to the context in which 
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we are viewing a stimulus or event, what we have just experienced, and what we might 
experience next. As demonstrated throughout this dissertation, illusions emerge as a byproduct of 
perceptual mechanisms (such as grouping principles). Figure 1 presents an overview of factors 
influencing the emergence of illusory phenomena. Specifically, illusions manifest differently 
across species and human development as a function of processing mode (global versus local) 
and attentional control, and may be impacted by working memory capacity. Decisional biases 
appear to be contingent upon experience and motivation, including food type and prepotency of 
rewards.  
Further, external factors such as illusory array design and testing paradigm directly 
impact illusion perception. Array design, as defined by the relationship between inducer and 
target elements within an illusory array, directly impacts illusion perception. Response 
competition may emerge if the size of the illusory array is too heavily weighted towards inducing 
stimuli, such that the inducers are the more salient element within the array relative to the target 
stimulus. Relationships of this nature between inducer and target stimuli create a unique 
challenge within comparative and developmental work in that the task rule (i.e., “discriminate 
target amongst inducers”) must be supported by stimuli design and presentation, task style, and 
training protocols. For example, task designs that increase focus on target features (i.e., method 
of adjustment, absolute classification, etc.) may assist in decreasing response biases to 
incorporate inducers into target discrimination. Thus, the manner in which illusions are presented 
to pre- and non-verbal species and populations can constrain or perhaps create a scaffold for 
illusory perception. In my work, these methodological challenges proved to be especially true for 
local processors (e.g., monkeys) that first perceive the individual elements within an array prior 
to the global figure.  
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Future work that extends illusion perception to other classes of stimuli (e.g., numerosity 
illusions) will shed light on the circumstances under which perception ‘goes awry’ across species 
and the processes that lead to such misperceptions. Further, between-subjects designs that 
investigate the role of individual differences (i.e., differences in working memory, attention span, 
processing style) are vital in determining the role of top-down versus bottom-up processes in 
illusion perception. Understanding these individual differences will provide predictive power to 
the study of perceptual illusions. Within-subjects designs that investigate the emergence of 
different types of illusions within the same individuals (and across the lifespan within the same 
participant) will be key in determining when and why seemingly similar illusions (such as the 
Delboeuf and Ebbinghaus-Titchener illusions) are perceived differently. More broadly, I am 
interested in the extent to which context impacts choice behavior beyond geometric illusions, 
including the extension of context across time and space (e.g., as manipulated via the interleaved 
task paradigm). Ultimately, deepening our understanding of how context influences perception 
and choice, and disentangling what is unique in human perception versus the perceptual 
experiences of other species and across the lifespan, will shed light on how we see and 
subsequently interact with our world.  
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8.10 Figures 
 
Figure 1.  An overview of the factors impacting visual illusion emergence and decisional biases, 
including species, age, task design (i.e., paradigm and array design) and internal factors (i.e., processing 
style, attention, executive functions such as working memory, experience, and motivation). Each of 
these factors may also interact with each other, and future research could illustrate those 
interconnections and provide a clearer model of the degree to which each factor causes illusions and 
biases. 
 
 
